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ABSTRACT 
 




My dissertation offers a critique of the concept of authenticity that Martin Heidegger 
develops in Being and Time. The concept of authenticity has been critiqued for many 
reasons—mainly for political, moral, and ideological reasons. My dissertation develops, 
on the other hand, a conceptual critique: I argue that the concept of authenticity is a 
paradoxical concept. I argue, more precisely, that it is paradoxical, as the concept of 
authenticity proposes, for a person to confront, transparently and determinedly, his or her 
own death, while, at the same time, being able to be an individual—understanding him or 
herself as an individual, and making autonomous choices. In offering this critique, I 
provide interpretations of some of the basic concepts in Being and Time that break from 
conventional interpretations or are new. For example, I interpret the concept of 
inauthenticity from the perspective of the psychoanalytic idea of mania. Ultimately, 
however, I provide philosophical, or conceptual reasons to resist a concept with clearly 
problematic moral and political implications. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation offers a critique of the concept of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) that 
Martin Heidegger develops in Being and Time.1 I will claim that the concept of 
authenticity is paradoxical. The concept of authenticity brings together two phenomena, 
and in a peculiar way. On the one hand, according to the concept of authenticity, the 
authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of death. On the other hand, the 
authentic person anticipates his individuality. And, according to the concept of 
authenticity, the authentic person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death and 
his anticipation of his individuality are identical to one another. For the authentic person 
to anticipate the authentic experience of death is for him to anticipate his individuality. 
The paradox is this: the two anticipations that the concept of authenticity identifies with 
one another are incompatible with one another. If a person anticipates the authentic 
experience of death, then he is not, in that anticipation, able to anticipate his 
individuality. For this reason, however, by identifying these two anticipations, a paradox 
is found at the heart of the concept of authenticity. 
 In this introduction, I will give a preliminary account of the concept of 
authenticity and the paradox that emerges at its heart. The foregoing description of the 
concept and its paradox is inadequate, of course, because it is composed of the 
sophisticated and not at all straightforward concepts that Heidegger develops in Being 
and Time—anticipation, the authentic experience of death, individuality, among others. I """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 Page citations will be to Martin Heidegger, Being and Time [hereafter BT], trans. Joan 
Stambaugh (State University of New York Press, 1996) and, in brackets, Sein und Zeit (Max 
Niemeyer Verlag, 2006). Occasional reference will be made to Macquarrie and Robinson’s 
translation [hereafter BT/MR], Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(Harper & Row, 1962).  
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therefore will (1) give a brief overview of those concepts, in order to give an initial 
picture of the concept of authenticity and its paradox. I will also (2) look at a critique of 
Heidegger’s concept of authenticity with which my own critique shares certain features; I 
will point out how the critique that I offer in this dissertation is distinct from that critique. 
Finally, I will (3) give an outline of the plan of this dissertation. 
 
1. The concept of authenticity and its paradox 
I will here, then, try to bring into view the concept of authenticity and its paradox. For 
this, it is necessary to look at the basic concepts in which, in Being and Time, it is 
involved. I can note here that, in many of the following chapters in this dissertation, I will 
be offering interpretations of these basic concepts—for example, the concept of care 
(chapter 3) and the concept of death (chapter 5). I will also give a comprehensive 
interpretation of the concept of authenticity itself (chapter 6). This discussion will 
therefore be introductory and provisional, in the sense that not all of the relevant features 
of the concepts to be discussed will be addressed; questions that may arise in relation to 
them will be deferred to later chapters; and I will anticipate many of the conclusions at 
which, in later chapters, I will arrive.  
 For Heidegger, authenticity does not indicate what it might at first indicate in 
common English—the genuineness of an object, over against its simulacra; a “real thing” 
as opposed to a “fake thing.” The reason for this is that, for Heidegger, authenticity is not 
a qualification of objects or things. In Being and Time, Heidegger makes a basic 
distinction in relation to the ontological character of different kinds of beings. The 
“ontological” character of beings, however, does not indicate, for Heidegger, the “ontic” 
$"
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character of beings.2 Whereas the ontic character of beings is what they are in terms of 
their particular properties—a particular table has four legs, is brown, and so on—the 
ontological character of beings is how they are insofar as they are. Therefore, the 
ontological character of a table will not be comprised by its particular properties, but 
rather by how the table is, insofar as it is. In Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes 
three kinds of these ontological ways of being among beings: “presence-at-hand” 
(Vorhandenheit), “readiness-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit), and existence (Existenz).  
For a being to have the ontological character of readiness-to-hand, means that it 
can be used, or is available; in human beings’ practical activity, it can perform some kind 
of function in order to carry out some kind of work.3 For a being to have the ontological 
character of presence-at-hand, means that the properties that it possesses it possesses 
presently—they are fully present in it. Thus a particular table has four legs and is brown. 
But as present-at-hand, this possession of four legs, and this brownness, are fully present 
in it: the table is, presently, four-legged and brown. Finally, for a being to have the 
ontological character of Existenz, means that what it is, it is possibly. In other words, a 
being which exists is not what it is in terms of what it presently is, but rather in terms of 
what it possibly is. What it possibly is Heidegger calls its “possibilities” (Möglichkeiten). 
These possibilities, however, are not modal or categorial possibilities—in other words, 
what is possible for a being to be insofar as what it possibly could be is not be 
inconsistent with what is the case or with what is known to be true. Rather, these 
possibilities are a being’s abilities: what a being is able to be, through, for example, the 
exercise of its practical understanding, its use of worldly beings in its world, and its """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2 BT, 10 ff. [12 ff.]. 
3 BT, 67 [71].  
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pursuit of some kind of self.4 Heidegger therefore uses the term “ability-to-be” 
(Seinkönnen) coextensively with “existence.”5 A doctor who exists is a doctor in the 
sense that he is able to be a doctor. And, indeed, it should be clear that the particular 
being whose ontological character is that of existence is the human being. Heidegger 
refers to this being, the human being, whose being is existence, with the terminological 
designation “Dasein.” “Da-sein,” Heidegger writes, “is always its possibility.”6 Lastly, it 
should be pointed out here that, for Heidegger, the being whose being is existence, or the 
ability-to-be, is the being whose being is “care” (Sorge). Care is, for Heidegger (and I 
will return to this in the third chapter) the ontological essence of Da-sein, that is, of the 
human being. Care is, therefore, not an apprehensive concern over something, which the 
English word, but also the German Sorge, might suggest. Nor is care what Heidegger 
calls Besorgen and Fürsorge—taking care of particular worldly beings, or taking care of 
particular others; these are, for Heidegger, modalities of care, but neither is care itself. 
Rather, care, as the ontological essence of the Da-sein or the human being, is the basic 
way in which Da-sein or the human being is. Care, therefore, indicates what existence 
and the ability-to-be indicate: that the human being is what he is able to be.  
Authenticity, then, is not the authenticity of the “genuine” thing as opposed to the 
“fake” thing. If that were the case, then authenticity would characterize objects or things, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4 I will discuss further, in the third chapter, why “abilities” can be divided into these three types. 
5 William Blattner has especially stressed that, for Heidegger, the being of the human being is 
best understood as Seinkönnen, or, as he translates it, the “ability-to-be.” See William Blattner, 
Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Stambaugh (as well as 
MacQuarrie and Robinson) translates “ability-to-be” as “potentiality-of-being.” This translation is 
infelicitous, since it suggests an ontological category, that of potentiality, which, since Aristotle, 
has applied to present-at-hand objects; but Seinkönnen refers, for Heidegger, strictly and only to 
Dasein, that is, a being that is not a present-at-hand object but that exists. I will therefore, in my 
text, use Blattner’s translation. 
6 BT, 40 [42]. Stambaugh renders Heidegger’s “Dasein” as “Da-sein.” I will preserve this in 
quotations of her translation; but in my own text, I will refer to “Dasein” as “Dasein.” 
&"
"
in other words, beings whose kind of being is presence-at-hand. For Heidegger, 
authenticity always qualifies a being whose being is existence, or whose being is the 
ability-to-be, or whose being is care. Heidegger writes: 
 
Da-sein is always its possibility. It does not “have” that possibility only as a mere 
attribute of something objectively present. And because Da-sein is always 
essentially its possibility, it can “choose” itself in its being, it can win itself, it can 
lose itself, or it can never and only “apparently” win itself. It can only have lost 
itself and it can only have not yet gained itself because it is essentially possible as 
authentic…7 
 
Only a being whose being is that of existence, the ability-to-be, or care, can be authentic. 
But then what, specifically, is it for a person—a being whose being is existence, the 
ability-to-be, or care—to be authentic? As I suggested above, authenticity brings together 
two phenomena, and in a peculiar way. According to the concept of authenticity, the 
authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of death, and anticipates his 
individuality; and, for the authentic person, these two anticipations are identical to one 
another: a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is a person’s 
anticipation of his individuality. Let me look at each of these elements of the concept of 
authenticity in more detail. 
 First, the authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of death. 
Heidegger writes: 
 
Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation frees one from one’s lostness 
in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities 
lying before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically 
understood and chosen.8  
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
7 BT, 40 [42-3].  
8 BT, 244 [264].  
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But what is it to “anticipate” the authentic experience of death? And what is the 
“authentic experience of death”? I will begin with the latter first. Death (Tod), for 
Heidegger, is not organic death, or the conclusion of a person’s life. He calls these two 
kinds of death “perishing” (Verenden) and “demise” (Ableben) respectively.9 Death, 
rather, is a person’s being-toward-death (Sein zum Tode): not the event of death, but the 
way in which a person relates to his death. Heidegger therefore proposes the term 
“dying” (Sterben) as coextensive with his use of the word “death”; dying, a person is 
relating to his death.10 But it must be emphasized again that, for Heidegger, being-
toward-death is not being-toward the event of death—perishing or demise. Being-toward-
death (or just simply “death” or “dying”) means, for Heidegger, that a person’s possibility 
is impossibility. Heidegger writes that death is “the possibility of the impossibility of 
existence in general” (die [Möglichkeit] der Unmöglichkeit der Existenz überhaupt)11 and 
that death is “the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence” (die 
Möglichkeit der maßlosen Unmöglichkeit der Existenz).12 Now, the general formulation 
of death as “the possibility of the impossibility of existence” presents a number of 
difficulties, all of which I will look at in detail in the fifth chapter. Here I want only to 
offer a provisional explanation of the formulation. By “possibility,” as I suggested above, 
Heidegger means ability. And, as I will explain in more detail in the third chapter, by 
“ability” Heidegger fundamentally means a person’s projection into his abilities. 
“Projection,” (entwerfen), for Heidegger, indicates that practical skill or know-how by 
which a person is able to exercise his skills, is able to use worldly beings, and is able to """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
9 BT, 223-4 [240-1]; 229 [247].  
10 BT, 229 [247].  
11 BT, 242 [262], emphases removed. 
12 BT, 242 [262]. 
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pursue a possible kind of self. By projecting, a person is able: he exercises his skills, he 
uses worldly beings, and he pursues a possible kind of self. Death, then, is a person’s 
projection—he projects into abilities. But as the “possibility of impossibility,” death is 
that projection in which that into which a person projects is his impossibility. This 
“impossibility” must be understood, however, in the same non-modal or non-categorial 
way as “possibility”: it therefore does not indicate that some state of affairs is not 
consistent with what is the case, or with what is known to be true. “Impossibility” 
indicates that a person does not have any particular abilities. The “possibility of 
impossibility” therefore means that a person projects, or projects into abilities, but in this 
way: that he projects into no particular abilities. 
 Death is a person’s projection into no particular abilities. However, for Heidegger, 
this projection into no particular abilities can be experienced. I will, in the fifth chapter, 
discuss in detail the sense in which death can be experienced; I will here only give an 
initial presentation of the sense in which it can be experienced. For Heidegger, a person is 
always dying: it is always the case that he is projecting into no particular abilities. 
“Factically,” Heidegger writes, “one’s own Da-sein is always already dying, that is, it is 
in a being-toward-its-end.”13 But a person can experience his always dying in two distinct 
ways. A person can experience it authentically, or inauthentically. Inauthentically 
experiencing his death, a person, Heidegger suggests, is in a “flight” (Flucht) from death. 
In a “flight” from death, a person denies his dying: he experiences his death, not as what 
it is, but as what it is not. A person does not experience his death, in other words, as his 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
13 BT, 235 [254].  
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projection into no particular abilities, but rather “reinterpret[s] it… and veil[s] it.”14 I will, 
in the fifth chapter, consider precisely how a person “reinterprets” and “veils” his death. 
Alternatively, however, a person can experience his death authentically, or, as Heidegger 
says, can “experience” (erfahren) death in a “genuine sense” (genuinen Sinne).15 The 
authentic experience of death is that experience of death in which a person experiences it 
as what it is, namely, as the projection into no particular abilities. The authentic 
experience of death can therefore be said to be the explicit, not fleeing, experience of 
projecting into no particular abilities. 
 But what, then, is the “anticipation” of authentic experience of death? 
“Anticipation” (Vorlaufen), for Heidegger, is not merely expecting or predicting; in fact, 
Heidegger resists both these senses of the word. Expecting or predicting, Heidegger 
suggests, can only relate to events whose way of being is presence-at-hand; to expect or 
to predict is to expect or predict that something will be present.16 Anticipation, on the 
other hand, is the anticipation of something whose way of being is characterized by 
existence, the ability-to-be, or care. What is anticipated is the authentic experience of 
death: anticipation is the anticipation of death (Vorlaufen zum Tode), or the anticipation 
of a person’s authentic experience of death. Still, however, anticipating the authentic 
experience of death is not a mere awaiting of the authentic experience of death. By 
anticipating the authentic experience of death, Heidegger writes, a person does not 
“think” or “brood” over it (denken and bedenken).17 Rather, by anticipating the authentic 
experience of death, a person courageously, determinedly, and transparently seizes it. In """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14 BT, 235 [254].  
15 BT, 222 [239].  
16 BT, 242 [262].  
17 BT, 241 [261].  
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the anticipation of the authentic experience of death, Heidegger writes, “[t]he more 
clearly this possibility is understood, the more purely does understanding penetrate to it 
as the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general.”18 Whereas “anticipation” is 
Stambaugh’s (as well as MacQuarrie and Robinson’s) translation of “Vorlaufen,” other 
translations that can be given for “anticipation” are “forerunning” or “running up into.” 
Whereas these translations are, I believe, inadequate because they must only be 
understood metaphorically, they nevertheless capture the dimension of the transparent 
and determined seizure of the authentic experience of death that Heidegger means to 
evoke by Vorlaufen zum Tode. In anticipating the authentic experience of death, a person 
seizes, runs up into, his explicit experience of projecting into no particular abilities. 
 Second, however, according to the concept of authenticity, the authentic person 
anticipates his individuality. To restrict myself to the quote I gave above:  
 
Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation frees one from one’s lostness 
in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities 
lying before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically 
understood and chosen.19  
 
A person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is also a person’s 
anticipation of his authentic understanding of his own factical abilities, and, even more, 
his own factical abilities which are “lying before” that death. Furthermore, a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death is a person’s anticipation of choosing 
those abilities, which he understands to be factical, and lying before his death. I will give, 
in the sixth chapter, a full discussion of the “individuality” that is anticipated by the 
authentic person; here I wish only to give an initial sense of what it is.  """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
18 BT, 242 [262].  
19 BT, 244 [264].  
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By anticipating his abilities in such a way that those abilities are understood to be 
factical, and to be lying before death, a person anticipates his abilities in such a way that 
they are understood to be individual. For they are, according to Heidegger’s 
understanding of “facticity” (Faktizität) (which I will also describe fully in the fourth and 
sixth chapters), understood to be those abilities by which a person is, as the particular 
individual he is, constituted.20 And they are, as anticipated as lying before death, 
understood to be what Heidegger calls a “whole” (Ganze),21 and, as a whole, constitutes a 
person in his limited, particular, individuality.  
Additionally, a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is his 
anticipation of his ability to choose, and, indeed, his ability to make individual choices. 
As I will explain in the sixth chapter, in anticipating the authentic experience of death, a 
person is placed in the mood of anxiety (Angst), since anxiety is that mood in which 
death is authentically experienced.22 But in the mood of anxiety, a person, Heidegger 
writes, “reveals himself” as “being free for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself.” 
Even more, the anxiety experienced in the anticipation of the authentic experience of 
death “brings Da-sein before its being free for… (propensio in)…, the authenticity of its 
being…”23 In the anxious anticipation of the authentic experience of death, therefore, a 
person anticipates his ability to make individual choices. Later, I will say more about 
these individual choices. Here, however, I only want to note how this ability to make 
individual choices fills out the individuality that is anticipated by the authentic person. 
The authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of death, and anticipates his """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
20 BT, 127 [135].  
21 BT, 244 [264].  
22 BT, 245 [265]; BT, 232 [251]. 
23 BT, 176 [188].  
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individuality, in this sense: he anticipates his understanding of himself in terms of limited 
and factical abilities; and he anticipates his ability to make individual choices. 
Third, and lastly, according to the concept of authenticity, a person’s anticipation 
of the authentic experience of death, and a person’s anticipation of his individuality, are 
identical with one another. One can glimpse this identity in the quote that I have already 
provided twice: 
 
Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation frees one from one’s lostness 
in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities 
lying before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically 
understood and chosen.24  
 
In a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death, a person’s factical 
abilities, limited by death, are disclosed, so that they can first be authentically understood 
and chosen. A person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death, and a person’s 
anticipation of his individuality, are the same.  
This identity becomes even clearer if one refers to the role of anxiety in a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death and a person’s anticipation of his 
individuality. As I suggested, it is in the mood of anxiety that death is authentically 
experienced. But, for Heidegger, in anxiously anticipating the authentic experience of 
death, a person does not only experience an anxiety that explicitly discloses that a person 
projects into no particular abilities. Also, and even, at the same time, in anticipating the 




24 BT, 244 [264].  
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In [anxiety], Da-sein is taken back fully to its naked uncanniness and benumbed 
by it. But this numbness not only takes Da-sein back from its ‘worldly’ 
possibilities, but at the same time gives it the possibility of an authentic 
potentiality-of-being.25 
 
The mood of anxiety not only (nicht nur) discloses a person’s “naked uncanniness,” or, 
according to Heidegger’s understanding of “uncanniness,” the loss of worldly abilities, so 
that a person finds himself absolutely not “at home.”26 The mood of anxiety also, and, 
more precisely, at the same time (zugleich), is that mood in which a person is given the 
ability to be an individual. Or, again: 
 
Together with the sober Angst that brings us before our individualized 
potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakable joy in this possibility.27  
 
The anxiety experienced in the anticipation of the authentic experience of death is 
“sobering” because, as the mood in which a person explicitly experiences death, it attends 
to the collapse of those abilities with which a person ordinarily fills his life. As Heidegger 
says, anxiety “fetches” a person out of those embracing abilities.28 But anxiety is also, 
together with (zusammen mit) this sobriety, a mood of “unshakeable joy” (gerüstete 
Freude): it is in this that a person is also given the ability to be an individual. 
 It might be suggested that this identification of a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death and a person’s anticipation of his individuality only holds 
true, for Heidegger, in the case of a person’s anxious anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death, and that it therefore need not hold true in the case of the anticipation 
of the general, not necessarily anxious, authentic experience of death. But this suggestion 
assumes that, for Heidegger, there can be an anticipation of the authentic experience of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
25 BT, 316 [344].  
26 BT, 176 ff. [188 ff.].  
27 BT, 286 [310].  
28 BT, 176 [189]. 
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death without the mood of anxiety, which, however, is not the case.29 Heidegger neither 
equivocates about nor qualifies his identification of a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death, with a person’s anticipation of his individuality. As 
Heidegger writes, a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death “frees for 
death the possibility of gaining power over the existence of Da-sein and of basically 
dispersing every fugitive self-covering-over.”30 A person’s anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death is that anticipation by which his own self is uncovered. 
 In the seventh chapter, I will give a detailed argument about why I believe this 
concept of authenticity is paradoxical. I will, however, briefly state my claim here. As I 
suggested, a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is a person’s 
anticipation of his explicit experience of projecting into no particular abilities. However, 
as I also suggested, a person’s anticipation of his individuality is his anticipation of 
understanding himself in terms of limited and factical abilities, and making individual 
choices. This latter anticipation appears to require, however, that a person anticipates his 
projection into particular abilities: for how else could he understand himself in terms of 
limited and factical abilities, and anticipate his ability to make individual choices? But if, 
according to the concept of authenticity, a person’s anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death is a person’s anticipation of his individuality, then, according to the 
concept of authenticity, a person’s anticipation of his projection into no particular 
abilities is his anticipation of his projection into particular abilities. And this is a paradox. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
29 According to Heidegger, “thrownness into death,” or a person’s “ownmost nonrelational 
potentiality-of-being not to be bypassed”—a person’s death—is revealed “more primordially and 
penetratingly in the attunement of Angst” (BT, 232 [251]). A person authentically experiences 
death in the mood of anxiety. Or, again, “the attunement which is able to hold open the constant 
and absolute threat to itself arising from the ownmost individualized being of Da-sein is Angst” 
(BT, 245 [265]). 
30 BT, 286 [310]), emphases not added. 
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 Still, if the concept of authenticity is a paradox, this does not necessarily mean 
that it needs to be discarded, or entirely rejected. In the seventh chapter, in which I try to 
show that the concept of authenticity is paradoxical, I will therefore consider a way in 
which the concept of authenticity can be rethought, in such a way that it does not present 
a paradox. Perhaps there is a way of thinking about how we relate to our deaths, in such a 
way that we can relate to ourselves as individuals, that does not involve a simultaneous 
anticipation of the projection into no particular abilities, and the projection into particular 
abilities. 
 
2. The heroism critique of authenticity 
In the second chapter, I will review some criticisms, as well as some defenses, that the 
concept of authenticity has received in the scholarly literature. My aim will be to show 
that the kind of criticism that I offer in this dissertation has not yet been offered, and to 
show that sympathetic defenses of the concept of authenticity interpret it in such a way 
that a paradox, in it, is conspicuous. Here, however, I would like to consider one criticism 
of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity which, in many ways, resembles my own. I would 
like to indicate the way in which my criticism differs from this criticism. This criticism 
can be found in the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Simon Critchley.31 
 Levinas and Critchley have taken issue with what can be called the “heroic” view 
of death found in Being and Time. Critchley suggests that Heidegger’s concept of 
authenticity shares certain features with the idea of “tragic heroism,” especially as it was 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
31 See Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Duquesne University 
Press, 1990), and Simon Critchley, “Comedy and Finitude: Displacing the Tragic-Heroic 
Paradigm in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis,” Constellations, 6:1 (1999), 108-122, 112. 
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articulated in post-Kantian German philosophy. According to this idea of “tragic 
heroism,” the tragic hero is fated to die. However, this fatal fate, his death, is, in fact, his 
possibility of achieving his individuality. For example, Antigone wins her conscience by 
burying herself alive. This tragic heroism is not limited only to the action of tragedies. I 
can mention that, in the Romantic interpretation of Socrates, it was the identity of an 
encounter with death and an encounter with the virtuous, individual self that was 
emphasized: 
 
Perhaps [Socrates] did not imagine, however much he must have been aware of 
the true dignity both of his own character and of the cause of truth and virtue in 
which he suffered, that that character and that cause would in after ages derive 
new reverence and dignity, from the example of resolution and steadfastness 
which he set before his friends and disciples in the manner of his death.32 
 
For Critchley, this tragic heroism is fully present in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. 
“Tragic-heroic thematics of authenticity are powerfully at work”33 in Being and Time, 
Critchley writes, insofar as “through an anticipatory relation to its death, Dasein can 
freely assume its fate, its historicity, and achieve the individual union of freedom and 
necessity.”34 This conclusion agrees with how I interpreted the concept of authenticity 
just above. By anticipating the authentic experience of death, the authentic person 
anticipates his individuality; by heroically seizing his death, the authentic person 
heroically seizes himself. 
 Levinas and Critchley try to undermine this understanding of death, according to 
which a person can relate to it in such a way that, at the same time, he can achieve his 
individuality. And they undermine this understanding of death by developing their own """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
32 Friedrich von Schlegel, Lectures on the History of Literature, Ancient and Modern, Vol. I 
(William Blackwood, Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1818), 89. 
33 “Comedy and Finitude,” 111.  
34 “Comedy and Finitude,”, 111.  
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conceptions of what a person’s relation to his death genuinely is. I can point out here, 
however, that Levinas and Critchley, in writing about a person’s relation to his death, do 
not make all of the distinctions that I made above; they do not write about a person’s 
“authentic experience” of death, and do not always write about a person’s “anticipation” 
of the authentic experience of death. But if the relation to death of which they write 
resembles any of the relations to death which I have described, it is the authentic 
experience of death: it is a person’s explicit, and not fleeing, experience of death, in terms 
of what it genuinely is.  
 Levinas therefore understands the authentic experience of death as the experience 
of the other, and Critchley understands the authentic experience of death as comic 
experience. I will not, here go into the details of how, exactly, the authentic experience of 
death should be understood to be the experience of the other or comic experience: I only 
want to indicate what is essential for understanding Levinas’s and Critchley’s critique of 
Heidegger. For Levinas, the authentic experience of death is an experience in which 
 
suffering attains its purity, where there is no longer anything between us and it 
[death], [and] the supreme responsibility of this extreme assumption turns into 
supreme irresponsibility, into infancy. Sobbing is this, and precisely through this 
it announces death. To die is to return to this state of irresponsibility, to be the 
infantile shaking of sobbing.35 
 
And, for Critchley, “death is that in the face of which the subject is not able to be able.”36 
Critchley and Levinas therefore understood the authentic experience of death in a way 
that is similar to the way in which I explained the authentic experience of death above. 
To be sure, Critchley understands the authentic experience of death as an experience in 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
35 Time and the Other, 72.  
36 “Comedy and Finitude,”, 112.  
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which a person “is not able to be able,” which is different from understanding the 
authentic experience of death as an explicit experience of the fact that a person is able, 
that is, does project, but projects into no particular abilities. And Levinas, for his part, 
does not specifically understand death as projecting into no particular abilities. Still, both 
Levinas and Critchley evoke an authentic experience of death in which, as Levinas says, 
a person experiences that he is entirely irresponsible, or, as Critchley says, is unable.     
 But, for Levinas and Critchley, if the authentic experience of death is understood 
in these ways—as an experience of irresponsibility or inability—then it does not make 
sense to understand the authentic experience of death as an experience in which a person 
is able to be an individual. In other words, this understanding of death destroys the tragic-
heroic paradigm, according to which the hero, in confronting his death, “wins,” as it 
were, his individuality. As Levinas writes, in view of his understanding of the authentic 
experience of death, that authentic experience of death 
 
marks the end of the subject’s virility and heroism. The now is the fact that I am 
master, master of the possible, master of grasping the possible. Death is never 
now. When death is here, I am no longer here, not just because I am nothingness, 
but because I am unable to grasp. My mastery, my virility, my heroism as a 
subject can be neither virility nor heroism in relation to death.37 
 
And, similarly, Critchley writes, as a consequence of his understanding of the authentic 
experience of death, death “is not something that can be heroically assumed in a free 
fatefulness, but is rather something radically ungraspable, a weaker and ever-weakening 
conception of finitude.”38 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
37 Time and the Other, 72. 
38 “Comedy and Finitude,”, 112.  
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 What the criticism I offer in this dissertation shares with Levinas’s and 
Critchley’s critiques is the idea that, in a person’s relation to his death, a person cannot 
relate to himself in such a way that he can be an individual. I have been inspired by 
Levinas’s and Critchley’s work to pursue this path, even though I think that their pursuit 
of it faces certain obstacles—obstacles which are related to their understanding of the 
authentic experience of death as the experience of the other and as comic experience, 
analogies which, I believe, recreate the very problem which, in Heidegger, they mean to 
critique. There are, however, two key differences that I wish to point out between our 
respective critiques. 
 First, what I am critiquing is the identification, proposed by the concept of 
authenticity, between a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death, and a 
person’s anticipation of his individuality. As I suggested, Levinas and Critchley 
generally avoid the concept of anticipation. So there is a sense in which I am critiquing 
an entirely different problem from the one that Levinas and Critchley are critiquing, even 
if the two problems are, in a general way, similar. They are generally similar, insofar as 
both critiques consider, generally, whether a person’s relationship to death can facilitate 
a relationship to himself in which a person is an individual. But they are different in 
terms of how that relationship to death, and to a person himself, is understood.  
 Second—and this is the major difference—Levinas and Critchley both develop 
their own conceptions of the authentic experience of death, that is, they develop 
conceptions of the authentic experience of death that do not mean to present how 
Heidegger, in Being and Time, understands the authentic experience of death, or a 
person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death. They believe that, if the 
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authentic experience of death is understood in the ways that they propose, then it 
becomes clear that a person who authentically experiences death cannot, in that 
experience, be able to be an individual, or a “tragic hero.” I wish to show how a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death cannot be identified, as the concept of 
authenticity proposes, with a person’s anticipation of his individuality. But I believe that 
these two anticipations cannot be identified with one another, because of the meaning 
that Heidegger, in Being and Time, gives to them. My critique is therefore an immanent 
critique, not an external critique, of the concept of authenticity in Being and Time. I 
believe that the concept of authenticity is paradoxical; but that it is paradoxical because it 
itself articulates a paradox. In this light, the concept of authenticity, and its tragic 
heroism, self-destructs. 
 
3. The plan of this dissertation 
The plan of this dissertation is as follows. 
 Chapter 2. I will here consider some criticisms and defenses of Heidegger’s 
concept of authenticity in the scholarly literature. I aim to show that critiques have not, in 
large part, focused on the problem of a paradox in the concept of authenticity; and that 
defenses, in interpreting the concept of authenticity, give evidence to a paradox of which, 
however, they are more or less unaware.  
 Chapter 3. I will here give an interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of care, a 
concept whose meaning must be established in order adequately to understand the 
concept of authenticity. I will argue that Heidegger defines care as a structure, consisting 
in three types of abilities that belong to ontological essence of Dasein, or the human 
#+"
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being. I will also show how my interpretation of care makes sense of Heidegger’s 
ontological understanding of Dasein or the human being as, essentially, the “ability-to-
be,” or as a being whose being consists in abilities.  
 Chapter 4. I will here give an interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of 
inauthenticity, a concept whose meaning must, like that of care, be established in order to 
understand the concept of authenticity. I will resist the common interpretation according 
to which the anonymity that belongs to the inauthentic person is reducible only to the 
inauthentic person’s conformity to das Man, “the one,” “the they,” or, as I will put it, the 
impersonal crowd. I will give an interpretation according to which the inauthentic 
person’s anonymity also is explained by what I call the inauthentic person’s “existential 
mania.” As a heuristic, I will draw on the psychoanalytic understanding of mania, in 
Freud, Melanie Klein, and D.W. Winnicott. 
 Chapter 5. I will here consider some preliminary problems in the interpretation of 
Heidegger’s understanding of death. I will first consider in what sense, for Heidegger, 
death can be experienced, and in what sense death can be authentically experienced. I 
will then consider one of Heidegger’s fundamental descriptions of death—that it is the 
“possibility of impossibility.” I will discuss some of the apparent difficulties this 
formulation gives rise to, possible ways to resolve them, and the interpretation of the 
formulation that I believe is correct. 
 Chapter 6. I will here give an interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of 
authenticity. I will first look in more detail at what, for Heidegger, is involved in the 
authentic experience of death. I will then look at how, for Heidegger, the authentic person 
anticipates the authentic experience of death. And I will finally look at how, according to 
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the concept of authenticity, the authentic person anticipates his individuality, and how 
this anticipation of his individuality is identical to his anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death.  
 Chapter 7. I will here offer a critique of the concept of authenticity: I will try to 
show that it is a paradoxical concept. I will claim that a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death cannot be identified, as the concept of authenticity 
proposes, with a person’s anticipation of his individuality. I will also raise a related 
problem posed by the concept of authenticity, namely, that a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death is nonsensical. Finally, I will consider a way of rethinking 
the concept of authenticity that can relieve it of a paradox. But I will also present reasons 
why the concept of authenticity should not be rethought, so that, ultimately, from its 
paradox, there is no relief. 
##"
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Chapter 2: Critiques and Defenses of the Concept of Authenticity 
 
The concept of authenticity is one of the central concepts of Being and Time, and, 
naturally, it has given rise to much scholarly debate. The concept of authenticity has been 
attacked from a number of perspectives: primarily—and beginning in the mid-twentieth 
century—it has been attacked on account of its moral and political consequences, and its 
status as ideology. However, recently, the concept of authenticity has been defended, and 
from an equivalent variety of perspectives. It has been understood to be a version of 
Kant’s ethics of autonomy; an account of how a person can overcome a dispersed life, 
and lead a life that is coherent and integrated; and as an account of how a person achieves 
responsibility.  
 I will here give an overview of these critiques and defenses of the concept of 
authenticity. My purpose in this overview is to show how the critique of the concept of 
authenticity that I will offer in this dissertation has, on the one hand, been overlooked, 
and, on the other hand, is partially motivated. On the one hand, the moral, political, and 
ideological critiques of the concept of authenticity do not find it to be paradoxical. In 
fact, they imply that it is not paradoxical. On the other hand, the defenses of the concept 
of authenticity pose the problem of a paradox in that concept: in their elaborations of the 
concept of authenticity, that concept can be seen to be paradoxical. But these defenses 
are, more or less, unaware of that paradox. 
 One last note should be added here. In the following, I will not address one type 
of critique of the concept of authenticity. This is the critique according to which the 
concept of authenticity rests on assumptions that belong to German Idealism’s 
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“metaphysics of the subject,” or on the view of the human being as autonomous and self-
transparent. In a number of texts, including Being and Time, Heidegger gives a 
systematic and compelling critique of this metaphysics of the subject.39 One could even 
characterize Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole as a critique of this metaphysics: 
Heidegger wishes to undermine the view of the human being as self-originating. If the 
concept of authenticity depends on this metaphysics—if it suggests that the human being 
is autonomous, self-transparent, or self-originating—then it is clearly problematic. A 
good presentation of the relation between the concept of authenticity and this 
metaphysics of the subject, and of how Heidegger, in his later work, developed views that 
avoided a similar kind of reliance on the metaphysics of the subject, has been given by 
Bret Davis40 and Fred Dallmayr.41 
I will therefore (1) look at critiques of the concept of authenticity in order to show 
that they do not indicate that the concept of authenticity is paradoxical; and (2) look at 
defenses of the concept of authenticity in order to show that their accounts of the concept 




39 See, for example, “The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead” and “The Age of the World Picture,” 
in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (Harper 
Torchbacks, 1982); The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Indiana 
University Press, 1984); Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly 
(Indiana University Press, 1988); The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to 
Philosophy, trans. Ted Sadler (Continuum, 2005); Nietzsche, Vols. 1, 2, 3, 4, trans. David Farrell 
Krell (HarperOne, 1991).  
40 Bret Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Galassenheit (Northwestern University 
Press, 2007), 38 ff. 
41 Fred R. Dallmayr, “Ontology of Freedom: Heidegger and Political Philosophy,” Political 
Theory, 12:2 (1984), 204-234. 
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1. Critiques of the concept of authenticity 
Three types of critique of the concept of authenticity can be identified: (A) a moral 
critique, (B) a political critique, and (C) an ideological critique. I will look at each in turn. 
 A. Many critiques see in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity what Leo Strauss 
understood to characterize Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole, when he commented that 
“Heidegger has learned the lesson of 1933 more thoroughly than any other man.”42 The 
problem with the concept of authenticity is that it is immoral. But why is it immoral?  
In the first chapter, I gave a preliminary characterization of the concept of 
authenticity: the authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of death, and, 
identical to that, anticipates his individuality. I did not, however, give a full 
characterization of the individuality that the authentic person anticipates. I will give that 
full characterization in the sixth chapter. Here, however, it is necessary to say something 
about it. For Heidegger, a person anticipates his individuality insofar as he, among other 
things, anticipates his ability to make independent choices.  For Heidegger, these choices 
are “independent” because they are not dependent on what Heidegger calls “das Man”—
“the one,” or the “they,” or, as I will put it, the impersonal crowd, whose norms for acting 
and understanding a person generally follows. This impersonal crowd, for Heidegger, 
generally determines the specific type of possibilities that a person chooses—and 
therefore accounts, among everyone, for a general condition of “averageness” 
(Durchschnittlichkeit). And it also determines that each a person chooses these average 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
42 Leo Strauss, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Political Philosophy,” Interpretation, 2 
(1971), 1-9, 5. 
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possibilities. Each person therefore suffers, for this reason, a “disburdening” (Entlassen) 
of his own, independent, ability to choose.43  
On the other hand, the authentic person burdens himself with his own, 
independent, ability to choose. This is related to the fact that the authentic person 
anticipates the authentic experience of death. As I will explain more fully later, for the 
person who anticipates the authentic experience of death, the impersonal crowd is unable 
to disburden him of his own ability to choose. According to Heidegger, “any being-with 
the others fails when one’s ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake.”44 In other words, 
insofar as a person anticipates the authentic experience death (that experience in which a 
person’s “ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake”), then any “being-with” others—the 
carrying out of that kind of care that the impersonal crowd carries out—can no longer 
occur. But this implies, for Heidegger, that if a person anticipates the authentic 
experience of death, and if a person anticipates making any choices, then these choices 
must be made by the person himself. Heidegger therefore writes that “[a]nticipation of its 
nonrelational possibility forces the being that anticipates into the possibility of taking 
over its ownmost being of its own accord.”45 A person’s anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death—the “anticipation of [the person’s] nonrelational possibility”—
compels a person to anticipate making his own choices, or to make choices “of [his] own 
accord.”  
Again, I will return this dimension of authenticity later. Relevant here is the fact 
that, for Heidegger, the authentic person anticipates the ability to make choices that are 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
43 BT, 119-120 [127]. 
44 BT, 243 [263]. 
45 BT, 243 [263]. 
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not determined by anyone but himself: what and that the authentic person anticipates 
choosing, is not determined by the prescriptions of the impersonal crowd, but only by 
himself. And this dimension of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity has given rise to the 
charge that it involves a highly problematic, because immoral, decisionism.  
The concept of authenticity has been linked to decisionism at least since Count 
Christian von Krockow’s Die Entscheidung (1958), which grouped Heidegger together 
with Carl Schmitt and Ernst Jünger as three exemplary decisionist thinkers.46 Of course, it 
is Schmitt who is generally thought to be the primary and clearest representative of 
decisionism. Schmitt argued in his Political Theology that certain situations obtain, in 
which legally-binding rules are no longer able to be enforced.47 Schmitt was referring, in 
particular, to the state of war, or to the “state of exception” (Ausnahmezustand). In these 
situations, according to Schmitt, a sovereign is able to emerge who determines binding 
laws. But the fact that these laws are binding cannot be traced back to already established 
legal rules—since those rules are in suspense. Their bindingness is due, rather, only to the 
fact that the sovereign has decided on them. Schmitt viewed his decisionism as a theory 
of sovereignty, in the tradition of Bodin or Hobbes (“Sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception”48) as well as a response to a legal philosophy, like that of Hans Kelsen, which 
holds that the bindingness of legal rules is self-sustained, or is not dependent on any 
personal resolution that they be enforced, but rather can be derived from a fundamental 
legal rule. The reception of Schmitt’s theory of decisionism, however, has mainly 
emphasized something else: that with a theory of a sovereign who is capable, like an """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
46 Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Entscheidung: eine Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger, Carl 
Schmitt, Martin Heidegger (Campus Verlag, 1990). It is unpublished in English.  
47 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George 
Schwab (University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
48 Political Theology, 5.  
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absolute god, of creating binding rules without any reason but his own decision, Schmitt 
was promoting an immoral morality. For Schmitt can be understood to be celebrating, or 
fetishizing, the individual’s act of decision itself, without any concern for whether this 
decision follows any social or rational constraints.  
Heidegger’s understanding of authenticity as a person’s ability to make choices 
independently of the prescriptions of the impersonal crowd has been understood along the 
same decisionist lines. Herman Philipse has given a rigorous presentation49 of the 
decisionism in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, in a long response to Frederick 
Olafson’s contention50 that it is possible to ground generally binding moral prescriptions 
on Heidegger’s analyses of Dasein in Being and Time. Philipse believes that if there is 
any normative proposal in Being and Time, then it is concentrated in the concept of 
authenticity, and, in particular, in the authentic person’s ability to make choices 
independently of the prescriptions imposed by das Man. Philipse stresses that, for this 
reason, these choices must not be determined by any general rules: a person is able to be 
authentic, only in a vacuum of social or rational normative guidelines. From this, Philipse 
draws the plausible implication that Heidegger’s concept of authenticity entails an anti-
morality. For a person can be authentic only if he frees himself from any social or 
rational constraint. The concept of authenticity therefore prescribes that a person resist 
any social or rational prescription; it prescribes the dissolution of prescription. This is 
why it is immoral. It can be added that, for Philipse, Heidegger’s inheritance of the sins 
of decisionism does not end here. Philipse suggests that because of the heightened 
possibility of conflict and disorder in circumstances in which no general rules are """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
49 Herman Philipse, “Heidegger and Ethics,” Inquiry, 42:3-4 (1999), 439-74. 
50 Frederick Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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acknowledged, Heidegger’s concept of authenticity leads to authoritarianism. In these 
circumstances, only a general law, or what Philipse not too subtly calls a Gleichshaltung, 
which is backed merely by authoritarian fiat, can and must guarantee order.51 
B. Many critiques have also understood the concept of authenticity to have 
dangerous political effects. Though this kind of critique of the concept of authenticity is 
similar to the ideological critique that I will describe just below, it should be separated 
from it. It does not claim that the concept of authenticity is a philosophical concept that 
merely lends the veneer of philosophical legitimacy to a political program that was 
already underway, in order to perpetuate it. Rather, it claims that the concept of 
authenticity is simply politically dangerous.  
This critique is the most straightforward. As I have suggested, the concept of 
authenticity identifies a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death with a 
person’s anticipation of his individuality. But this means that the pathway to a person’s 
individuality goes through a person’s encounter with death. The concept of authenticity 
thereby valorizes death. Just as the religious ethics of martyrdom gives death the 
significance of the means to salvation, so too Heidegger’s concept of authenticity gives 
death the significance of the means to individuality. But by valorizing death, Heidegger 
also valorizes that kind of politics that valorizes death—primarily, that kind of politics 
that celebrates war. 
Adorno especially critiqued the concept of authenticity from this perspective. In 
The Jargon of Authenticity, Adorno was actually less concerned with the mystification of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
51 A similar line of reasoning, that connects Heidegger to decisionism, and that links this 
decisionism to authoritarianism, can be found in Reiner Schürmann’s attempt to identify 
Heidegger’s thought with anarchism. See Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to 
Anarchy, trans. Christine-Marie Gros (Indiana University Press, 1987).  
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the language that Heidegger uses in order to describe authenticity—he largely limits that 
critique to its popular publicists. Adorno was more concerned with the militarism that the 
concept of authenticity promotes. For Adorno, Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is “a 
regression to the cult of death” and “from the beginning [has] gotten along well with 
military matters.”52 Even more, for Adorno, Heidegger gives death the obligatory force of 
Kantian morality. Heidegger “cracks the whip when he italicizes the auxiliary verb in the 
sentence, ‘Death is.’ The grammatical translation of the imperative in a predication 
makes the imperative categorical. This imperative does not allow for refusal, since it no 
longer at all obliges like the Kantian imperative, but describes obedience as a completed 
fact.”53 Like a military commander, the concept of authenticity makes death a privileged 
state, and even makes death obligatory. 
 C. The concept of authenticity has also been criticized as ideology. This critique 
is not entirely separate from the moral and political critiques. For the ideology critique, 
the concept of authenticity is immoral, and, indeed, immoral because it evinces a 
decisionism; additionally, it encourages militarism. However, for this critique, the 
immorality and militarism in the concept of authenticity only reflect and perpetuate a 
group of fateful political and cultural ideas which, at the time of the publication of Being 
and Time, already had currency in Weimar Germany.  
 Karl Löwith, who was a student of Heidegger’s at the University of Freiburg, was 
one of the first critics of Being and Time who claimed that its concept of authenticity is 
ideological. According to Löwith, the identification of a person’s anticipation of the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
52 Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will 
(Northwester University Press, 1973), 138. 
53 The Jargon of Authenticity, 88. 
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authentic experience of death with a person’s anticipation of his individuality is not 
materially distinct from the Nazi regime’s injunction to blind sacrifice: 
 
“Freedom toward death,” which in Being and Time is printed in italicized 
boldface, and on the basis of which the Dasein which is always one’s own and is 
individuated unto itself achieves its “capacity-for-Being-whole,” corresponds in 
political decisionism to the sacrifice of one’s life for the total state in the exigency 
of war. In both cases the principle is the same: the radical return to something 
ultimate, namely the naked that-ness of facticity, i.e., the return to what remains 
in life when one does away with every kind of inherited life-content or what-
ness.54 
 
Furthermore, what the “specifically German sense of Heidegger’s notions of Dasein” 
makes clear is that  
 
existence and resoluteness, Being and capacity-for-Being, the interpretation of 
this capacity as one of fate and Having-To, the insistence on the (German) 
capacity-for-Being which is “always one’s own,”… all reflect the catastrophic 
manner of thinking characteristic of almost all people in Germany during the time 
following the war… All these concepts and words were fundamentally 
expressions for the bitter and hard resoluteness of a willing which asserts itself in 
the face of the Nothing and which is proud of its contempt for happiness and 
humanity.55 
 
Löwith finds in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity what can be called a “heroic 
nihilism.” A person can become something, can become an individual, through an 
throwing himself into an experience in which he is nothing: death. Like Adorno, Löwith 
believes that Heidegger’s articulation of this heroic nihilism motivates political 
militarism. However, Löwith views it primarily as a rhetoric that works to conscript 
readers and listeners into militaristic policies that were already being pursued. After 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
54 Karl Löwith, “The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt,” in Martin Heidegger and 
European Nihilism, trans. Gary Steiner, ed. Richard Wolin (Columbia University Press, 1995), 
160. 
55 Karl Löwith, “European Nihilism: Reflections on the European War,” in Martin Heidegger and 
European Nihilism, 220. 
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Löwith, and in Germany, this critique has especially been elaborated by Jürgen 
Habermas.56 
 More recently, Richard Wolin has extended this ideology critique in order to 
show that the concept of authenticity, as well concepts associated with it in Being and 
Time, promoted not merely a political militarism, but a more general Weimar cultural 
sensibility that endorsed violence and transgression, and was contemptuous toward  
democratic values. A philosophical mirror of this sensibility, the concept of authenticity, 
and Being and Time as a whole, is an invitation to live dangerously. The concept of 
authenticity reflects, for example, the “aestheticization” of death familiar from Weimar 
art (for example, Dix), as well as from modern and Weimar conservative political thought 
(for example, Jünger’s group). Death is understood to disrupt, in a liberating way, the 
alienating rigidity and mechanicity of uniform daily life: 
 
[Striking in Heidegger] is what one might describe as a shared disposition, mood, 
or aesthetic sensibility [with Weimar “conservative revolutionaries”]; a general 
fascination with “limit-situations” (Grenzsituationen) and extremes; an interest in 
transposing the fundamental experiences of aesthetic modernity—shock, 
disruption, experiential immediacy; an infatuation with the sinister and forbidden, 
with the ‘flowers of evil’—to the plane of everyday life, thereby injecting an 
element of enthusiasm and vitality in what had otherwise become a rigid and 
lifeless mechanism.57 
  
Additionally, for Wolin, the isolation of the authentic person—as I suggested above, the 
authentic person’s anticipation of his individuality is dependent on his freedom from 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
56 See Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence 
(MIT Press, 1990), 131-160; “Work and Weltanschauung,” in The New Conservatism: Cultural 
Criticism and the Historians’ Debate, 144, 147. 
57 Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 30. 
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submitting to the prescriptions of the impersonal crowd—reflects an elitism that is 
“distrustful of a democratic sensibility”:58  
 
The “hero-worship” proposed by Heidegger—the search for an archetypal 
exemplar of human greatness—is suggestive of Nietzsche’s Übermensch. Both 
the Übermensch and Heidegger’s authentic Dasein manifest their “superior 
natures” by their scorn of moral convention. The hero (along with the “bohème,” 
to whom neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger accords much interest) is the 
quintessential antibourgeois. Whereas for the bourgeois, life is a matter of 
calculation, utility, and narrow self-interest, for the hero, glorious acts of self-
affirmation count alone, and utilitarian concerns are beneath contempt.59 
 
 A number of points about these moral, political, and ideology critiques can be 
made. First, it may be correct to find in the concept of authenticity an immoral 
decisionism. And it may be correct to find in the concept of authenticity a “heroic 
nihilism,” or a “regression to a cult of death” that promotes militarism. But these critiques 
do not question the validity of Heidegger’s arguments that justify this heroic nihilism or 
militarism. In other words, these critiques do not question the validity of Heidegger’s 
arguments concerning authenticity, namely, that a person’s anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death is identical to a person’s anticipation of his individuality. Rather, 
they employ a polemical language (nihilism, regression, and cult) in order to describe the 
concept of authenticity in such a way that makes it look by turns frightening and 
embarrassing. These critiques can be called the “status quo” critiques of the concept of 
authenticity. They merely point out its deviation from generally accepted moral and 
political beliefs, and find it problematic merely on account of this deviation. This may be 
rhetorically effective. But it is a philosophically ineffective means of combating a 
concept that, clearly, carries dangerous implications. With the ideology critique, the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
58 The Politics of Being, 46. 
59 The Politics of Being, 63. 
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situation is the same. The concept of authenticity is associated with facets of a cultural 
sensibility that we no longer share and wish to share. However, through this ascription of 
guilt-by-association, the justifications for and coherence of the concept of authenticity go 
unchallenged. François Fédier, in commenting on ideology critiques of Heidegger’s 
philosophy that identified it as the sophisticated propaganda of National Socialism, 
rightly pointed out that these ideology critiques can preclude an actual criticism of that 
work itself: “one realizes immediately that there is also a means to prevent ab limine the 
possibility of objective appraisal: namely, by moralistically sealing off access to his 
work.”60 
 The relevance here, however, of the fact that none of these critiques question the 
justifications for or the coherence of the concept of authenticity, is that, as a consequence, 
none of these critiques raise the question whether the concept of authenticity is 
paradoxical. These critiques even imply that the concept of authenticity is not 
paradoxical. To be sure, what is paradoxical can be morally and politically dangerous, as 
well as ideologically effective—in the Marxist sense, all ideology must articulate 
contradictions; and Kierkegaard knew, in Fear and Trembling, that his exposition of 
Abraham’s paradoxical faith could lead to baseless murder. But to identify the concept of 
authenticity with a decisionism that was actually realized during the Nazi era, and that 
continues to be realized today;61 or to understand it as promoting a regression to a cult of 
death, something that must be able to be realized since the cultic behavior to which a 
person regresses did in fact occur in the past; or to view it as a concept that reflects the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
60 François Fédier, “Trois attaques contre Heidegger,” Critique, 234 (1966), 883-904. 




tastes and practices of the “anti-bourgeoisie,” tastes and practices which, necessarily, 
must have been realized if the historical category of the “anti-bourgeoisie” is to make any 
sense—all of this is to imply that the concept of authenticity is not paradoxical. If it were 
paradoxical, then its conceptual content—the identification of a person’s anticipation of 
the authentic experience of death and a person’s anticipation of his individuality—could 
not be realized in decisionism, in a regression to a cult of death, or in the tastes and 
practices of the anti-bourgeoisie.   
 Ultimately, the good intentions of the moral, political, and ideology critiques can 
be more effectively carried out by a demonstration that the concept of authenticity is 
paradoxical. And part of my own intention in trying to demonstrate that it is paradoxical 
is to show that the decisionism and militaristic politics that it proposes are impossible, 
and that if it is ideology, it is unpersuasive as ideology. For putting the legacy of credo 
quia absurdum est aside, what is paradoxical is both impossible and unpersuasive.  
 
2. Defenses of the concept of authenticity 
The concept of authenticity has also received a number of sympathetic interpretations that 
try to defend it. I will look at three representatives of these defenses here: (A) a defense 
of the concept of authenticity as a version of Kant’s idea of autonomy; (B) a defense of 
the concept of authenticity as an account of how a person can lead a coherent life; and 
(C) a defense of the concept of authenticity as an explanation of how a person achieves 
responsibility. My aim is to show how, in each of these defenses, the concept of 
authenticity presents a paradox, but how, in each of these defenses, this paradox goes 
more or less unacknowledged. The paradox in the concept of authenticity is a problem 
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that sympathetic interpretations of authenticity invariably pose; yet they have not yet 
confronted this problem either explicitly or critically. 
 A. As I already suggested, the concept of authenticity involves a person’s 
anticipation of the ability to make independent choices. The fact that the concept of 
authenticity involves this anticipation of the ability to make an individual choices has led 
many interpreters to recognize in it a commitment to the value of autonomy, and 
therefore to understand authenticity as a Kantian moral concept, and even one which 
remedies certain problems in Kant’s own account of autonomy.  
For Heidegger, the authentic person possesses the autonomy of being able to 
anticipate making independent choices. But the anticipation of this ability primarily 
involves a resistance to following the prescriptions of das Man, the impersonal crowd. In 
order to anticipate this ability, a person only needs to resist the prescription, by the 
impersonal crowd, of that and what he chooses. According to Steven Crowell, therefore, 
in Being and Time 
 
[t]he kind of subject who can be an agent while being absorbed in the world is a 
self whose identity is normatively achieved not by overcoming the passivity in its 
nature in order to constitute itself as a unified person, but rather by overcoming its 
anonymity to take responsibility for its own self as a task.62 
 
Therefore, while Heidegger’s concept of authenticity explains how a person is 
autonomous, nevertheless this autonomy does not derive, as it derives for Kant, from a 
problematic noumenal self which is supposed to produce events in the world that 
contravene and cannot be explained by its causal laws. It only derives from a person’s 
claiming responsibility for himself, over against a condition of everyday anonymity. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
62 Steven Crowell, “Sorge or Selbstbewußtsein? Heidegger and Korsgaard on the Sources of 
Normativity,” European Journal of Philosophy, 15:3 (2007), 315-333, 329. 
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Sonia Sikka has especially tried to understand the concept of authenticity as a 
version of Kant’s idea of autonomy. For her, just as Kant divides the human being into 
freely acting, moral self, and a mechanically acting, empirical self, in Being and Time, 
“Dasein also has two ‘selves,’ or possible ways of being, one of which involves an 
unsteady being driven about by daily concerns, and the other a self-possessed choosing to 
be responsible.”63 For Sikka, while there is not a substantial difference between the moral 
self and the authentic self, Heidegger describes phenomenologically what Kant tries to 
deduce a priori:  
 
Being and Time, I believe, attempts to uncover the phenomenological basis for 
Kant’s view that the property of person’s, in virtue of which they are worthy of 
respect, is freedom… Furthermore, “authenticity” is Heidegger’s version of 
autonomy. Like Kant, he presents it as being the result of a decision whose 
motivating source appeals without compelling, and is identified as the self rather 
than any alien authority. The result is a description of self-regulation that is 
supposed to represent a realization, rather than a compromise, of autonomy, and is 
a necessary condition for any form of morality.64 
 
Sikka is correct that Heidegger’s phenomenology of authenticity does describe a state of 
the person quite close to Kantian autonomy. Even if that state does not, as Heidegger 
carefully specifies, include guidance by universalizable subjective maxims or by an 
internal court of justice,65 nevertheless the authentic person is able to anticipate making 
choices that are not coerced, and can, as a consequence, “regulate” himself in such a way 
that he is responsible for his own actions.  
But it is important to emphasize that, despite this parallel, Sikka is aware that 
Kant, in describing the origins and the exercise of autonomy, says nothing about death, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
63 Sonia Sikka, “Kantian Ethics in Being and Time,” Journal of Philosophical Research, 31 
(2006), 309-334, 314. 
64 “Kantian Ethics in Being and Time,” 319. 
65 BT, 270 [293]. 
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and that, for Heidegger, and as I mentioned in the introduction, authenticity is 
inextricably linked to death. As I suggested in the introduction, and as I will describe in 
greater detail later, a person’s anticipation of the ability to make independent choices is 
identified, by Heidegger, with a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of 
death. Sikka recognizes this distinction. “There is no parallel, in Kant’s thought,” Sikka 
writes, “to the central place Heidegger assigns to the awareness of death.”66 But while 
Sikka thus admits that it is a notable, if not the central difference, between the two 
accounts of autonomy, she does not raise the question of the meaning, explanation, and 
effects of this difference. Nor, in her own description of how Heidegger’s authenticity 
evinces Kant’s autonomy, does she give any “place” to it in Heidegger’s account. I will 
return below to the significance of the fact that while Sikka acknowledges the “place” 
that death has in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, she does not substantively discuss 
that place at all.  
B. The concept of authenticity has also been understood to give an account of 
how a person is able to lead a coherent life. Charles Guignon, in a number of texts, has 
especially defended the concept of authenticity from this perspective. It should be pointed 
out that this defense is particularly sensitive to the connection between the concept of 
authenticity and Stoic ethics, which exhorts a person to live, against the arbitrariness and 
disorder of everyday life, a self-collected life that is directed toward a singular aim. It is 
also sensitive to another parallel between the concept of authenticity and Stoic ethics. For 
Stoicism, a self-collected life partially originates in the anticipation of death, the 
praemeditatio futurorum malorum. Similarly, according to this interpretation of the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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concept of authenticity, a person’s ability to lead a coherent life is rooted in what 
Guignon calls a “confrontation” with death. Unlike Kantian defenses of the concept of 
authenticity like Sikka’s, then, this defense of the concept of authenticity does not shy 
away—or apparently does not shy away—from discussing the “central role” that a 
person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death plays.  
For Guignon, the reason why Heidegger claims that a person is, in an everyday 
way, not authentic, is due to a condition of self-dispersion. For Guignon, the “tendency to 
fall into mundane activities catches us up in the ‘turbulence’ of life and tears us away 
from the possibility of taking hold of our existence in a coherent, integrated way.”67 The 
problem with “mundane activities” is not that they are banal or uninteresting. The 
problem, rather, is that they have no immanent order or purpose. To live in an everyday 
way is to be in a state of distraction in one’s practical life. But just as distraction is a kind 
of negative state of mind in which one’s thinking is a thinking which has no purpose, or 
an indeterminate thinking, an inauthentic practical life is a life which has no purpose, or 
an indeterminate living.  
For Guignon, however, intruding into this self-dispersion of inauthenticity is the 
realization that one will die. “Confronted with our being-toward-death,” or “forced to 
confront our own finitude,” “the roles we have been playing suddenly seem anonymous, 
and we are faced with the demand to own up to our lives.”68 By “confronting” death, a 
person recognizes that his time is not infinite, and he is led to consider whether he is 
engaging in his, so to speak, “real priorities” or what, so to speak, is “really important.” 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
67 Charles Guignon, “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 280. 
68 “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy,” 282. 
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Additionally, the specific finitude of a person’s life that death displays unfolds before a 
person a delimited, defined life that stands in contrast to the indefinitely extensive life 
presented by everyday self-dispersion. The “confrontation” with death therefore allows a 
person to live a coherent, purposeful, and whole life. “Facing death, one is pulled back 
from the dispersal, distraction, and forgetfulness of everydayness. The result is the ability 
to live with a clear-sighted grasp of the temporal continuity and future-directedness of 
one’s own life-happening. This lucidity leads to a way of living we might call ‘self-
focusing.’”69 “Authentic self-focusing, understood as a resolute reaching forward into a 
finite range of possibilities, gives coherence, cohesiveness, and integrity to a life 
course.”70  
The interpretation of the concept of authenticity as a person’s ability to lead a 
coherent life therefore acknowledges the “central role” that a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death possesses in Heidegger’s account of authenticity in Being 
and Time. It is only because a person’s confrontation with death intrudes on his 
dispersed, distracted, purposeless life, that a person is able to order his life in such a way 
that it has a definite goal, and is able to understand it to be a whole bounded by definite 
limits. For Guignon, “as Heidegger describes it, the path to [a] deeper involvement in the 
public world passes through a radical breakdown of our complacent absorption in 
everydayness.”71 I will, however, come back below to a question that is very significant 
in evaluating this interpretation of authenticity. According to Heidegger’s understanding 
of a person’s anticipation of death, does that anticipation in fact give a person the ability 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
69 “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy,” 282. 
70 “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy,” 282. 
71 “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy,” 281-2. 
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to understand his life purposefully and coherently? Does the anticipation of death, an 
“encounter” with death, display to a person a purposeful and coherent life?  
C. Finally, François Raffoul has given an interpretation of the concept of 
authenticity that stresses the close connection between a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death—or what Raffoul also calls a person’s finitude or 
facticity—and the constitution of his responsibility.72 Generally, through his 
interpretation, Raffoul wants to develop an idea of responsibility that is independent of 
the closely related concept, “accountability,” which, for him, has dominated the 
philosophical tradition, and which suggests that a person is responsible for his actions 
only so long as he is the undetermined cause of his actions—or only insofar as he lacks 
any relation to death, finitude or facticity, experiences in which, according to Raffoul, a 
person is not the undetermined cause of his actions. 
For Raffoul, the concept of authenticity shows that it is only through the relation 
to experiences, like those of death, finitude, or facticity, which fundamentally undermine 
a person’s responsibility, that a person’s responsibility is constituted. Raffoul’s 
interpretation is therefore a representative of a perspective that sees in the concept of 
authenticity the beginning of a tradition of thinking about responsibility which is 
especially prevalent in recent French thought, and which can be found in all of the major 
French thinkers of the twentieth century, like Levinas, Bataille, Lacan, Derrida, and 
Nancy. A person’s responsibility—or more broadly agency or freedom—is constituted 
through experiences or conditions in which that responsibility is radically placed in 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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suspense. Heidegger’s concept of authenticity understands that the radically improper 
experience of death—that is, an experience in which a person experiences what falls 
outside his own self—is that experience in which a person comes to appropriate himself, 
or constitutes his own selfhood. As Giorgio Agamben writes, for Heidegger, 
 
death, considered as a possibility, is absolutely empty; it has no particular 
prestige. It is the simple possibility of the impossibility of all comportment and all 
existence. Precisely for this reason, however, the decision that radically 
experiences this impossibility and this emptiness in Being-towards-death frees 
itself from all indecision, fully appropriating its own impropriety for the first 
time.73 
 
But how, then, does Raffoul understand the concept of authenticity to explain how 
an experience in which a person’s responsibility is radically undermined, to be that 
experience in which a person’s responsibility is constituted? For Raffoul, in an 
experience of death, finitude, or facticity, a person experiences some event74 whose 
existence the person has not chosen, and whose character is such that it excludes the 
exercise of that person’s choice. However, Raffoul claims that it is only to the extent that 
a person experiences an event which he has not chosen, and which cannot be seamlessly 
integrated into a person’s voluntary choices, that a person can, in fact, become 
responsible for that event. For it is only this kind of event that can be a task or a challenge 
that a person must explicitly, and willfully, try to resolve. It is only this kind of event that 
a person can be responsible for. A person’s experience of death, in Heidegger’s sense, is 
a paradigm of the experience of such an event. Therefore, a person exercises for the first 
time his own responsibility, to the degree that he experiences, and takes responsibility 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
73 Remnants of Auschwitz, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Zone, 2002), 74-5. 
74 Raffoul himself seems to suggest that what is experienced in an experience of facticity or 
finitude is an “event”; it is far from certain, of course, that Being and Time would allow this.  
%#"
"
for, his own death—even if, or precisely because, it is impossible for him to take 
responsibility for that experience of death. Raffoul therefore writes that “[t]he primordial 
sense of responsibility is hence: the appropriation of the inappropriable, as 
inappropriable” and that “what I have to appropriate, ultimately, is the inappropriable 
itself… I am responsible because I am thrown in an existence that I have to answer for. 
So that to be thrown (facticity) and to be called (responsibility) are one and the same 
phenomenon.”75 
In evaluating these defenses of authenticity, I want to begin with Raffoul. For 
Raffoul explicitly recognizes an implication of his defense of the concept of authenticity 
that I wish to claim is present in the other two defenses, even though those other two 
defenses do not acknowledge it. Raffoul is aware that with his interpretation of the 
concept of authenticity, as “the appropriation of the inappropriable, as inappropriable,” 
he has walked pointblank into the territory of the paradoxical. Raffoul admits that the 
connection that he draws between a person’s experience of death, finitude or facticity, 
and the constitution of responsibility 
 
might seem at first paradoxical: the very motif of facticity could indeed be seen as 
a challenge to the very possibility of responsible agency, as it opposes the 
traditional values and ideals of modernity, its model of the absoluteness and 
transparency of subjectivity. More precisely, does facticity, with its senses of 
opacity, finitude, and expropriation, not challenge the very possibility of a free 
self-assumption of subjectivity in responsibility, since it represents precisely not 
only what I am not responsible for but also what I cannot in principle 
appropriate?76 
 
However, Raffoul raises this specter of paradox (“might seem at first paradoxical”) 
before he affirms that “[t]he primordial sense of responsibility is hence: the appropriation """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
75 “Heidegger and the Origins of Responsibility,” 212. 
76 “Heidegger and the Origins of Responsibility,” 205. 
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of the inappropriable, as inappropriable” and that “what I have to appropriate, ultimately, 
is the inappropriable itself.” In other words, Raffoul does not conjure away, but 
materializes, this specter of paradox. He affirms that, in light of the concept of 
authenticity, the constitution of responsibility is a paradoxical constitution, or that a 
person becomes responsible only when he enjoys an experience—that of death, finitude, 
or facticity—in which his responsibility is undermined. In still other words, Raffoul 
affirms that the concept that he interpreting, the concept of authenticity, is paradoxical. 
 A closer look at the Kantian defense of authenticity reveals the same presence of 
paradox. I mentioned above that Sikka acknowledges that Heidegger, unlike Kant, gives 
a “place” to what she calls the “awareness” of death in his understanding of autonomy—
that is, in his understanding of authenticity. But Sikka, in describing how the authentic 
person realizes autonomy, makes no mention at all of what “place” the “awareness” of 
death has in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. Effectively, in Sikka’s interpretation, the 
“awareness” of death has no place at all in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. And 
Sikka has good reason for this, so to speak, “utopianism of death,” or this assigning to 
death no place in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. For according to Heidegger, the 
“awareness” of death (a word that Heidegger never uses) possessed by the authentic 
person is the anticipation of the authentic experience of death in which, as I suggested 
above, a person transparently, and determinedly, seizes the fact that he projects into no 
particular abilities. The anticipation of the authentic experience of death is therefore the 
seizure of a devastating experience. As Heidegger writes, in the anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death, a person finds himself “primarily unsupported by concern 
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taking care of things” (auf die besorgende Fürsorge primär ungestütz)77; that is, in the 
anticipation of the experience of death, a person finds that he is unable to care for 
particular other people, and is unable to take care of particular worldly beings.  
But if a person’s “awareness of death” is this, then to what extent is it compatible 
with a person’s realization of the ability to make autonomous choices, or a person’s 
realization of “self-regulation”? Is it not paradoxical that a person have an “awareness” of 
death—that is, anticipate the authentic experience of death—and, also, realize his 
autonomy, make autonomous choices, and actively “regulate” himself? It can be 
conceded that Sikka never interprets the concept of authenticity as identifying a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death and the realization of a person’s 
autonomy. Sikka only claims that the anticipation of the authentic experience of death has 
a “place” in Heidegger’s account of authenticity. It would therefore be incorrect to claim 
that Sikka’s defense of the concept of authenticity is paradoxical in the strict sense that it 
identifies the anticipation of the authentic experience of death with a person’s realization 
of autonomy. But if it is not paradoxical in this strict sense, then it is paradoxical in a 
looser or more conventional sense. At the very least, a crucial step is missing from 
Sikka’s account. How can such an anticipation of the authentic experience of death lead 
to the realization of autonomy and self-regulation? Can such a step exist? Would not such 
a step falter? For very good reason, Kant did not give a central “place” to the 
“awareness” of death in his understanding of autonomy. Giving a central place to the 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death in the realization of autonomy displaces 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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that autonomy from its very possibility. The anticipation of the authentic experience of 
death immerses a person in an experience in which autonomy cannot be exercised.  
Guignon’s interpretation of the concept of authenticity as a person’s ability to lead 
a coherent life faces a similar dilemma. It can be recalled that for Guignon, intruding into 
the self-dispersion of the inauthentic person’s life is a person’s “confrontation” with 
death; confronting the fact of this death allows a person to live his life in a coherent, 
purposeful, way. Death, a “radical breakdown,” is, as Guignon writes, “the path to [a] 
deeper involvement in the public world.” “Confronted with our being-toward-death,” 
“forced to confront our own finitude,” “the roles we have been playing suddenly seem 
anonymous, and we are faced with the demand to own up to our lives.” But in what sense 
can a person’s “confrontation” with death be understood as “path”;78 and in what sense is 
this path a path insofar as it, so to speak, voices a “demand to own up to our own lives”? I 
would suggest that while Guignon does—and unlike Sikka—incorporate a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death into his interpretation of the concept of 
authenticity, he incorporates it by consuming it.  
For Heidegger, a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is not 
the disclosure of “path,” and it is, especially, not the disclosure of a “path” because it 
places a “demand” on a person. I can here refer to what I briefly explained above, and 
will explain in greater detail in the sixth chapter. Heidegger understands the anticipation 
of the authentic experience of death as an anticipation which brings a person into the 
mood of anxiety. But Heidegger writes that anxiety is numbing: in anxiety, “Da-sein is """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
78 The interpretation of death as a kind of “path” is also a common interpretation of the concept(s) 
of death worked out in Heidegger’s later work. See Julian Young, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002), 64-73, and Carol White, Time and Death: Heidegger’s 
Analysis of Finitude (Ashgate, 2005). 
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taken back fully to its naked uncanniness and benumbed by it.”79 The rendering, in this 
passage, of Heidegger’s “von ihr benommen” as “benumbed by it” is peculiar to 
Stambaugh, and is not used by MacQuarrie and Robinson, who translate “von ihr 
benommen” as “fascinated by it.”80 But that anxiety “benumbs,” or is numbing, has a 
straightforward plausibility. If a person is “taken back fully to [his] naked uncanniness,” 
or is immersed in a situation in which, in no way, a person is “at home,” that is, has no 
familiar self to pursue, skills to exercise, and worldly being to use—and this is the 
authentic experience of death—then a person is numbed. Anxiety is a mood of 
disorientation, and it is a mood that is disoriented: it is numbness. In anticipating the 
authentic experience of death, then, a person experiences this numbness, or this 
disorientation. 
But how then could a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death, 
an experience of anxiety, numbness, and disorientation, be equated, as Guignon equates 
it, with the disclosure of a path, a path that is a demand, and, in particular, a demand to 
live a coherent, purposeful, life? Anxiety, numbness, and disorientation would appear to 
disclose, in fact, only that no paths open up before a person, and that no demands can be 
heard and responded to. This explains why, while Guignon does not, like Sikka, simply 
pass over the anticipation of the authentic experience of death in his defense of the 
concept of authenticity, he nevertheless suppresses part of that anticipation. He 
suppresses the fact that a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is, for 
Heidegger, an anticipation of anxiety, numbness, and disorientation. He suppresses this 
dimension of a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death for good reason. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
79 BT, 316 [344].  
80 BT/MR, 394. 
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For were a person’s “confrontation” with death understood as the anticipation of anxiety, 
numbness, and disorientation, then it would be strictly paradoxical that this 
“confrontation” with death be an “confrontation” that opens up a path for a person, or that 
places a demand on a person. However, this is precisely how Guignon understands a 
person’s “confrontation” with death: as, on the one hand, a “confrontation” with that 
which voices a clear demand that a person “own up” to his life, and a “confrontation” 
with a “pathway” through which a person’s “deeper involvement” in the world is made 
possible; but, on the other hand, as an “confrontation” with what Guignon rightly calls a 
“radical breakdown,” or, understood rigorously, a “confrontation” with a death in the face 
of which a person is anxious, numbed, and disoriented. These two hands are cuffed 
together in an incoherent knot. 
My purpose is not, however, to criticize any of these interpretations of 
authenticity as interpretations of authenticity. These interpretations of authenticity are, in 
fact, correct. They all pose the problem of a paradox at the heart of the concept of 
authenticity. But they all pose this problem of a paradox because they are correct. Putting 
aside one or two exceptions, they try to do justice to the side of the concept of 
authenticity according to which a person is able to be responsible, autonomous, or live a 
coherent life; they try to do justice to the side of the concept of authenticity according to 
which the authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of death; and they try to 
do justice to the fact that these two sides of the concept of authenticity are identified with 
one another. But this constellation of elements in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity 
articulates a paradox, and, therefore, sympathetic interpretations of the concept of 
authenticity inherit, and suffer the paradox in the concept that they interpret. They may 
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not acknowledge that paradox, or they may try, in certain respects, to cover that paradox 
up—for example, by not discussing what one of those sides in fact involves. A critique of 
these interpretations should not, therefore, critique these interpretations themselves. 
Rather, it should critique what they correctly interpret: Heidegger’s concept of 
authenticity. This is what I now propose to do. 
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Chapter 3: The Structure of Care 
 
In this chapter, I will give an interpretation of one of the central concepts of Being and 
Time, and a concept which is crucial to understand in order to critique Heidegger’s 
concept of authenticity: the concept of care (Sorge). By “care,” Heidegger does not mean 
the psychological state or attitude of “concern,” the opposite of the psychological state or 
attitude of indifference, in which a person relates to a state of affairs in apprehensiveness. 
As Heidegger writes, “as a primordial structural totality, care lies ‘before’ every factical 
‘attitude’ and ‘position’ of Da-sein, that is, it is always already in them as an existential a 
priori.”81 Nor does Heidegger simply mean what he calls Besorgen and Fürsorge—a 
person’s taking care of particular worldly beings, or a person’s caring for particular 
others. Besorgen and Fürsorge are modalities of care; however, they are not care itself. 
Care, rather, indicates the kind of being (Sein) of Dasein, that is, the kind of being of the 
human being. Dasein, the human being, is, as care. Heidegger therefore gives his primary 
discussion of care in a section entitled: “The being of Da-sein as care.”82 “Care,” 
therefore, is coextensive with what Heidegger calls “existence” (Existenz) that is, the type 
of being that Dasein, the human being, possesses, as opposed to the kind of being things 
and worldly tools possess—kinds of being he calls, respectively, presence-at-hand 
(Vorhandenheit) and readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit).83 “Care” is also coextensive with 
what Heidegger calls a person’s “ability-to-be” (Seinkönnen), a designation of a person’s 
being whose significance I will discuss below.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
81 BT, 180 [193].  
82 BT, 178 [191].  
83 BT, 39ff. [42ff.].  
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 But if care is the being of the human being, then the question that must be asked 
is: What is this care that is the being of the human being? In the following, I will offer 
what I call a “structurally differentiated” view of care. For this structurally differentiated 
view of care, care, for Heidegger is the unity of certain basic elements which, together, 
constitute the structure of the being of the human being. Heidegger states explicitly that 
care indicates such a differentiated structure. The section in which Heidegger introduces 
his discussion of care is entitled: “The Question of the Primordial Totality of the 
Structural Whole of Da-sein.”84 And at the end of his discussion of care, Heidegger writes 
that “[t]he whole of the constitution of Da-sein itself is not simple in its unity, but shows 
a structural articulation which is expressed in the existential concept of care.”85 A 
structurally differentiated view of care will, then, focus on the elements by which this 
structure is articulated, and their unity—since it is this “which is expressed in the 
existential concept of care.” I will argue that three basic elements can be identified: what 
I will call the “possible self,” a person’s “skills,” and the “facilitating world.” I will 
explain in greater detail below why I use these terms, what, in particular, these three 
structural elements are, and why, together, they constitute a unified structure.  
 Primarily, I will, in this chapter, give a structurally differentiated view of care. 
However, viewing care as a structure carries two implications that I want to emphasize. 
On the one hand, the claim that Heidegger defines care as a structure involves a slight but 
notable departure from the common way in which interpretations understand Heidegger 
to define care. For these common interpretations, Heidegger defines care as the being of 
the human being, but, beyond that, the being of the human being according to which """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
84 BT, 169 [180].  
85 BT, 186 [200], emphasis added. 
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things are “at issue” or “matter” for the human being. I will discuss, in the following, 
what being at “issue” or “mattering” means. There is no question that things being “at 
issue” or “mattering” does provide a preliminary and general sense of what Heidegger 
means by “care.” However, these concepts do not allude to any kind of structure. In the 
following, I will therefore want to emphasize that, while things being “at issue” or 
“mattering” does provide an initial orientation to what care is, nevertheless it is ultimately 
and specifically a structure that defines what care is. Second of all, viewing care as a 
structure allows one of the most salient aspects of what, for Heidegger, the being of the 
human being is, to be seen: the fact that the being of the human being is the ability-to-be 
(Seinkönnen), or consists in abilities (Möglichkeiten), or, more precisely, as I will discuss 
in the following, a projection into abilities. William Blattner, in Heidegger’s Temporal 
Idealism,86 has especially emphasized this; and my interpretation of care is strongly 
dependent on this book. The three elements of the structure of care—the possible self, 
skills, and the facilitating world—all ultimately indicate three different kinds of abilities. 
In the following, I will therefore want to emphasize how this structurally differentiated 
view of care helps understand the being of the human being in terms of abilities.  
 As I suggested just above, I do not offer this interpretation of the concept of care 
only because it is one of the central concepts of Being and Time. The concept of care, 
rather, underlies the primary concepts involved in the critique of the concept of 
authenticity that I wish to offer. Primarily, it underlies the concepts of inauthenticity and 
authenticity—the two concepts that are the themes of the following two chapters. 
Heidegger makes it very clear that a person’s care underlies a person’s inauthenticity and 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
86 See Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism. 
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authenticity. Both inauthenticity and authenticity are ways in which a person “is”—
neither, as I suggested above, can qualify an object—and therefore both must be 
understood on the basis of that particular way in which a person “is.” But if a person “is” 
as that which cares, or—to use the designations that are coextensive with “care,” or that 
also designate a person’s being—that which “exists,” or that which “is its possibility,” or 
that which, as Heidegger says, is characterized by “mineness” [Jemeinigkeit],87 then it is 
only on the basis of a person’s care, existence, being-as-possibility, or mineness, that a 
person’s inauthenticity and authenticity take their respective shapes. Heidegger writes: 
 
Dasein is always its possibility. It does not “have” that possibility only as a mere 
attribute of something objectively present. And because Da-sein is always 
essentially its possibility, it can “choose” itself in its being, it can win itself, it can 
lose itself, or it can never and only “apparently” win itself. It can only have lost 
itself and it can only have not yet gained itself because it is essentially possible as 
authentic, that is, it belongs to itself. The two kinds of being of authenticity and 
inauthenticity—these expressions are terminologically chosen in the strictest 
sense of the word—are based on the fact that Da-sein is in general determined by 
always being mine. But the inauthenticity of Da-sein does not signify a “lesser” 
being or a “lower” degree of being. Rather, inauthenticity can determine Da-sein 
even in its fullest concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested, and capable of 
pleasure.88 
 
Therefore, I give this interpretation of care with the intention of being able to show, in the 
following two chapters, what inauthenticity and authenticity are, and, ultimately, with the 
intention of preparing my critique of the concept of authenticity. 
 I will, then, (1) look at the common interpretation of care according to which it 
consists in the fact that things are “at issue” or “matter” for a person; and (2) offer my 
own structurally differentiated view of care; and I will (3) explain in what way a """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
87 These three latter concepts are used by Heidegger to describe the being of Dasein or the human 
being, at the very beginning of Being and Time; only later does he add that the being of Dasein or 
the human being is care. See BT, 39 ff. [42 ff.], and BT, 178 ff. [191 ff.].  
88 BT, 40 [42-3].  
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structurally differentiated view of care allows the being of the human being to be 
understood to comprise a person’s ability-to-be or abilities. 
  
1. Care as things being “at issue” or “mattering” 
I would first like to consider an interpretation of care which, currently, is very 
widespread. Care is understood as the being of the human being. Care is the ontological 
character of the human being, what distinguishes the way in which the human being is, as 
opposed to the way in which objects or worldly beings (for example, tools), are. Care, 
then, is not what Heidegger calls an “ontic” characterization of the human being—it does 
not express a property or properties of the human being that other beings do not possess 
(for example that it is a “featherless biped”). Care, rather, is the way in which the human 
being is—regardless of the specific properties it might possess.  In Heidegger’s 
terminology, care is an ontological, or existential characterization of the human being, 
not an ontic, or existentiell characterization of the human being.89 
This is all correct, and it will be the starting point of my own interpretation. What 
I would specifically like to consider here is the interpretation that care, as the being of the 
human being, consists in the fact that, for the human being, things are “at issue” for it, or 
things “matter” to it.90 For this interpretation, then, regardless of whatever specific 
properties characterize the human being, the human being is in such a way that what """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
89 BT, 10 ff. [12 ff.], 41 [43-4]  
90 It may be objected that I am conflating two different interpretations of care into one; after all, 
the passages in Being and Time in which this language (in translation) can be found are (with one 
exception—see below) different, and treat different themes. This is especially the case if the 
interpretation of care as things “mattering” is based on Heidegger’s discussion of attunement and 
moods—which does not discuss things being “at issue” at all. However, in interpretations of care 
as things being “at issue” or “mattering” for a person, these two concepts do not seem to mean 
anything substantially different from one another. In any case, whether they are two 
interpretations or one should not change whether my objections are correct.  
&%"
"
things are—what either worldly beings, or the human being itself are—makes a 
difference to how the person, himself, is. (This relation, it can be noted, is also present in 
the person’s relation to things characterized by “indifference,” insofar as this indifference 
to things can and does indeed “make a difference” to how the person, himself, is.) To 
give only two examples—since this view is very widespread—William Blattner writes: 
 
By “care” Heidegger does not want to refer to the particular emotional 
phenomena of worry and devotion, but rather to a constitutive or existential 
condition of human life, on that characterizes a carefree and/or detached person as 
much as one committed to service to others. To care about one’s being is for it to 
matter to one, to make a difference to who one is… Our lives matter to us, they 
concern us, even when they matter by being negligible or irrelevant, whereas non-
human things have no concern with anything at all. They cannot even experience 
their existence as irrelevant.91 
 
And Charles Guignon writes: 
 
Heidegger… [says that] what is distinctive about Dasein is that its being—that is, 
its life as a whole—is at issue for it. In other words, we are beings who care about 
what we are: we care about where our lives are going and what we are becoming 
in our actions. Because our being is at issue for us in this way, we are always 
taking a stand on our lives in what we do. To say that I take a stand on my life 
means that I do not always act on my immediate desires and basic needs, for I 
have second-order motivations and commitments that range over and affect the 
sorts of first-order desires I have.92 
 
 Now, there is no question that this interpretation of care gives a good sense of 
what it is. That care involves things being “at issue” or “mattering” for a person is, in 
fact, unavoidable. As some passages that I will quote in the following will show, that 
things are “at issue” or “matter” for a person is an essential part of the being of the human 
being, and, if care is the being of the human being, then things being “at issue” or """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
91 William Blattner, Heidegger’s Being and Time (Continuum International Publishing Group, 
2006), 37. 
92 Charles Guignon, “Becoming a Self: The Role of Authenticity in Being and Time,” The 
Existentialists: Critical Essays on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre, ed. Charles 
Guignon (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 122. 
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“mattering” for a person is part of care. Even more, this interpretation explains why 
Heidegger uses the word “care” (Sorge) to begin with: he is writing about that very 
general feature of human practical existence by virtue of which humans are capable of 
comporting themselves toward beings, a world, and themselves, in such a way that beings 
are significant, that world matters, and they themselves have a point. For this reason, this 
interpretation is more than adequate as a preparatory point of access to what care is: that 
things are “at issue” or “matter” familiarizes and orients us to care. 
What I only would like to suggest here is that Heidegger, in writing about things 
being “at issue” or “mattering” for a person, is not defining what care is, in the sense that 
to define what care is, is to give a precise and comprehensive specification of what it is. 
Alternatively, when he writes about care as a structure, it is abundantly clear that he is 
defining what care is in this sense. I here then will briefly review those textual areas in 
which Heidegger discusses things being “at issue” or “mattering,” in order to show that, 
in these discussions, Heidegger does not mean to give a definition of care. 
The formulation of things being “at issue” and the idea of things “mattering”93 for 
a person are found in the MacQuarrie and Robinson translation, at the very beginning of 
Heidegger’s analyses of the being of the human being, in the section entitled “The Theme 
of the Analytic of Dasein.” The passages run as follows:94 
 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
93 At least I think that interpretations of care as things “mattering” mean partially to rely on this 
passage, and specifically on the sentence beginning “To entities such as these…” But I may be 
wrong; interpretations that understand care as things “mattering” for a person provide sparse 
textual justification. 
94 The formulation of something being “at issue” also appears in the Macquarrie and Robinson 
translation of a passage that begins Heidegger’s consideration of the human being’s temporality 
(“Dasein exists as an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is itself an issue,” BT/MR, 458 
[406]). I will not consider it in detail, because what I say about the passages that I quote in the 
main body of my text applies to it as well.    
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We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in 
each case mine. These entities, in their Being, comport themselves towards their 
Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being. 
Being is that which is an issue for every such entity. [Das Sein ist es, darum es 
diesem Seinden je selbst geht.]95 
 
That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being [Das Sein, darum es 
diesem Seinden in seinem Sein geht], is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to 
be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as 
things that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, their being is a “matter 
of indifference”; or more precisely, they “are” such that their Being can be neither 
a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite [Diesem Seinden ist sein Sein 
“gleichgültig,” genau besehen, es “is” so, daß ihm sein Sein weder gleichgültig 
noch ungleichgültig sein kann]. Because Dasein has in each case mineness, one 
must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: “I am”, “you are”. 
 Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. 
Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each 
case mine. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, 
comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility.96 
 
I will not dispute the appropriateness of translating gehen… um in such a way that it 
means that its object is “at issue” for its subject. Nor will I dispute the appropriateness of 
translating gleichgültig and ungleichgültig as “matter of indifference” and its “opposite,” 
that is, something which positively matters. So I will, then, acknowledge that Heidegger 
is stating that, for beings with the being of Dasein, that is, beings with the being of the 
human being, things are at issue, and things matter. But the question that I want to raise at 
this point is: where here is Heidegger announcing that he is defining care?  
It does not appear that he is defining care. In fact, “care” is not mentioned in these 
passages. To be sure, if one refers to Stambaugh’s translation, it comes close to being 
mentioned in these passages. She renders “Das Sein ist es, darum es diesem Seinden je 
selbst geht” as “It is being about which this being is concerned.” But it should be 
emphasized that it only comes close to being mentioned, since “to be concerned” is not """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
95 BT/MR, 68 [41-2].   
96 BT/MR, 68-9 [42]. 
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“care,” Sorge. In fact, Stambaugh uses “concern” to translate Fürsorge, which, as I 
suggested above, is not identical to care, Sorge, even though it is a modality of care. 
Even more, since she introduces “concerned” into this passage through the translation of 
gehen… um, “concerned” is introduced into this passage only if being “at issue,” which is 
what this passage is supposed to define care to be, is eliminated from it.  
It may perhaps be replied that, in these passages, Heidegger is defining the being 
of the human being, and, as he later says, that being is care. If this is the case, then when 
these passages state that things are “at issue” or “matter” for a person, it is defining care, 
even while care, the term to be defined, is in absentia (a curious procedure). I can 
concede this for the moment. But then it becomes clear that Heidegger is listing a number 
of defining properties of care—not only does care entail that things are “at issue” or 
“matter” for the being whose being is care, but that being whose being is care is 
characterized by “mineness,” by being “delivered over” to itself, by comporting itself 
toward itself, by using personal pronouns, by making a decision in respect to itself, and 
by comporting itself toward its ownmost possibility (which, later, will be defined as that 
being’s comporting itself toward its own death97). If, then, in this passage, Heidegger is 
defining care, why is it the case that only things being “at issue” or “mattering” are 
highlighted, rather than, say, the use of personal pronouns, or the fact of self-
comportment?  
 There is another possible textual source for this definition of care—namely, 
Heidegger’s discussion of attunement (Befindlichkeit). According to Heidegger, 
attunement, along with understanding, are both constitutive of “the there” (das Da); and 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
97 BT, 232 [250].  
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insofar as “the there” refers to the being that is there for the human being, they are 
constitutive for the human being’s being there, that is, the human being’s very being. 
(“The being which is essentially constituted by being-in-the-world is itself always its 
‘there.’”98) But whereas understanding discloses the there in terms of abilities upon which 
it can project—that is, discloses possible uses of worldly beings whose use that 
understanding allows99), attunement discloses, and through specific “moods” 
(Stimmungen), “how one is.”100 However, “how one is” is not, for Heidegger, a simple 
internal feeling that can be accessed introspectively. “How one is,” for Heidegger, is a 
general way in which the world shows up. Heidegger’s analysis of bad moods shows this: 
 
In bad moods, Da-sein becomes blind to itself, the surrounding world of 
heedfulness is veiled, the circumspection of taking care is led astray… Mood 
assails. It comes neither from “without” nor from “within,” but rises from being-
in-the-world itself as a mode of that being. But thus by negatively contrasting 
attunement with the reflective apprehension of the “inner,” we arrive at a positive 
insight into its character of disclosure. Mood has always already disclosed being-
in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself toward 
something.101 
 
Heidegger then explicitly identifies this general showing-up of the world with things 
“mattering.” As attuned in moods, a person’s “being-in,” that is, a person’s disclosure of 
the “there,” 
 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
98 BT, 125 [132]. Hence “there” is not the “there” of “over there”; it is not a place or discreet 
space. As Heidegger says, the human being is its there: the there is therefore the understanding, 
attuned disclosure of being. Of course, Heidegger smuggles into this rather idiosyncratic 
conception of the “there” the ordinary spatial significance of “there.” For a human being to be 
there is not only to be disclosing being in an understanding and attuned way; it is also to be 
disclosing being in an understanding and attuned way here and now, at this moment and at this 
place. Hence this understanding and attuned disclosure of being is “factical.” It is always at a 
“there,” or Heidegger’s idiosyncratic “there” is “over there” or “over here.”  
99 BT, 134 ff. [143 ff.].  
100 BT, 127 [134]. 
101 BT, 128-9 [136-7].  
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is existentially determined beforehand in such a way that what it encounters in the 
world can matter to it in this way [in dieser Weise… angegangen werden kann]. 
This mattering to [Diese Angänglichkeit] is grounded in attunement, and as 
attunement it has disclosed the world, for example, as something by which it can 
be threatened. Only something which is the attunement of fearing, or fearlessness, 
can discover things at hand in the surrounding world as being threatening. The 
moodedness of attunement constitutes existentially the openness to world of Da-
sein.102 
 
 In light of these passages, it must be acknowledged that, for Heidegger, things 
“mattering” for a person is part of a person’s very being, and therefore is part of care. 
But, again, it is not clear why, here, Heidegger, in indicating the role of things 
“mattering” in a person’s being, is understood to be defining what care is. Similar to 
Heidegger’s initial discussion of things being “at issue,” or things being a “matter of 
indifference” or the “opposite” of a “matter of indifference,” care, Sorge, is not 
mentioned in these passages. One would assume that if Heidegger were defining care in 
these passages, then he would use the word, and indicate that he is defining it; and, again, 
it will become clear that, when Heidegger does define care, he is very explicit that he is 
defining care. Additionally, I can again concede that Heidegger is, here, defining care. 
But it is again not clear why this particular property of care is understood to be the only 
or the primary property of care. That things “matter” to a person is due to the fact that a 
person’s being is always characterized by attunement. However, as Heidegger points out, 
attunement is only one dimension of a person’s being. In particular, it is complemented 
by a person’s understanding. (“We see the two equiprimordially constitutive ways to be 
the there in attunement and understanding”103). Why then should a property that belongs 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
102 BT, 129 [137].  
103 BT, 126 [133].  
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to a person’s attunement, that things “matter,” fundamentally define a person’s being or 
care, rather than, for example, a property that belongs to a person’s understanding? 
 On the other hand, one reason that does clearly explain why Heidegger is 
understood to define care as the fact that things “matter” to a person, is that this concept 
of care has been interpreted in light of Harry Frankfurt’s understanding of care in his 
influential article “The Importance of What We Care About.”104 Marlène Jouan has 
written about the analogies between these two concepts of care.105 Jouan describes 
Frankfurt’s understanding of care in the following way: 
 
according to Frankfurt, to care about something is to guide oneself, both in 
particular courses of action and in life generally, in light of something which is 
important to us, to such a point that the object of our care is constitutive of what 
we are. From this definition it is already manifest that the concept of care applies 
to two main theoretical issues… First a metaphysical one, or the issue of personal 
identity or self-constitution: the concept of care is meant to provide the conditions 
of possibility for being a self or a subject…106  
  
What is particularly interesting about this definition of Frankfurt’s concept of care is its 
proximity to the interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of care that I have been discussing. 
Care amounts to the fact that something is “important” to a person—that something 
“matters” to a person; and care underlies the very being of a person (it is a 
“metaphysical” issue). However, Jouan proceeds to characterize Heidegger’s definition 
of care in the following way: 
 
What about Heidegger’s concept of care? There are two passages in Being and 
Time which are directly and mainly devoted to this concept: chapter 6 from the 
first section, where the concept qualifies the Dasein’s being as grasped in the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
104 Harry Frankfurt, “The Importance of What We Care About,” The Importance of What We 
Care About (Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
105 Marlène Jouan, “Harry Frankfurt’s metaphysics of care: Towards an ethics without reason,” 
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 34:7 (2008), 759-797. 
106 “Harry Frankfurt’s metaphysics of care,” 761-2. 
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unity or the whole of its various existential structures, and chapter 3 from the 
second section, where Heidegger raises the question of the meaning (Sinn) of 
care… At first approximation, the following definition of care can be given: to 
care (about/for), as far as the Dasein is concerned, is to be committed to some 
possibility of himself or herself as the specific form of its always already achieved 
relation to the world and of its self-understanding within it. Ontologically, this 
means that care defines the a priori constitution of the Dasein that governs the 
various ways for him or her to be concerned with other and with the “things” 
ready-to-hand in the world. Care is thus the articulated core ground in which all 
the existential characters of the Dasein find their unity, and in reference to which 
the various “existential” ways of managing oneself in the world can be 
explained.107 
  
In characterizing Heidegger’s definition of care, Jouan emphasizes that Heidegger 
defines the concept of care as the unity of all of the structural aspects of a human being’s 
being: “the concept qualifies the Dasein’s being as grasped in the unity or the whole of its 
various existential structures.” “Care is thus the articulated core ground in which all the 
existential characters of the Dasein find their unity.” While, therefore, there may be a 
sense in which, for Heidegger, care involves something like Frankfurt’s importance, 
nevertheless, from the perspective of precisely defining what care is, what is relevant is 
not this importance—or things mattering—but rather a structure.  
 Let me reiterate that my aim here has not been to minimize the relevance of things 
being “at issue” or “mattering” for a person for understanding what care is. All of the 
passages that I have considered show, in fact, that things being “at issue” or “mattering” 
for a person are deeply involved, for Heidegger, in the being of the human being, and 
therefore in care. I merely wanted to show that they cannot be understood to define care, 
in the sense that a definition provides a precise and comprehensive specification of what 
care is. But what then defines care? 
 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
107 “Harry Frankfurt’s metaphysics of care,” 762. 
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2. A structurally differentiated view of care 
In fact, I believe that Jouan’s interpretation of how Heidegger defines care is correct. In 
other words, I would like to suggest that, for Heidegger, care is, specifically and 
comprehensively, a unity of certain elements that makes up a structure, and this structure 
is the being of the human being.108 This view of care can be called the “structurally 
differentiated” view of care, and I will here give an interpretation of care from its 
perspective. 
Although Hubert Dreyfus does himself offer the interpretation of care as things 
being “at issue,” he nevertheless views care in this structurally differentiated way. 
Quoting Heidegger’s statement that care is “the formal existential totality of Dasein’s 
ontological structural whole,” Dreyfus states that “[c]are unifies the various structural 
aspects of Dasein’s way of being.”109 And there is an abundance of evidence within Being 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
108 Stephen Mulhall, in his interpretation of the concept of care, gives the Frankfurt-inspired 
interpretation, but at just that moment at which he identifies Heidegger’s ultimate definition. 
Mulhall writes that it is Heidegger’s “overarching tripartite characterization” of the being of the 
human being—which Mulhall enumerates as projecting, being thrown, and being-in-the-world—
that “reveals the essential unity of Dasein’s Being to be what Heidegger calls care.” Mulhall then 
quotes Heidegger’s definition of care as “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (-the-world) as Being-
alongside (-entities-encountered-within-the-world). This Being fills in the signification of the 
term ‘care’.” (Mulhall uses the MacQuarrie and Robinson translation.) Mulhall then comments 
that the “proliferation of hyphens indicates that these provisionally separable elements of 
Dasein’s Being are ultimately parts of a whole. And, by labeling that whole ‘care’, Heidegger 
evokes the fact that Dasein is always occupied with the entities it encounters in the world – 
concerned about ready-to-hand present-at-hand entities, and solicitous of other human beings… 
The world and everything in it is something that cannot fail to matter to it.” In other words, 
Mulhall correctly perceives that care names a unity (a “whole”) of structural elements (its 
“parts”). But he then writes that the word care “evokes” something apart from this unity, which, 
he says, it “labels”—namely, that the “world and everything in it is something that cannot fail to 
matter to it.” See Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time: Second Edition (Routledge, 
2005), 112. 
109 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
Division I (MIT Press, 1991), 238-9. Dreyfus’s evidence for his interpretation that “[c]aring, 
understood ontologically, is ‘making itself an issue,’” is the following passage (which he takes 
from Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation): “Dasein exists as a being for which, in its being, 
that being is itself an issue. Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected itself upon its ability to be 
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and Time that suggests that care, for Heidegger, is just this. The first section in which 
Heidegger introduces the chapter entitled “Care as the Being of Da-sein” is itself entitled 
“The Question of the Primordial Totality of the Structural Whole of Da-sein.”110 He states 
that, in this chapter, “the structural whole of the being we seek [the being of Dasein, of 
the human being] must then come to light in an elemental way.”111 In the section in which 
he explains how care is the being of the human being, he begins by stating that “[i]n the 
unity of the determinations of being of Da-sein that we have mentioned, this being 
becomes ontologically comprehensible as such.”112 He characterizes care as a “primordial 
structural totality.”113 He says that “[t]he expression ‘care’ means an existential and basic 
ontological phenomenon which is as yet not simple in its structure.”114 He speaks of “the 
unity and totality of the structural manifold of care.”115 He concludes the section on the 
being of Dasein or of the human being as care by stating that “[t]he whole of the 
constitution of Dasein itself is not simple in its unity, but shows a structural articulation 
which is expressed in the existential concept of care.”116 This all suggests that, for """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
before going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its projection it reveals itself as something 
which has been thrown. It has been thrownly abandoned to the ‘world,’ and falls into it 
concernfully. As care—that is, as existing in the unity of the projection which has been fallingly 
thrown—this entity has been disclosed as ‘there.’” Therefore, Dreyfus, on the one hand, quotes a 
passage in which Heidegger explicitly states that care designates a unity (“As care—that is, as 
existing in the unity…”) but then, on the other hand, arrives at the conclusion that care has to do 
with “making itself an issue.” Now, this is a phrase which does appear in the passage that he 
quotes. But it appears, in the passage, independently of Heidegger’s explicit statement about care. 
And—if one were selecting phrases from this passage in order to define care, simply because they 
appear in this passage—it is a phrase which appears alongside other phrases that could just as 
much be taken as definitions of care (“Essentially ahead of itself,” “it has projected itself upon its 
ability,” “it reveals itself as something which has been thrown”). 
110 BT, 169 [180].  
111 BT, 170 [182]. 
112 BT, 178 [191].  
113 BT, 180 [193].  
114 BT, 183 [196].  
115 BT, 183 [196].  
116 BT, 186 [200]. 
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Heidegger, care is a unity of elements, which makes up a particular structure, and this 
structure is the being of the human being. And, therefore, an interpretation of care must 
interpret care in such a way that (a) it shows the elements of the structure that is care, and 
(b) it shows how those elements are unified.  
I will focus here on the first part (a) since, in discussing the elements of the 
structure of care, how they are unified will become clear. But what are the elements that 
make up the structure that is care?  
Heidegger gives an explicit enumeration of these elements. He writes that “[t]he 
formal existential totality of the ontological structural whole must thus be formulated in 
the following structure: The being of Da-sein means being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in 
(the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered). This being fills in 
the significance of the term care…”117 (As I suggested above, in looking at the view of 
care according to which it means that things are “at issue” or “matter” to a person, 
Heidegger is very explicit when he is defining care.) He repeats this enumeration of 
unified structural elements elsewhere. He writes that “[t]he characterization of care as 
‘being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in’—as being-together-with—makes it clear that 
this phenomenon, too, is yet structurally articulated in itself.”118 He repeats it elsewhere 
too: The “primordial constitution of being of care” is “being-ahead-of-itself—already-
being-in-a-world—as being together with innerworldly beings.”119 And Heidegger 
provides confirmation that it is these particular elements that constitute the structure that 
is care, and gives a slightly more specific description of them, in discussing how, as he 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
117 BT, 179-80 [192].  
118 BT, 183 [196].  
119 BT, 188 [202].  
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says, the “underlying totality of care shows through in the phenomenon of willing.”120 
What “shows through” in the phenomenon of willing is, he says, “the previous 
disclosedness of the for-the-sake-of-which in general (being ahead-of-oneself), the 
disclosedness of what can be taken care of (world as the wherein of already-being), and 
the understanding self-projection of Da-sein upon a potentiality-for-being toward a 
possibility of the being “willed.’”121  
In Heidegger’s enumeration of these elements, what is particularly conspicuous is 
his emphasis on their temporal senses. In the first three enumerations that I considered, 
care involves being “ahead-of-oneself,” which involves the future; being “already-in (the 
world),” which involves the past; and “being-together-with,” which indicates the 
present.122 In the fourth enumeration, however, this temporal dimension becomes 
confused; while the first two elements again indicate the future and past, respectively, the 
third element now no longer appears to indicate the present, but rather the future.123 I will 
not try to tease out here the specific temporality of care that Heidegger is trying to show 
in these specific enumerations; it is clear that Heidegger is foreshadowing his later 
discussion of how care is fundamentally dependent on the three temporal ecstases.124  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
120 BT, 181 [194].  
121 BT, 181 [194].  
122 Mulhall, in enumerating the elements of the structure of care, especially emphasizes this 
temporal dimension: “Dasein’s thrownness (exemplified in its openness to states-of-mind) shows 
it to be already in a world; its projectiveness (exemplified in its capacity for understanding) 
shows it to be at the same time ahead of itself, aiming to realize some existential possibility; and 
its fallenness shows it to be preoccupied with the world. The overaching tripartite characterization 
reveals the essentially unity of Dasein’s Being to be what Heidegger calls care.” Heidegger and 
Being and Time, 112. 
123 On the other hand, in the fourth enumeration, the second element also may be taken to indicate 
the present, although, in the parentheses, Heidegger reaffirms that it indicates the past. 
124 BT, 297ff. [323ff.].  
''"
"
What, rather, I want to focus on are the three basic kinds of abilities that these 
enumerations specify in the structure of care. Why exactly these three elements specify 
abilities will only emerge in the following. But it can provisionally be seen that the first 
element that Heidegger enumerates, “being-ahead-of-oneself” or “for-the-sake-of-
which,” indicates a kind of self which a person purposefully pursues and therefore is able 
to be. And the second element that Heidegger enumerates, “already-being-in-the-world” 
or “what can be taken care of,” indicates the world, or worldly beings, which can be 
cared for, that is, which a person is able to care for. And the third element that Heidegger 
enumerates, “being together with innerworldly beings,” or “the understanding self-
projection of Da-sein upon a potentiality of being,”125 indicates a person’s ability to be 
with innerworldly beings, or an ability, by virtue of understanding, to pursue a 
potentiality-for-being or a possibility.  
What I would like to do here is to consider each of these three elements of the 
structure of care in turn. I will not, however, immediately highlight the sense in which 
each of these elements of the structure of care are abilities; I will discuss that in the 
following section. I will, for each of these elements, introduce special, and I hope 
clarificatory, names. Why I choose these particular names will become clear in the course 
of my discussion. I will call the first element “the possible self,” the second element “the 
facilitating world,” and the third element “skills.” I will, however, for the sake of a 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
125 In the enumerations, this third element seems to change senses. In the first three enumerations, 
Heidegger writes about being with innerworldly beings; in the fourth enumeration, Heidegger 
writes about projecting upon a potentiality-for-being, which refers, not to innerworldly beings per 
se, but rather to the for-the-sake-of-which. I cannot explain this change of sense; it might be 
related to the fact that Heidegger is trying to show how the structure of care makes sense of 
willing. In any case, significant for me is only the abilities that these enumerations allow to be 
identified in the structure of care.  
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clearer exposition, look at the possible self first, skills second, and the facilitating world 
third.  
A. The possible self. Heidegger’s first characterization of what he calls the “for-
the-sake-of-which” or “being-ahead-of-itself,” or what I am calling the “possible self,” 
makes clear its connection to classical teleology. Just as, for Aristotle, every specifically 
human undertaking, every techne and every praxis, aims at, or holds before itself in 
anticipation, some good,126 so too, for Heidegger, something toward which a person’s 
action can ultimately aim stands out before him in each of his actions. After describing 
the “world” as an interlocking network of beings that perform some work (a performance 
of some work that Heidegger calls “relevance,” Bewandtnis, or “what-for,” Wozu; I will 
return to this below) Heidegger introduces the possible self as not just another work-to-
be-performed, or relevant what-for, but rather as a “for-the-sake-of-which” (Worum-
willen): 
 
The total relevance itself, however, ultimately leads back to a what-for which no 
longer has relevance, which itself is not a being whose being is defined as being-
in-the-world, to whose constitution of being worldliness itself belongs. This 
primary what-for is not just another for-that as a possible factor in relevance. The 
primary “what-for” is a for-the-sake-of-which.127 
 
The possible self duplicates or plays the same position as Aristotle’s “good.” Each 
worldly activity, or each use of a worldly being, is undertaken for the sake of some 
specific possible self. (And there is a difference between “the” possible self and “some 
specific possible self,” which I will comment on in the next paragraph.) Heidegger 
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126 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a. 
127 BT, 78-9 [84].  
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therefore writes that the uses of worldly beings are “anchored” in the for-the-sake-of-
which.128  
 But the proximity of the possible self to the good of Aristotle’s practical teleology 
is complemented by a specific distance. Heidegger’s possible self is not an abstract 
“goodness”—an abstract goodness that Aristotle critically attributes to Plato129 but which 
is still preserved in his own interpretation of the good as happiness. Rather, it possesses a 
particular shape. It is a self, and that it is a self explains why I am calling this element the 
possible self:  
 
Da-sein is a being which is concerned in its being about that being. The “is 
concerned about…” has become clearer in the constitution of… being toward its 
ownmost potentiality-for-being. This potentiality is that for the sake of which any 
Da-sein is as it is. Da-sein has always already compared itself, in its being, with a 
possibility of itself.130 
 
John Haugeland has given a useful account of how this aimed-at self should be 
understood.131 Haugeland calls it a “role.” He understands a “role” as a set of normative 
expectations, which can be publicly articulated, and to which a person finds himself 
accountable.132 These normative expectations should not be understood as imperative 
obligations, but rather as specifications of a type of life to which a person tries to 
conform. It should be noted, however, that the possible self itself does not take the form 
of a specific kind of self—it itself is not any kind of specific possible self. The possible 
self is “ontological,” not “ontic.” Nevertheless, in a person’s concrete activity, a person """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
128 BT, 179 [192]. 
129 Nicomachean Ethics, 1096a. 
130 BT, 179 [191]. 
131 John Haugeland, “Heidegger on Being a Person,” Noûs, 16:1 (1982), 15-26. 
132 For example, according to Haugeland: “[w]e call a sort which is involved in many interrelated 
norms a role—e.g., the role of the king in chess” (“Heidegger on Being a Person,” 17); and “what 
a unity of accountability is accountable for is a function of its official rank—or, more generally, 
its various social and institutional roles” (“Heidegger on Being a Person,” 21). 
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does pursue a specific kind of possible self. The possible self will be instantiated, as the 
case may be, by a broad diversity of “roles,” such as those of a doctor, a teacher, and so 
on. A person’s practical activities in the world are directed toward the fulfillment of the 
normative expectations of some specific possible self.  
 But the quality that sheds the most light on the meaning of the possible self is not 
its teleological nature, nor the fact that it is a self, but rather the fact that is always 
possible. This explains why I am calling it the possible self. This “possibility” must, 
however, be understood in a specific sense. The possible self is not “possible” in the 
familiar metaphysical and epistemological senses. That is, it is not a state of affairs that is 
not is not inconsistent with what is the case or known to be true. Rather, the possible self 
is possible insofar as it belongs to the future: 
 
When one understands oneself projectively in an existentiell [that is, some 
particular] possibility, the future underlies this understanding, and it does so as a 
coming-toward-oneself from the actual possibility as which Da-sein always 
exists.133 
 
Or, again, the “schema in which Da-sein comes back to itself futurally, whether 
authentically or inauthentically, is the for-the-sake-of-itself.”134  
What is this “futurity” of the possible self? This futurity must be understood in a 
specific sense. Heidegger does not understand time to be composed of moments, discreet 
“presents,” which succeed one another, and which can be quantitatively “added up.” For 
Heidegger, this is a “vulgar” understanding of time.135 If, for this reason, the possible self 
is futural, its futurity cannot be understood as a future moment to which a present 
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133 BT, 309 [336]. 
134 BT, 333 [365]. 
135 BT, 385 [420] ff. 
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moment ineluctably passes. The futurity of the possible self is, rather, a futurity of 
availability. The possible self stands open as a determinate kind of self that a person is 
able to direct himself toward. Insofar as the possible self is “futural,” Heidegger suggests, 
“‘future’ does not mean a now that has not yet become ‘actual' and that sometime will be 
for the first time, but the coming in which Da-sein comes toward itself.”136 Or, again, the 
future self is a “potentiality [that] lets Da-sein come towards itself in its heedful being 
together with what is to be taken care of.”137 
 The contribution of a person’s possible self to the structure of care can, in this 
perspective, be understood in the following way: The possible self holds open, as 
available, some specific self, for which a person’s worldly actions aim.  
 B. Skills. But how does a person manage to pursue some specific kind of possible 
self, or, to shorten the expression, a possible self? Even if, for Heidegger, a person never 
will “realize” a possible self, in the sense that it will become a completed object, a person 
does manage and is able to move toward it. This suggests that, in the structure of care, the 
possible self must be complemented by skills on whose basis a possible self can be 
pursued. What I am here calling “skills” describes that element in the structure of care 
that Heidegger calls “being together” with innerworldly beings, or the “understanding 
self-projection” of the human being, and it is this “being together” with innerworldly 
beings, or this “understanding self-projection,” which allow a person to act in such a way 
that some kind of possible self can be pursued.  
I use the term “skills” for a specific reason. For Heidegger, the “understanding” 
(Verstehen) of the “understanding self-projection,” for which I am using the term “skills,” """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
136 BT, 299 [325].  
137 BT, 310 [337].   
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does not primarily refer to a faculty of representation or cognition that displays, to the 
mind, objects with particular properties. For Heidegger, this kind of “theoretical” 
understanding is secondary to a more fundamental kind of understanding.138 Heidegger 
writes that 
 
[s]peaking ontically, we sometimes use the expression “to understand something” 
to mean “being able to handle a thing,” “being up to it,” “being able to do 
something.” In understanding as an existential, the thing we are able to do is not a 
what but being as existing.139  
 
“Understanding” means to “be able to do something,” to “handle a thing.” Heidegger 
therefore introduces the concept of “projection” (entwerfen) or “project” (Entwurf) in 
order to indicate the fundamental character of understanding.140 A “project” is the 
understanding of some possible action, or some possible use of a worldly being, that 
allows that action to be performed, or that allows that worldly being to be used. For this 
reason, Heidegger writes that understanding “throws” possibilities “before” (vorwirft) a 
person: “the project character of understanding means that understanding does not 
thematically grasp that upon which it projects… in projecting project throws possibility 
before itself as possibility, and as such lets it be.”141 This is why I use the term “skills” in 
order to describe this structural element of care. A person’s involvement with 
innerworldly beings, or understanding self-projection, consists in the exercise of some 
skills that allows a person to act. 
This conception of understanding as skills explains why it is, for Heidegger, along 
with the possible self, an element of the structure of care. A person can pursue some kind """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
138 See also BT, 56ff. [59ff.]. 
139 BT, 134 [143]. 
140 BT, 136 [145].  
141 BT, 136 [145].  
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of possible self because a person has some set of skills whose exercise enables him to 
pursue some kind of possible self. Heidegger writes that 
 
[f]ormulated primordially and existentially, understanding means: to be projecting 
toward a potentiality-of-being for the sake of which Da-sein always exists. 
Understanding discloses one’s own potentiality of being in such a way that Da-
sein always somehow knows understandingly what is going on with itself. This 
“knowing,” however, does not mean that it has discovered some fact, but that it 
holds itself in an existentiell possibility.142 
 
A person pursues some kind of possible self. But a person’s understanding allows him to 
have some set of skills, through which he understands what is “going on” with himself, 
so that he can project toward a possible self, or “hold himself” in specific possibilities so 
that he can move toward a possible self. Heidegger therefore writes that a person’s skills 
“entrusts” a person to himself, or “frees” a person for a possible self: 
 
As a potentiality for being which it is, it has let some go by; it constantly adopts 
the possibilities of its being, grasps them, and goes astray. But this means that Da-
sein is a being-possible entrusted to itself, thrown possibility throughout. Da-sein 
is the possibility of being free for its ownmost potentiality of being.143 
 
By, so to speak, “picking up” (and, so to speak, “dropping”) certain skills, a person is 
“freed” for his “ownmost potentiality of being,” in other words, is freed to pursue a 
possible self (and, in this case—for reasons which are connected with Heidegger’s use of 
the word “ownmost,” and which I will explain later—a possible self that is authentic). 
This, then, is the contribution that a person’s skills makes to the structure of care: it is 
only on the basis of a person’s skills, that a person can pursue some kind of possible self.  
 C. The facilitating world. The structure of care includes the possible self, and 
skills; a person, whose being is characterized by care, is able to pursue some kind of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
142 BT, 309 [336].  
143 BT, 135 [144] 
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possible self, and is able to exercise some set of skills by virtue of which that self is 
pursued. However, for Heidegger, this pursuit of a possible self, and this exercise of 
skills, does not occur in a vacuum. It occurs in a world. The possible self is a worldly 
possible self; and skills are skills that are deployed in a world. Alongside these first two 
elements of the structure of care, therefore, Heidegger adds the element of the world, and 
I will call this element of the world the “facilitating world,” a designation whose meaning 
will become clear momentarily.  
 Two features of this facilitating world should especially be emphasized. First, for 
Heidegger, the world—which, like the possible self, and a person’s skills, is not any 
particular world; it is a type of structure by which any particular world is organized—
consists of worldly beings. But these worldly beings are not an agglomeration of dense, 
individual, substances, “objects” or “things” whose being is “presence-at-hand” 
(Vorhandenheit). Rather, they are beings which are “ready-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit), or 
ready to be practically used.144 Worldly beings are materials, on which work can be 
performed, and from which other beings that can be used can be developed;145 worldly 
beings are instruments, or beings with which work can be performed;146 and worldly 
beings are beings that are produced from materials and through instruments, and which 
can, in turn, be used for further work.147 As Mark Okrent has shown very well, they are 
beings whose basic character is their functional use in human activity. 148 The 
fundamental way in which these worldly beings exist can therefore be called 
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144 BT, 67 [71].  
145 BT, 66 [70].  
146 BT, 65 [69].  
147 BT, 65 [70].  
148 Mark Okrent, Heidegger’s Pragmatism (Cornell University Press, 1991). 
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“anthropotechnic.”149 They are articulated in just that way such that human work and 
action are supported, or facilitated, by them. “What is at hand,” Heidegger writes, “is 
discovered as such in its serviceability, usability, determinentality.”150 
Second, these worldly, facilitating beings, enjoy relations of reference 
(Verweisung) with one another. These referential relations should not be understood in 
light of the concept of reference common to the philosophy of language. For Heidegger, 
material beings are “referred to” to the instrumental beings that work on them in the 
sense that they can, in an appropriate manner, be worked on by them. Instrumental beings 
are “referred to” the beings that they work to produce in the sense that they can, in an 
appropriate manner, be worked with, so as to produce those beings. And those produced 
beings can become material and instrumental in turn, and therefore can be “referred” 
again to instrumental and produced beings.151 In other words, worldly beings are related 
referentially to one another because one use of a worldly being leads directly to, or 
further facilitates, another use of a worldly being. For this reason, Heidegger says, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
149 The world is technological in the sense that the way in which it is articulated supports human 
work and practice. But the world is “anthropotechnic” insofar as it is characteristically human 
technique that this technical articulation allows: human technique uses materials, uses 
instruments, and produces beings through materials and instruments, and worldly beings are 
meaningful in just that way, that material-use, instrument-use, and production, can take place. In 
this sense, an anthropotechnical world is not what is commonly understood to be a “technical” 
world. A “technical” world (if it even deserves the name “world”) can be compared to an 
anthropotechnical world in the way that Heidegger, in The Question Concerning Technology, 
compares the way in which being is disclosed technologically, as “standing reserve” and in the 
“frame,” to the way that being is disclosed according to the four Aristotelian “causes.” See Martin 
Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (Harper & Row, 1982), 8. There is no question that 
Heidegger preserves the “technicity” of the four Aristotelian causes; they disclose a way in which 
beings come to presence through techne. However, each of these technical causes possess a 
meaning in which human action—here, for Heidegger, primarily poeisis—can understand itself, 
and support itself. Heidegger therefore uses the concept of “indebtedness” to describe the relation 
to the causes, a concept that makes the causes intelligible in just that way that human practice can 
be “at home” (in the sense of “oikos”) in them. 
150 BT, 135 [144]. 
151 BT, 78 [83-4].  
(&"
"
worldly beings have “relevance” (Bewandtnis).152 The world is not, then, an exhaustive 
set of individual substances, things, or objects, but rather a network of mutually 
facilitating beings, each of whose uses facilitates the uses of other beings.  
 I call this element of the structure of care the “facilitating world” because, in the 
ready-to-hand character of worldly beings, and in the referential relations between 
worldly beings, this world facilitates its own use. Worldly beings are such that they can 
be used, and they are such that the use of one being allows other beings to be used.  
The fact that the facilitating world is facilitating in these ways shows its 
connection to the other two structural elements of care. A person can pursue some kind of 
possible self because the ready-to-hand character of worldly beings and the referential 
relations between worldly beings facilitates the pursuit of some kind of possible self. If a 
person pursues a possible self of a doctor, then his specific world facilitates that pursuit; 
he has materials, tools, and products, using which, independently and together, he can be 
a doctor. And a person can exercise some kind of skills, in order to pursue some kind of 
possible self, because the worldly situations in which he exercises those skills is 
composed of beings whose ready-to-hand character and referential relations facilitates 
that exercise. A person can skillfully pursue a possible self of a doctor because his 
specific world facilitates the exercise of his skills: its materials, tools, and products, can 
be used by the exercise of his skills. 
 
 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
152 BT, 78 [84]. “Beings are discovered with regard to the fact that they are referred, as those 
beings which they are, to something. They are relevant together with something else…. To be 
relevant means to let something be together with something else. The relation of ‘together… 
with…’  is to be indicated by the term reference.” 
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3. Care and ability 
It is possible now to understand more precisely Heidegger’s statement that “[t]he being of 
Da-sein means being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with 
(innerworldly beings encountered). This being fills in the significance of the term 
care…”153 “Care” is the structural whole consisting in these three elements: the possible 
self, a person’s skills, and the facilitating world. And these elements are unified with one 
another, insofar as by the exercise of some kind of skills, a person pursues some kind of 
possible self, and this pursuit, and this exercise, are facilitated by some kind of 
facilitating world. When, therefore, in the following, I speak of a person’s care, I mean to 
indicate the being of the human being that consists in these three unified elements. 
Ontologically—that is, in terms of a person’s very being—a person is characterized by 
the possible self; by skills; and by being in the facilitating world. And, ontically—that is, 
in terms of the particular properties that a particular person possesses—a person has a 
specific possible self, a specific set of skills, and is in a specific facilitating world. 
 However, I want, lastly, to point out a feature that all of the differentiated 
structural elements that compose care—the possible self, skills, and the facilitating 
world—share in common. They all refer to a person’s abilities. The possible self is a self 
that a person is able to pursue—as available to a person, it is a self that a person is able to 
become. A person’s skills are skills that a person is able to exercise, and, by exercising, 
are those skills by which a person is able to pursue a possible self. And the facilitating 
world is a facilitating world because it consists in worldly beings which are able to be 
used—in other words, in their ontological character, they are able to perform some work, 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
153 BT, 179-80 [192].  
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and are able to be referred to one another, so that, in their own use, other world beings 
are able to be used.  
 Care, the being of the human being, is therefore a structure that essentially 
comprises a person’s abilities, or, more generally, what Heidegger calls a person’s 
“ability-to-be” (Seinkönnen). And that it is in terms of a person’s abilities that, in 
particular, a person’s authenticity must be understood is clear from the passage in which 
Heidegger explicitly links authenticity to the being of the human being: 
 
Dasein is always its possibility. It does not “have” that possibility only as a mere 
attribute of something objectively present. And because Da-sein is always 
essentially its possibility, it can “choose” itself in its being, it can win itself, it can 
lose itself, or it can never and only “apparently” win itself.154  
 
To be sure, in Stambaugh’s translation, which I am using in this dissertation, the words 
“ability” and “abilities” are not used. She renders Heidegger’s “Möglichkeit” and 
“möglichkeiten” as “possibility” and “possibilities”; additionally, she renders 
“Seinkönnen” not as “ability-to-be,” but as “potentiality-of-being.” These translations, 
however, are misleading, and while I will preserve them in quotations that I give, in 
referring, in my own text, to the concepts of Möglichkeit, Möglichkeiten, and Seinkönnen, 
I will refer to them as “ability,” “abilities,” and “ability-to-be.” The reason is 
straightforward. In English, the word “possibility” primarily signifies modal or categorial 
possibility—what could be the case or could be true insofar as it is not inconsistent with 
what is the case or is known to be true. But what Heidegger means to refer to with 
“Möglichkeit” is not this kind of “possibility,” but rather, precisely, a person’s ability—
what a person is able to be, insofar as he pursues a possible self, exercises skills, and uses 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
154 BT, 40 [42].  
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worldly beings.155 Similarly, the “können” in “Seinkönnen” is misleadingly rendered as 
“potentiality,” since “potentiality,” like “possibility,” suggests modal or categorial 
possibility—what a being can be just insofar as it is not inconsistent with what is the case 
or is known to be true. But by “können” Heidegger means to indicate what a being can be 
insofar as it is able to be what it can be—that is, what it can be insofar as what it can be 
are just its abilities: 
 
Da-sein is always what it can be and how it is its possibility [ability]. The 
essential possibility [ability] of Da-sein concerns the ways of taking care of the 
“world” which we characterized, of concern for others, and always already 
present in all of this, the potentiality-of-being [ability-to-be] itself.156 
  
The structure of care, then, ultimately indicates a structure consisting in a person’s 
abilities (Möglichkeiten) or ability-to-be (Seinkönnen). One last qualification, however, 
should be added to this. A person’s abilities, and likewise a person’s ability-to-be, should 
not be understood as static things that inhere in a person, like the color red, or a certain 
weight, inheres in a person. But this is not merely because a person’s abilities comprise a 
person’s care, that is, a person’s very being, and therefore cannot be understood as simple 
properties of a person’s being. Rather, and primarily, they do not inhere in a person’s 
being because they do not have, for Heidegger, the ontological character of presence-at-
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
155 There is also an etymological argument for preferring “ability” over “possibility” in translating 
“Möglichkeit.” The English “possibility” is derived from the Latin “possibilitas.” The German 
“Möglichkeit” is unrelated to “possibilitas”; and its root, “mögen,” has a sense that “possibilitas” 
lacks: what might be insofar as it is at a person’s pleasure or disposal. “Ability” therefore 
captures this latter meaning in “Möglichkeit” much better than “possibility.” However, it can be 
pointed out that the same problem does not obtain in the translation of “Seinkönnen” as 
“potentiality-of-being.” “Potentiality” derives from the Latin “potentia,” that is, might, force or 
power; and so, etymologically, “potentiality” preserves a sense of ability that “possibility” does 
not. But while this might be the case etymologically, the philosophical history of “potentia” or 
“potentiality” covers over that sense of ability, and so the word “ability” is preferable for the 
“können” in “Seinkönnen.” 
156 BT,  134 [143]. Translation amended. 
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hand. They are therefore not present. They are, rather, abilities: they “are” only insofar as 
they are what a person is able to be. This means, however, that if a person is his abilities, 
this is not due to the fact that those abilities, so to speak, “stand” in him, as substantial, 
self-subsistent things—as when, for example, a table with four legs, is a table with four 
legs, because these legs “stand” beneath the table, as substantial, self-subsistent things. 
Rather, for Heidegger, what supports the fact that a person is his abilities is the fact that a 
person is projecting into his abilities.  
“Projection” (entwerfen) is a concept to which I referred above. As I explained, it 
indicates the understanding of the human being, but, in particular, that understanding by 
which a person throws before himself (vorwirft) some ability. The concept of projection 
can now be expanded in the following way. It indicates the understanding by which a 
person throws before himself, or, as I will say, projects into, some ability: that is, throws 
before himself, or projects into, some possible self, or some worldly being. In this 
throwing-before-himself of, or projecting into, some possible self, or some worldly being, 
that possible self or worldly being is a person’s ability: a person is able to pursue a 
possible self, or able to use a worldly being, because, projecting into them, understands 
how to pursue a possible self, or he understands how to use a worldly being. However, for 
this reason, projection does not merely support a person’s abilities insofar as it projects 
into those particular abilities which are a person’s possible self or worldly beings. Even 
more, it itself is an ability. I initially introduced the concept of projection in order to 
account for that structural aspect of care which is a person’s skills, and, as I explained, a 
person’s skills also indicate a person’s ability: a person is able to exercise his skills, so 
that he is able to pursue a possible self, and is able to use worldly beings. A person’s 
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projecting, therefore, is that ability by which a person is able to pursue a possible self, 
and is able to use worldly beings.  
In the following, then, when speaking of a person’s care, I therefore mean to refer 
to a structure, whose elements comprise the possible self, a person’s skills, and the 
facilitating world. But these three structural elements ultimately consist in a person’s 
abilities—a person’s ability to pursue a possible self, a person’s ability to exercise skills, 
and a person’s ability to use worldly beings. But, finally, as consisting in a person’s 
abilities, a person’s care can be understood as his projecting into abilities: his ability, or 
skill, to project into a possible self, and worldly beings, so that a possible self is able to 
be pursued, and worldly beings are able to be used.  
)!"
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Chapter 4: Inauthenticity as Existential Mania 
 
In this chapter, I will give an interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of inauthenticity 
(Uneigentlichkeit). My aim is to prepare an understanding of the concept of authenticity, 
which I will interpret in the sixth chapter. However, in this chapter, I will say little about 
the concept of authenticity. My interest is to make clear what, in many ways, is its 
contrary,157 so that, in the following chapter, the nature and significance of its own 
properties can be more clearly seen. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger consistently distinguishes authenticity from 
inauthenticity. They are two mutually independent kinds of existence by which a person 
is characterized. In his discussion of guilt, Heidegger writes that Dasein “always 
maintains itself in this being as either authentic or inauthentic existence.”158 For 
Heidegger, authenticity and inauthenticity are distinguished, in particular, in relation to a 
person’s ability to be an individual. Heidegger differentiates what he calls the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
157 To be sure, it is unclear whether the condition of authenticity is truly the “contrary” of the 
condition of inauthenticity, in the sense that the person who is inauthentic is not authentic at all, 
and the person who is authentic is not inauthentic at all. Heidegger does, often, speak this way—
for example, in the quote that I give just below, Heidegger says that a person relates to his guilt in 
“either authentic or inauthentic existence” (emphasis added). Also see BT, 80 [86]: “In 
understanding a context of relations, Da-sein has been referred to an in-order-to in terms of an 
explicitly or inexplicitly grasped potentiality-of-its-being for the sake of which it is, which can be 
authentic or inauthentic.” And see BT, 345 [376]: “Da-sein always exists as authentically or 
inauthentically historical.” However, Heidegger writes that that the condition of authenticity is a 
modification of the condition of inauthenticity (BT, 122 [130]); and he also writes that the 
condition of inauthenticity is a modification of the condition of authenticity (BT, 293 [317]). 
Putting aside the question of incoherence in the text, this suggests that they are not separable from 
one another like contraries, but are interwoven. I only want to note that for the purposes of my 
own critique of the concept of authenticity, I do not have a horse in this race. That the concept of 
authenticity is paradoxical is true whether or not the authentic self is a modification of the 
inauthentic self, or vice-versa. This question has been primarily addressed in a debate over 
whether inauthenticity is an inescapable condition. See Taylor Carman, “Must We Be 
Inauthentic?,” Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus: 
Volume 1, ed. Mark A. Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (MIT Press, 2000); Being-in-the-World, 141ff. 
158 BT, 283 [306]. 
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“inauthentic self” from the “authentic self, the self which has explicitly grasped itself.”159 
And, as Heidegger writes in relation to a person’s understanding, “[u]nderstanding is 
either authentic, originating from its own self, or inauthentic.”160 A person who is 
inauthentic has neither grasped himself, nor does his understanding—and, as I will show, 
his abilities in general—originate161 from his own self; on the other hand, a person who is 
authentic grasps himself, and his understanding—and, as I will show, his abilities in 
general—do originate from his own self. The inauthentic person, then, is a person who is 
anonymous—not “anonymous” insofar as he is, so to speak, “unknown by others,” but 
anonymous in the sense that he can neither grasp himself as the individual that he is, nor 
play an originating role in respect to himself. 
 In the following, I will give an interpretation of why the inauthentic person is 
anonymous that supplements the reasons given by the common interpretation of 
inauthenticity. For this common interpretation, which I will call the “conformity” 
interpretation, the inauthentic person is anonymous because the inauthentic person 
conforms his abilities and understanding to the kind of abilities and understanding 
characteristic of what Heidegger calls das Man, “the one,” “the they,” or, more 
straightforwardly (and the formulation I will use in the following), the impersonal crowd. 
The kinds of abilities that the inauthentic person understands and chooses, and the very 
fact that the inauthentic person makes choices at all, is determined by the impersonal 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
159 BT, 121 [129].  
160 BT, 137 [146].  
161 As I will explain, and against Heidegger’s own statement that I just quoted, this “origination” 
must not be understood as a pure origination, as though what is originated were created by a 
person’s own self. 
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crowd. The impersonal crowd exercises a “dictatorship” (Diktatur)162 over the life of the 
inauthentic person, who, as a result, is anonymous.  
This interpretation is correct, but I believe that it overlooks a crucial part of 
Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity and the anonymity that belongs to it. Namely, it 
overlooks the fact that the inauthentic person is characterized by what I will call 
“existential mania,” that is, is characterized by the fact that he understands his abilities as 
limitless and not factical, and that he is perpetually acting. For Heidegger, I will argue, 
these three properties of the inauthentic person explain, as much as the inauthentic 
person’s conformity to the norms that regulate the action and understanding of the 
impersonal crowd, why the inauthentic person is anonymous. Significantly, in a lecture 
course given before the publication of Being and Time, it is primarily this existential 
mania that Heidegger emphasizes in discussing what, in Being and Time, will become 
inauthenticity. I will refer to what Heidegger says in this lecture course in my 
interpretation of inauthenticity in Being and Time. 
It is also significant that the connection between mania and anonymity can be 
found in a group of psychoanalytic texts that address the psychological condition of 
mania—texts by Freud, Melanie Klein, and D.W. Winnicott. This psychoanalytic 
conception of mania has deep and interesting parallels with Heidegger’s conception of 
what I am calling existential mania. As I will show, for the psychoanalytic conception, 
the manic person is in a perpetual “flight” from anxiety and death, takes his libidinal 
possibilities to be unlimited, but does not understand the real libidinal possibilities that he 
possesses, and is perpetually acting; significantly, as a result, the manic person’s 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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understanding of himself as an individual is severely diminished, and he becomes 
incapable of any genuine, individual concern. I will, therefore, in the following, give a 
brief account of the psychoanalytic conception of mania, in order to bring into view some 
of the ideas and connections between ideas that will be relevant in looking at Heidegger’s 
understanding of inauthenticity. 
However, it should be stressed that I do not want to claim that the existential 
mania that Heidegger describes should be identified, in any way, with the psychological 
mania that the psychoanalysts describe. This would ignore Heidegger’s fundamental 
contention in Being and Time that the ontological dimensions of human life that he is 
describing, for instance inauthenticity, cannot be equated with the “facts” that the human 
sciences describe, for example, the facts that psychologists describe.163 Therefore, the 
psychoanalytic conception of mania will serve here only as a useful heuristic for 
introducing and becoming attentive to themes that are overlooked in interpretations of 
Heidegger’s conception of inauthenticity.  
I will therefore (1) look at the common conformity interpretation of 
inauthenticity, and of why the condition of inauthenticity is a condition of anonymity; (2) 
look at the psychoanalytic conception of mania; and (3) show how, apart from 
conformity, the reason why the inauthentic person is anonymous is the existential mania 





163 BT, 42ff. [45ff.]. 
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1. The conformity interpretation of inauthenticity 
The inauthentic person is anonymous—he neither “explicitly grasps” himself as an 
individual, nor is his individual self the “origin” of his understanding and activities. The 
common interpretation of this anonymity, which I am calling the “conformity” 
interpretation, is that it is due to the fact that the inauthentic person, in his abilities and 
understanding, conforms to the kinds of abilities and understanding characteristic of what 
Heidegger calls “das Man,” which is commonly translated as “the they” or “the one,” and 
which I will also call “the impersonal crowd.” But what, more precisely, is das Man?  
For Heidegger, the being of the human being is always a being which is a “being-
with” others: “Dasein,” being-there, is always “Mitda-sein,” being-there with. These 
others, with whom a person exists, are neither objects, nor facades behind which one 
must infer an human intentionality just like one’s own, nor tools. They are “completely 
different from tools and things.”164 Rather, they are beings who have the being of human 
beings—they are beings who exist, or whose being is care. The others “are like the very 
Da-sein which frees [discloses] them—they are there too, and there with it.”165 On the 
other hand, these others do not compose a group of distinct individuals. These others are 
distinct only in their indistinction: they mesh together into a crowd in which no one is 
distinct from any one else. In this crowd, “[e]veryone is the other, and no one is himself. 
The they [das Man]… is the nobody…”166 Being-with others, a person is with das Man, 
the impersonal crowd. 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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166 BT, 120 [128].  
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According to the conformity interpretation of inauthenticity, the inauthentic 
person is anonymous because this being-with others of the inauthentic person, is, so to 
speak, a being-like others. The others who compose das Man are beings whose being is 
care; but being-with this impersonal crowd means that a person’s own kind of care 
conforms to its kind of care. Charles Guignon therefore writes that the abilities in which 
the inauthentic person’s care consists become just those abilities in which the impersonal 
crowd’s care consists: 
 
For the most part in our everyday lives, we are dispersed into They-possibilities, 
doing what “one” does as anyone might do such things. Being a “They-self” in 
this way promotes a mode of existence Heidegger calls “inauthentic.” The 
German word for “authentic,” eigentlich, comes from the stem eigen which means 
“own,” so an inauthentic life would be one that is unowned or disowned. As 
inauthentic, my life is not my own but rather that of the They.167 
 
And Stephen Mulhall adds that the kind of understanding that is part of the inauthentic 
person’s own care only replicates the understanding that is part of the impersonal crowd’s 
care: 
 
the average everyday mode of Dasein is inauthentic. Its mineness takes the form 
of the “they,” its Self is a they-self – a mode of relating to itself and to others in 
which it and they fail to find themselves and so fail to achieve genuine 
individuality… if Dasein typically loses itself in the “they,” it will understand 
both its world and itself in the terms that “they” make available to it, and so will 
interpret its own nature in terms of the categories that lie closest to hand in 
popular culture and everyday life; and they will be as inauthentic as their 
creators.168 
  
But if a person’s abilities and understanding are just those abilities and 
understanding that the impersonal crowd possesses, then a person’s self will be just the 
self that characterizes each, indistinct “individual” in the impersonal crowd. As 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
167 “Becoming a Self: The Role of Authenticity in Being and Time,” 126. 
168 Heidegger and Being and Time: Second Edition (Routledge, 2005), 68. 
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Heidegger writes, “Initially, ‘I’ ‘am’ not in the sense of my own self, but I am the others 
in the mode of the they. In terms of the they, and as the they, I am initially ‘given’ to 
‘myself.’”169 Therefore, according to William Blattner, “immersion in the social world 
also involves a certain abdication of selfhood. Immersed in the social world, I do not own 
myself, but rather am, in Heidegger’s language, ‘dispersed’ in the public. Heidegger 
contrasts such dispersal with self-ownership, ownedness [authenticity]…”170  
 Heidegger introduces two concepts which further elaborate why the inauthentic 
person’s conformity to abilities and understanding characteristic of the impersonal crowd 
amounts to a condition of anonymity. These are the concept of “averageness” 
(Durchschnittlichkeit) and “disburdening” (Entlassen). Drawing on Kierkegaard’s well-
known discussion in A Literary Review of the equalization of individuals’ life-
possibilities in modernity, Heidegger writes that by conforming to abilities and 
understanding characteristic of the impersonal crowd, each person loses the ability for 
idiosyncrasy and exceptionality. Each person becomes only an average, fungible, version 
of the next: 
 
the they maintains itself factically in the averageness of what is proper, what is 
allowed, and what is not. Of what is granted success and what is not. This 
averageness, which prescribes what can and may be ventured, watches over every 
exception which thrusts itself to the fore… The care of averageness reveals, in 
turn, an essential tendency of Da-sein, which we call the leveling down of all 
possibilities of being.171 
 
Hubert Dreyfus has especially emphasized the role that averageness plays in the 
inauthentic person’s anonymity. For Dreyfus, the impersonal crowd establishes 
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170 Heidegger’s Being and Time, 40. 
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normative standards of beliefs and practices, which are binding on each individual 
person, and which, even more, become the condition of possibility of the belief and 
action of each individual person. What a person believes and does, then, merely repeats 
and perpetuates these average norms, cutting him off from anything novel or unique in 
the world or in himself: 
 
Dasein yields to the pull of the world it is absorbed in and the seduction of 
language as the source of average intelligibility, so as to let itself be turned away 
from what is primordial in the world and in itself… The idea is that average 





falling in with the public leads Dasein to fall away from... In short, since norms 
are shared practices, the kind of life one lives and what one does at any given 
time will be just what anyone would do in that sort of situation.173 
 
 But, for Heidegger, conformity to the impersonal crowd not only prevents a 
person from choosing abilities that are outside of what is merely average; conformity to 
the impersonal crowd also prevents a person from making choices itself. Not only does 
the impersonal crowd prescribe the specific abilities that a person will possess; the 
impersonal crowd also prescribes the very fact that an individual will choose these 
abilities. The impersonal crowd, Heidegger suggests, disburdens a person of the faculty 
of individual choice: 
 
The they is everywhere, but in such a way that it has always already stolen away 
when Da-sein presses for a decision. However, because the they presents every 
judgment and decision as its own, it takes the responsibility of Da-sein away from 
it… The they always “did it,” and yet it can be said that “no one” did it. In the 
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173 Being-in-the-World, 235. 
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everydayness of Da-sein, most things happen in such a way that we must say “no 
one did it.”174 
 
Disburdening results in a kind of general moral impotence, and even in a kind of moral 
farce. An individual, whose autonomy has been ceded to the impersonal crowd, cannot 
find any individual power of choice in himself. However, the members of the impersonal 
crowd, who constantly refer responsibility to one another, cannot find the power of 
choice in themselves, either. Everyone is anonymous, because what would constitute 
each person’s individuality—that a person can make individual choices—is passed 
around like a hot-potato, until, through wear, it crumbles into nothing. 
 The conformity interpretation of inauthenticity therefore makes the anonymity 
belonging to the inauthentic person very clear. The inauthentic person is anonymous 
because, in being-with, he is being-like, or his kind of care is just that kind of care of the 
impersonal crowd. Even more, the inauthentic person follows the average norms of the 
impersonal crowd, and therefore is not, in any way, unique. And the inauthentic person is 
disburdened of any autonomy, and therefore does not have an individual power of choice. 
In the following, my intention, therefore, is not to criticize this interpretation of 
inauthenticity, but rather to supplement it. I would like to argue that it overlooks one of 
the primary ways in which Heidegger explains the inauthentic person’s anonymity: what 
I want to call “existential mania.” 
 
2. The psychoanalytic conception of mania as a heuristic 
However, before I describe what this existential mania is, and what its relation to the 
inauthentic person’s anonymity is, I want briefly to review a conception of mania """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
174 BT, 119-20 [127].  
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developed by three psychoanalytic thinkers—Freud, Melanie Klein, and D.W. Winnicott. 
(It should be noted that the psychological mania that these three thinkers describe is 
distinct, in important respects, from the current psychiatric conception of mania, which 
understands it in light of bipolar mood disorders—a nosological entity that did not exist 
when these psychoanalysts developed their understanding of mania.) The psychological 
mania which they describe shares important features with the existential mania that 
Heidegger describes. For them, mania is a state in which a person denies death, 
destruction, and anxiety; understands his libidinal possibilities to be unlimited; cuts 
himself off from the reality of his own thoughts and fantasies, as well as the reality of 
other people; acts in such a way that his activity never comes to a stop; and, significantly, 
loses the capacity for a full appreciation of who he is, and for a genuine concern for 
others and for himself. Many of these characteristics of mania appear in the existential 
mania that Heidegger describes. A look at the psychoanalytic conception of mania can, 
therefore, serve as a useful heuristic in order to see more clearly Heidegger’s existential 
mania.  
I want to emphasize, however, that the parallels that can be seen between the two 
conceptions of mania are only parallels; the two conceptions are not identical to one 
another. The existential mania that Heidegger describes is, precisely, an existential 
mania: Heidegger means to point to features of a person’s existential constitution, or to 
features of a person’s being, which, according to him, are distinct from and more 
fundamental than the psychological facts which, for example, psychoanalysts describe. 
 This psychoanalytic conception of mania can best be understood by looking at 
each psychoanalyst’s conception of mania in turn. I will therefore look at (A) Freud’s 
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conception; (B) Klein’s conception; and (C) Winnicott’s conception. I will primarily 
emphasize the unique aspects of their contributions to the understanding of mania. 
 A. Freud did not in fact write very much about mania (Manie) at all—especially 
compared to other pathological conditions like hysteria or obsessional neurosis. His most 
comprehensive treatment of mania is in his article “Mourning and Melancholia,” which, 
as the title indicates, is not even primarily about mania.175 It is telling, however, that it is 
an article about mourning and melancholia, two phenomena that are related directly to 
death and loss, that he does treat mania at length.  
 In “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud understands mania as a pathological state 
of “joy, exultation, or triumph,” as well as the “readiness for all kinds of action.”176 
Additionally, he understands it as a part of what he calls “circular insanity.”177 In certain 
cases of melancholia—which Freud characterizes as a state in which a person loses all 
interest in the world and, above all, finds himself worthless; this would now be 
understood as depression—a manic state supervenes. However, the person then returns 
from this manic state to a melancholic state, but only then to return to a manic state again. 
This oscillation is continually repeated. Freud approaches mania from the perspective of 
this “circular insanity.” Mania is a state which removes a person from an already existing 
melancholic state. However, that melancholic state remains, even if it is not consciously 
experienced, and so, once the manic state is exhausted, the person falls back into the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
175 Apart from “Mourning and Melancholia,” the other text in which Freud treats mania at length 
is “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.” I will not review this latter text insofar as 
“Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” effectively repeats Freud’s view on mania from 
“Mourning and Melancholia,” except for the new contention that, in mania, the ego and the 
superego have “fused together.” See “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII. 
176 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV, 253. 
177 “Mourning and Melancholia,” 252. 
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melancholic state. As Freud writes, “the content of mania is no different from that of 
melancholia… both disorders are wrestling with the same ‘complex’, but… in 
melancholia the ego has succumbed to the complex whereas in mania it has mastered it or 
pushed it aside.”178 
 But why, and how, do manic states “master” or “push aside” melancholic states? 
For Freud, a person becomes melancholic after a person (or an abstract idea) he loves has 
died or is lost.179 However, the melancholic does not mourn this loss, or does not perform 
that “work” in which, Freud says, a person is able to acknowledge that the loved object is 
dead or lost, and can turn toward his present world in order to find new objects to love.180 
Rather, the melancholic “identifies” with the dead or lost loved object; he takes himself 
to be identical to it.181 The loved object therefore is preserved—as the melancholic 
himself, and the melancholic can continue to love it. Obviously, however, this love will 
not be perfect. For it is a dead or lost object that the melancholic loves, and, therefore, 
this love will be interwoven with profound hatred. It is on this basis that Freud explains 
what for him is the defining symptom of melancholia—the fact that the melancholic 
directs toward himself ruthless self-criticisms. “If the love for the object—a love which 
cannot be given up though the object itself is given up—takes refuge in narcissistic 
identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, 
debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering.”182 The 
melancholic finds himself worthless because, in order to preserve his love, he identifies 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
178 “Mourning and Melancholia, 253. 
179 “Mourning and Melancholia, 242. 
180 “Mourning and Melancholia, 243. 
181 “Mourning and Melancholia,” 248. 
182 “Mourning and Melancholia,” 250. 
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himself with something that is dead or lost; but, because what he loves is dead or lost, he 
hates that with which he identifies himself, or hates himself. 
 Mania “masters” or “pushes aside” this melancholia through renouncing any 
connection to such an object that is loved but also, because it is dead or lost, is hated. For 
Freud, mania is a “liberation” from such objects: the “manic subject plainly demonstrates 
his liberation from the object which was the cause of his suffering, by seeking like a 
ravenously hungry man for new object-cathexes.”183 In other words, mania is a state in 
which the objects that are loved are understood to be unable to die or be lost, and 
therefore cannot be hated; it is a state in which a person’s love is understood as pure, 
uninhibited love, because nothing in the objects of that love can impede it, or give rise to 
hate. This explains the defining symptoms, for Freud, of mania: it is defined by “joy, 
exultation, or triumph,” and a “readiness for all kinds of action,” because the manic 
person experiences his ability to love as omnipotently free and indestructible. This also 
explains the very interesting and, to my mind, provocative similarity that Freud discovers 
between mourning (which Freud does not understand as a pathology) and mania: “normal 
mourning, too, overcomes the loss of the object.”184 For through the work of mourning 
the person becomes convinced that his dead or lost object no longer has a place in reality 
(“the lost object is met by the verdict of reality that the object no longer exists”185) and 
therefore becomes capable of loving that which is entirely unaffected by loss or death—
that is, becomes capable of loving new objects of love.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
183 “Mourning and Melancholia,” 254. 
184 “Mourning and Melancholia,” 254. This similarity is not, in my eyes, commented on enough. 
185 “Mourning and Melancholia,” 254. 
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 B. Melanie Klein’s account of mania elaborates many of Freud’s initial insights, 
but rethinks them from the perspective of her own, original ideas—ideas which gave her 
the reputation of rejecting the Freudian orthodoxy, and which created her own school of 
psychoanalysis.186 Klein’s account of mania is one of the most comprehensive, and 
influential, in the psychoanalytic literature. 
 Like Freud, Klein viewed mania in the context of melancholia, or depression 
(unlike Freud, she relies heavily on the term “depression” in her writings). The two 
primary articles in which she discusses mania are entitled “A Contribution to the 
Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States” and “Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-
Depressive States.” Mania is a defense against depression, or, more specifically, a 
defense against what is one of Klein’s major theoretical innovations, what she calls the 
“depressive position.” Unlike Freud’s “libidinal stages,” Klein’s “positions” (apart from 
the “depressive position,” she also speaks of the “paranoid-schizoid position”187) are 
constellations of specific desires, fantasies, and beliefs, which are not necessarily 
identical to a moment in the process of psychological development, and are not specific 
to the mental life of infants. They can be true of adults, and can be availed of at any time 
by adults for defensive reasons, independently of regression to developmental fixation. 
The depressive position is a position in which a person identifies with a loved, or “good” 
object; but, at the same time, recognizes that this object is also “bad,” and directs sadistic, 
destructive, hatred toward it. For Klein, the depressive position marks an achievement of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
186 For an introductory overview of Klein’s work and its relation to Freud, see Hanna Segal, 
Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein (Karnac Books, 1998); Julia Kristeva, Melanie Klein, 
trans. Ross Guberman (Columbia University Press, 2004); Phyllis Grosskurth, Melanie Klein: 
Her World and Her Work (Aronson, 1996). 
187 See Melanie Klein, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms,” The Selected Melanie Klein, ed. 
Juliet Mitchell (The Free Press, 1987). 
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maturity, because the loved object is the person himself, or an ego that has matured, and 
the loved object is a “whole” and “real” object—it is both good and bad, and not only 
good or only bad.188 On the other hand, the depressive position is also a site pregnant with 
pathology. Klein writes that in the depressive position, the person has  
 
a fuller identification with the loved object, and a fuller recognition of its value, 
for the ego to become aware of the state of disintegration to which it has reduced 
and is continuing to reduce its loved object. The ego then finds itself confronted 
with the psychical fact that its loved objects are in a state of dissolution—in bits—
and the despair, remorse and anxiety deriving from this recognition are at the 
bottom of numerous anxiety situations.189 
 
In the depressive position, a person wishes to destroy what he loves, and this loved 
object, which he wishes to destroy, is himself. 
 For Klein, mania is an “escape” from the depressive position.190 Mania is a state in 
which a person’s desires and beliefs, directed toward and about himself and other people, 
are organized in such a way that the depressive position is not experienced. Klein gives, 
far more than Freud, a rich and comprehensive description of this manic state. The manic 
state is, first of all, characterized by denial. The “manic subject denies the different forms 
of anxiety,”191 denies “dread” and “the most overpowering and profound anxiety of 
all”192—the destructibility of himself. Connected with this, Klein writes that the manic 
state is characterized by a belief in omnipotence: the manic person believes that nothing 
that he can do can destroy an object, and that every activity that he enjoys with an object 
is an activity by which that object is kept alive. The manic person’s libidinal possibilities """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
188 Melanie Klein, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” The 
Selected Melanie Klein, ed. Juliet Mitchell (The Free Press, 1987), 118. 
189 “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of the Manic-Depressive States,” 124. 
190 “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 132. 
191 “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 133. 
192 “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 132. 
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are therefore understood to be limitless. Klein writes, in “Mourning and Manic-
Depressive States,” that hypomania—a condition similar to mania, but lacking psychosis 
and compatible with normal functionality—is characterized by a “tendency to conceive 
of everything on a large scale, to think in large numbers, all this in accordance with the 
greatness of [the manic person’s] omnipotence…”193 For this reason, however, the manic 
person displays a kind of perpetual activity. Mania is a condition of “over-activity” and 
an “excess of activity”194 in which there is a profound “hunger for objects.”195 The manic 
person’s activity never comes to a stop, since he never confronts his own ability to cause 
destruction, and never confronts a situation in which he does cause destruction. Klein 
writes that the manic person is in a state of “suspended animation”: the manic person is 
always acting, in order to prove to himself that he always gives rise to life, and that his 
objects are always alive. For the manic person, according to Klein, everything and 
anything can be “immediately called to life.”196  
Particularly interesting in Klein’s conception of mania is the connection that she 
draws between it and what can be understood to be loss of personhood. Klein places 
particular emphasis on the depressive position not only because, to her mind, so much 
psychopathology is due to defense against it. Even more, it is in the depressive position 
that a person becomes capable of recognizing his own individual reality, and also 
becomes capable of caring for himself and for others in light of that reality. Klein 
therefore attributes 
 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
193 “Mourning and Manic-Depressive States,” The Selected Melanie Klein, ed. Juliet Mitchell 
(The Free Press, 1987), 155. 
194 “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 132. 
195 “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 133. 
196 “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 133. 
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to the depressive position a central role in the child’s early development. For with 
the introjection of the object as a whole the infant’s object relation alters 
fundamentally. The synthesis between the loved and hated aspects of the complete 
object gives rise to feelings of mourning and guilt which imply vital advances in 
the infant’s emotional and intellectual life.197  
 
A person who is able to work through the depressive position—who is able to identify, 
successfully, with an object that is both good and bad, and therefore both love and hate 
himself—is able to fully recognize the real ambivalence in his own character: that he is 
both lovable and not lovable, and that he both loves and hates. Even more, a person who 
is able to work through the depressive position is able to recognize the destruction that he 
can cause. For this reason, he is able to have a genuine concern for objects in light of that 
destruction that he does cause—he is able to perform acts of reparation; and he is able to 
have genuine concern over himself in light of the destruction that he can cause.198  
Alternatively, for Klein, the manic person who defends himself against the 
depressive position is not capable of fully recognizing himself, or fully recognizing his 
affective abilities. He does not understand himself to be good and bad, but takes himself 
to be only good. And he does not understand himself to love and to hate, but takes 
himself only to love. This inability to recognize himself severely diminishes his self-
understanding. Even more, the manic person cannot have any genuine “concern” for 
objects, since he denies that they can be destroyed,199 and the manic person cannot have 
any genuine concern for himself, since he refuses to recognize his own guilt in wishing to 
bring about the destruction of objects. Klein therefore characterizes the manic state as a 
state of general “detachment.”200 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
197 “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms,” 178. 
198 “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 144. 
199 “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 134. 
200 “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 134. 
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C. Winnicott adopted Klein’s view of mania. He understands mania as a defense 
against the depressive position; manic states are “organized in respect of the anxiety 
belonging to depression.”201 I only therefore want to note an interesting extension that 
Winnicott makes to Klein’s understanding of mania. Winnicott suggests that manic states 
are facilitated by a certain kind of social world, and even can be said to be normal in 
respect to the norms of a certain kind of social world. 
Apart from Klein’s understanding of mania, Winnicott’s view of mania is 
influenced by a concept proposed by Nina Searl, the “flight to reality.”202 For Searl, it is 
incorrect to view mental pathology simply as the acceptance of an internal fantasy such 
that an external reality, which cannot be acknowledged, is repressed. Rather, in certain 
cases, there is an acceptance of an external reality such that an internal fantasy, which 
cannot be acknowledged, is repressed. For Winnicott, an implication of this “flight to 
reality” is that the acceptance of external reality assumes characteristics normally 
associated with delusion. For example, a person who flees to the reality of his loving 
parents, and thereby represses fantasies in which he does not have loving parents, or a 
person who flees to the reality in which his life is full of adventure, and thereby represses 
fantasies in which he cannot be adventurous, enjoys a fantasy of omnipotence. He enjoys 
a fantasy of omnipotence because the reality that he affirms is a reality in which he is 
omnipotent, and he represses what really undermines that fantastical omnipotence—
which, it so happens, is contained in internal fantasy. Winnicott therefore says, abruptly 
and startlingly, “[o]ne finds in this defence a flight to omnipotent fantasy, and flight from """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
201 D.W. Winnicott, “The Manic Defence,” Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis (Brunner-
Routledge, 1992), 131. 




some fantasies to other fantasies, and in this sequence a flight to external reality. This is 
why I think one cannot compare and contrast fantasy and reality.”203 
Winnicott approaches mania from the perspective of this flight to reality. The 
manic person harbors internal fantasies in which he is sadistically attacking his good 
objects, and the good objects with which he identifies—for example, internal 
representations of a loving mother, or his own ego that has identified with a loving 
mother. This accounts for a fundamental depression. However, for Winnicott, the manic 
person begins to participate in certain possibilities that allow him to repress that 
fundamental depression; what results is a manic state in which “we are more likely to feel 
elated, happy, busy, excited, humorous, omniscient, ‘full of life’, and at the same time we 
are less interested than usual in serious things and in the awfulness of hate, destruction, 
and killing.”204  
Significantly, however, for Winnicott, the possibilities in which the manic 
participates are possibilities afforded by a real social world. It is by fleeing to the real 
possibilities of a real social world that mania is supported. There is, first, a participation 
in the theatrical, performative social world: 
 
For instance, one is at a music-hall and on to the stage come the dancers, trained 
to liveliness. One can say that here is the primal scene, here is exhibitionism, here 
is anal control, here is masochistic submission to discipline, here is a defiance of 
the super-ego. Sooner or later one adds: here is LIFE. Might it not be that the 
main point of the performance is a denial of deadness, a defence against 
depressive “death inside” ideas, the sexualization being secondary.205 
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
203 “The Manic Defence,” 129. 
204 “The Manic Defence,” 131. 
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Theatrical performances—and other situations in which people are allowed to perform 
fictional roles, and to express a range of emotions and desires they are not normally 
permitted—are a part of real social world. Participation in them is therefore normal. But 
the reality that they constitute is a reality in which only “LIFE” reigns, and in which 
“deadness” is denied. Therefore, while participation in them is normal, nevertheless the 
person who participates in them is manic. Similarly, Winnicott discusses participation in 
modern urban cities: 
 
What about such things as the wireless that is left on interminably? What about 
living in a town like London with its noise that never ceases, and lights that are 
never extinguished? Each illustrates the reassurance through reality against death 
inside, and a use of manic defence that can be normal.206 
 
The interminable busyness of cities, the fact that “the lights never go off,” of which, for 
example, New Yorkers are so fond, describes the real social world of modernity. A 
person who recognizes this world, and participates in it, is normal: he adapts to the life of 
urban cities. At the same time, however, he is manic: by participating in this real social 
world, he seeks the fantastical reassurance that death does not exist. 
 What I want to emphasize here is that, for Winnicott, a person can recognize, and 
can act in respect of possibilities, characteristic of a certain kind of real social world, and 
while this recognition and action will be make the person normal, it will also support 
mania. He will be normal because he does recognize reality, and does successfully adapt 
his action to it; but he will be manic because, in that recognition and adaptation, he will 
hold onto the fantasy of the omnipotence of life—its indestructibility—and deny the 
possibility of death—the destructibility of life. Winnicott therefore writes that, in the case """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
206 “The Manic Defence,” 130. 
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of mania, the distinction between the normal and the pathological may be inappropriate 
(and the inappropriateness of this distinction is closely connected to the inappropriateness 
of the other distinction that Winnicott discussed, between fantasy and reality, and which 
he also, avante la lettre, deconstructed). “The truth is, one can scarcely discuss in the 
abstract whether such devices are a normal reassurance through reality or an abnormal 
manic defence; one can discuss, however, the use of the defence that we meet with in the 
course of the analysis of a patient.”207 
 Let me try to summarize this psychoanalytic picture of mania. Mania is a state 
that responds to death or loss: primarily the death or loss of that which a person loves, 
and identifies with—his own life. The possibility of this death or loss gives rise to anxiety 
and dread. Mania is a state which is a flight from this death or loss, and its anxiety and 
dread. The manic person denies that this destruction could occur, understands himself to 
have a limitless life in which destruction never occurs, and lives this limitless life in a 
kind of perpetual activity. At the same time, mania is a state which can, in certain 
circumstances, be understood to be normal: a person can participate in certain real social 
worlds that facilitate manic states. Finally, however, mania diminishes “personhood.” 
The manic person has a severely attenuated understanding of himself, and his world—he 
does not recognize what is destructive of life, in either himself or his world; and he 
cannot have concern for himself, and for others, in light of this possibility of the 
destruction of life. 
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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3. Inauthenticity as existential mania 
Heidegger’s concept of inauthenticity consists, I believe, not only in a person’s 
conformity to the impersonal crowd that the conformist interpretation emphasizes, but 
also in a person’s mania. And the reason, for Heidegger, why the inauthentic person is 
anonymous, is due just as much to a person’s mania as to a person’s conformity. This 
mania, however, is not the psychological mania that the psychoanalysts describe, but 
rather what I want to call an “existential mania.” While, in many respects, it resembles 
the psychological mania that the psychoanalysts describe, it is grounded in ontological 
characteristics that belong to the being of the human being.  
 The existential mania of the inauthentic person can most clearly be seen in 
Heidegger’s discussion of “falling” or “falling prey” (Verfallen and Verfallenheit). 
Falling, for Heidegger, “reveals” “a basic kind of the being of everydayness”208—that is, 
it describes the everyday way in which a person cares, or is able to pursue a possible self, 
is able to exercise skills, and is able worldly beings. For Heidegger, however, falling also 
directly describes a person’s inauthenticity. “What we called the inauthenticity of Da-sein 
may now be defined more precisely through an interpretation of falling prey.”209 
Significantly, Heidegger’s thematic discussion of inauthenticity-as-falling prey is 
separate from his thematic discussion of das Man, or the impersonal crowd. In his section 
on the impersonal crowd, Heidegger discusses being-with, the character of the 
impersonal crowd itself, and the inauthenticity of the person who conforms to it. 
Alternatively, in his section on falling, Heidegger discusses the way in which certain 
everyday ways in which a person cares—what he calls “idle talk” (Gerede), “curiosity” """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
208 BT, 164 [175].  
209 BT, 164 [175].  
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(Neugier), and “ambiguity” (Zweideutigkeit)—render a person inauthentic. Falling, 
Heidegger writes, is “tempting” (versucherisch), “tranquillizing” (beruhigend), and 
“alienating” (entfremdend); it “closes off to Da-sein its authenticity and possibility.”210 
 I will here look more closely at Heidegger’s discussion of falling in order to 
identify a source of the inauthentic person’s anonymity that is separate from conformity 
to das Man and consists in existential mania. I will also refer to a lecture course that 
Heidegger gave, on Aristotle, in 1921-22, and which focuses on remarkably similar 
themes. I will argue that Heidegger describes falling, or inauthenticity, as a condition in 
which a person’s abilities are understood to be (A) limitless and (B) non-factical and in 
which (C) a person is perpetually acting; and this existential mania (D) results in a 
person’s anonymity.  
 A. Understanding abilities as limitless. For Heidegger, the inauthentic person 
understands his abilities—or, more precisely, and following what I said in the third 
chapter, his projection into abilities—to be limitless. This becomes especially clear in 
Heidegger’s description of one of the central characteristics of falling, curiosity. 
Curiosity, for Heidegger, is not an isolated, intellectual attitude, but rather a modality of a 
person’s very care, in which a person seeks out novel abilities in himself, and novel 
possibilities in the world: 
 
[Curiosity] seeks novelty only to leap from it again to another novelty. The care 
of seeing is not concerned with comprehending and knowingly being in the truth, 
but with possibilities of abandoning itself to the world. Thus curiosity is 
characterized by a specific not-staying with the world. Consequently, it also does 
not seek the leisure of reflective staying, but rather restlessness and excitement 
from continual novelty and changing encounters… The two factors constitutive 
for curiosity, not-staying in the surrounding world taken care of and distraction """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
210 BT, 166 [178]; emphasis Heidegger’s. 
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by new possibilities, are the basis for the third essential characteristic of this 
phenomenon, which we call never dwelling anywhere. Curiosity is everywhere 
and nowhere. This mode of being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of being of 
everyday Da-sein, one in which it constantly uproots itself.211 
 
By straying from ability to ability, by not dwelling anywhere, the curious person is 
everywhere. In this sense, he understands himself to possess a limitless number of 
abilities.  
In Heidegger’s 1921-22 lecture course on Aristotle, he also emphasizes how, as 
part of a person’s “factical life”—that kind of life, characterized by abilities, and by 
which a person is constituted—a person takes himself to possess a limitless number of 
abilities. (In Being and Time, Heidegger again will link curiosity with a person’s 
“facticity.”212) Heidegger writes that factical life “holds before itself” an “infinite 
abundance” of abilities: 
 
[in factical life, the] very multiplicity of possibilities, however, always implies an 
increase in the possibilities of mistaking oneself in ever new ways. Factical life in 
itself, qua factical, thereby brings to maturation a distantiated interminability of 
possible mistakes, and insofar as these interminable mistakes are all of the 
character of meaningful things in which, as meaningful-worldly objects, life lives, 
this interminability becomes what is formalistically characterized as infinity and 
infinite abundance, inexhaustibility, that which can never be mastered, the 
“always more of” life, and the “always more than” life. This infinity is the 
disguise factical life factically places upon and holds before itself or its world.213 
 
I will come back below to the significance of the fact that, in this factical life, a person 
“mistakes himself.” Here, however, Heidegger describes, in more detail, the being 
“everywhere and nowhere” of the curiosity that he describes in Being and Time. A 
person’s worldly abilities are understood to be “interminable” and “inexhaustible”; those """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
211 BT, 161 [172-3]. 
212 BT, 167 [179]. 
213 Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into 
Phenomenological Research, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Indiana University Press, 2001), 80.  
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abilities never come to an end; there is “always more of” and “always more than” life. A 
person understands himself, in this condition, to be “infinite.” This infinity is not an 
abstract infinity, like the infinity of Hegel’s “bad infinity.” The inauthentic person is not a 
Brahmin. Rather, it is a “concrete” infinity: it is a person’s meaningful worldly objects, or 
meaningful worldly abilities in which his own abilities can be exercised, that are 
understood to be infinite, or are understood to be limitless. 
 Heidegger returns to a person’s understanding of his concrete abilities as infinite, 
or limitless, in Being and Time, in his discussion of the alienation characteristic of falling:  
 
Alienation cannot mean that Da-sein is factically torn away from itself. On the 
contrary, this alienation drives Da-sein into a kind of being intent upon the most 
exaggerated ‘self-dissection’ which tries out all kinds of possibilities of 
interpretation, with the result that the “characterologies” and “typologies” which 
it points out are themselves too numerous to grasp. Yet this alienation, which 
closes off to Da-sein its authenticity and possibility, even if only that of genuinely 
getting stranded, still does not surrender it to beings which it itself is not, but 
forces it into its inauthenticity, into a possible kind of being of itself.214 
 
Heidegger again makes clear that the limitless or infinite abilities that a person 
understands himself to possess refer to a person’s concrete, worldly abilities: it is the 
possibilities of interpretation—and therefore a person’s abilities in understanding himself, 
which lies in a person’s own being or care—which are taken to be infinite. However, 
Heidegger also makes clear that this self-understanding of abilities as limitless or infinite 
is directly connected to the condition of inauthenticity. Heidegger writes that a person’s 
alienation, a person’s self-estrangement, just is this understanding oneself as possessing 
limitless abilities. It is this self-understanding which “closes off to Da-sein its authenticity 
and possibility,” and “forces it into its inauthenticity.” 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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 B. Understanding abilities as non-factical. Heidegger additionally writes that a 
central characteristic of falling is a person’s not understanding himself in terms of his 
factical abilities, or, to put it another way, a person’s only understanding himself in terms 
of non-factical abilities. “Facticity” is a central concept of Being and Time, and I will, in 
the sixth chapter, give a more comprehensive discussion of it. For now, it can suffice to 
say that by “facticity,” Heidegger means to indicate the fact that a person’s being, or a 
person’s care, is constituted, and is specific: a person is factical insofar as he is 
constituted by specific abilities, or by specific worldly situations in which those specific 
abilities must be exercised.215 “Facticity,” therefore, does not refer to what is commonly 
thought of as “facts”—states of affairs of which propositions are true. “Facticity” refers 
to a dimension of a person’s being or care; it is an existential category.216 
 But what then is it for a person to have a non-factical self-understanding? 
Heidegger discusses this non-factical self-understanding in relation to the alienation 
characteristic of falling. In falling, a person 
 
develop[s] the supposition that the disclosedness of Da-sein thus available and 
prevalent could guarantee to Da-sein the certainty, genuineness, and fullness of all 
the possibilities of its being. In the self-certainty and decisiveness of the they, it 
gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic, attuned 
understanding. The supposition of the they that one is leading and sustaining a full 
and genuine “life” brings a tranquillization to Da-sein, for which everything is in 
“the best order” and for whom all doors are open.217 
 
Heidegger’s concept of “tranquillization” therefore does not refer to the effects of a mood 
drug, or a state of emotional relaxation. A person who is tranquillized understands his 
abilities never to be threatened. A person who is tranquillized presumes to enjoy only """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
215 BT, 127-8 [134-5], BT, 275-6 [299]. 
216 BT, 127 [135].  
217 BT, 166 [177]. 
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those abilities in which an undisturbed, full life consists. Heidegger refers to this same 
kind of self-understanding in describing curiosity; he writes that curiosity provides a 
person “with the guarantee of a supposedly genuine ‘lively life.’”218 
 A person who is tranquillized does not understand himself in terms of his factical 
abilities because, for Heidegger, it is only when a person loses his tranquillization, or the 
assurance of a lively life, a life that is not threatened, that he can understand his own 
factical abilities. Heidegger makes this especially clear in the lecture course on Aristotle, 
in a passage that clearly foreshadows his discussion of tranquillization in Being and 
Time: 
 
Life seeks to assure itself by looking away from itself. This looking is primary 
and provides the basic view, the way life sees itself. Life thereby develops its own 
self-searching, which, in falling, changes into carefreeness (securitas). 
Carefreeness is a mode of care, a mode of the concern of life for itself. 
Carefreeness then shapes the world and, in order to be satisfying, must increase; it 
becomes hyperbolic and grants an easier concern and fulfillment, i.e., the 
conserving and preserving of existence. At the same time hyperbolic existence 
proves to be elliptical: it eludes that which is difficult, that which can be attained 
only monaxos, in only one way (not haphazardly), it recognizes no fixed 
limits…219 
 
Like tranquillization, carefreeness, for Heidegger, describes a mode of care. But it is a 
mode of care, or a mode in which life is concerned for itself, in which life guards life 
itself, or in which life protects life itself, and protects life against anything that would 
threaten it. Carefreeness is concerned with “the conserving and preserving of existence.” 
However, carefreeness is carefreeness because carefreeness does not need to care about 
what would be, so to speak, “very concerning”—what would threaten its secure life. 
Carefreeness thus turns away from what is difficult, or what limits its easy existence. But """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
218 BT, 162 [173]. 
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it is precisely this in which a person’s factical life consists: by being carefree, life “seeks 
to assure itself by looking away from itself.” 
 In Being and Time, Heidegger returns to the theme of carefreeness in his 
discussion of idle talk. For Heidegger, idle talk, generally, is a kind of carefree 
understanding—an understanding in which a person is not concerned with whether what 
he has understood is genuinely understood. However, idle talk never genuinely 
understands because it is concerned with protecting itself from danger, or from being 
“stranded”:  
 
Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous 
appropriation of the matter. Idle talk already guards against the danger of getting 
stranded in such an appropriation [Das Gerede behütet schon vor der Gefahr, bei 
einer solchen Zueignung zu sheitern]. Idle talk, which everyone can snatch up, not 
only divests us of the task of genuine understanding, but develops an indifferent 
intelligibility for which nothing is closed off any longer.220 
 
Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes that is the exigency of being stranded, or of failing or 
of collapse (sheitern) that idle talk guards itself against. Idle talk, therefore, is not only 
not a simple carefree chattiness, nor a simple mode of understanding, but a basic way in 
which a person cares. Idle talk is idleness. However, for Heidegger, this means that a 
person only understands himself in terms of those abilities in which he can be idle, or in 
terms of those abilities in which he will be protected and secure. But because he 
understands himself in terms of these abilities, he will not understand himself in terms of 
his factical abilities. “Idle talk discloses to Da-sein a being toward its world, to others and 
to itself—a being in which these are understood, but in a mode of groundless floating.”221 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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 C. Perpetual activity. Finally, Heidegger characterizes falling as a state in which a 
person’s activity is perpetual. At the end of his section on falling, Heidegger writes that 
“[f]alling prey is an ontological concept of motion.”222 This “motion,” however, is not the 
motion of any object—or any present-at-hand or ready-to-hand object, a thing or a tool. 
This “motion” expresses the motion of a being whose being is care. Therefore, it is a 
motion that is characteristic of a person’s very care. A person’s pursuit, exercise, and use 
of his abilities is therefore in motion in a peculiar way.  
 Heidegger describes this motion as a “plunge” (Absturz). “Dasein plunges out of 
itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness.”223 
Heidegger also calls this movement “eddying” (Wirbel),224 which can also be translated 
as a gyre or vortex. In describing tranquillization, Heidegger gives a picture of this 
movement. Tranquillization “does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but 
drives one to uninhibited ‘busyness.’ Being entangled in the ‘world’ does not somehow 
come to rest.”225 The movement characteristic of falling is a movement of constant, 
impulsive, busyness. A person’s abilities are always, constantly, being exercised. In 
falling, therefore, a person’s activity is perpetual. In his lecture course on Aristotle, 
Heidegger describes perpetual activity as a fundamental part of factical life. He writes: 
 
The involvement with the world of care is apparently, in apprehension, a seriously 
adopted task, one which allows no rest, day or night, and to which life has 
supposedly committed itself in full, and yet actually (for apprehension itself, ‘still 
at times’) it is a mere letting oneself be pulled along, letting oneself be 
transported, such that thereby every clarification is renounced…226 
 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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 In light of the other aspects of falling that I have already discussed, that falling is 
a movement of perpetual activity should not be surprising. A person who understands 
himself in terms of limitless abilities, and a person who understands himself in terms of 
non-factical abilities, or those abilities in which he is never stranded, will precisely be 
“uninhibited” in his activity, and will never “come to rest.” For in this self-understanding, 
there are neither any limits, nor factical situations that rupture the easy exercise of a 
person’s abilities, to bring a person’s activity to a stop.   
 D. Existential mania and anonymity. Heidegger, then, describes inauthenticity as 
a condition of existential mania. The falling that characterizes inauthenticity is a 
condition in which the person understands his abilities—or, again, his projection into 
abilities—as limitless and non-factical, and in which the person’s activity is perpetual. 
But, then, is it possible to understand the inauthentic person’s anonymity on the basis of 
this existential mania? Is it possible to understand the inauthentic person’s anonymity 
outside of his conformity to the impersonal crowd—outside of the fact that his self is the 
self of the impersonal crowd, that his abilities are average, and that he suffers a 
disburdening of his power of choice? 
 What is particularly interesting about the existential mania that Heidegger 
describes is that, on its basis, and apart from any reference to conformity, the averageness 
of a person’s abilities, and the disburdening of the power of choice, it is possible to 
understand the inauthentic person’s anonymity. A person who understands his abilities as 
limitless will not understand himself to possess limited abilities. (Or, again, a person who 
understands his projection into abilities to be limitless will not understood his projection 
into abilities to be limited.) But he will therefore only understand himself as a diffuse, 
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indefinite self. Heidegger points to this diffusion of the self in describing curiosity. He 
writes that, because the curious person is “everywhere,” the curious person is precisely 
“nowhere,” and that, by pursuing novel ability after novel ability, the curious person is 
“uprooted.” Without any limits placed on a person’s abilities, a person cannot understand 
himself as an individual. Heidegger therefore states, in his lecture course on Aristotle, 
that the presumption of possessing an infinity of abilities is “the disguise factical life 
factically places upon and holds before itself or its world.” 
 Similarly, in his lecture course on Aristotle, and in describing a person’s self-
understanding as non-factical, Heidegger refers again to the fact that a person cannot 
understand himself within limits. Heidegger states that “hyperbolic existence proves to be 
elliptical: it eludes that which is difficult, that which can be attained only monaxos, in 
only one way (not haphazardly), it recognizes no fixed limits.” Here, however, these 
limits are, specifically, the limits imposed by a person’s facticity: what is eluded is what 
is difficult, those abilities that a person confronts as already constituted. In the same way, 
Heidegger, in Being and Time, writes that a person, because he guards against 
understanding himself in his own facticity, cannot achieve a genuine understanding of 
himself. “Idle talk already guards against the danger of getting stranded in such an 
appropriation” and therefore “divests us of the task of genuine understanding.” In order to 
arrive at a genuine individual, self-understanding, a person must be able to confront his 
own facticity—those abilities, or projection into abilities, by which a person is 
constituted. 
 Finally, a person whose activity is perpetual will be deprived of the ability to 
make his own, individual choices. As I suggested above, the movement characteristic of 
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falling, “plunging,” is a movement of impulsive, constant, activity. The person who 
plunges is in an eddy or vortex of activity. Heidegger writes that “Da-sein plunges out of 
itself,” and is “sucked into” this eddy (hineingewirbelt). This suggests that the person 
who plunges loses his capacity for deliberate choice. A comment that Heidegger makes 
about curiosity is pertinent here. Curiosity 
 
seeks novelty only to leap from it again to another novelty. The care of seeing is 
not concerned with knowingly being in the truth, but with possibilities of 
abandoning itself to the world. Thus curiosity is characterized by a specific not-
staying with what is nearest. Consequently, it also does not seek the leisure of 
reflective staying, but rather restlessness and excitement from continual novelty 
and changing encounters.227 
 
Restlessness and excitement (Unruhe und Aufregung) lead to leaping or hurtling 
(abspringen) between novelties, and abandoning oneself (Sichüberlassen) to the world. 
Heidegger here uses a vocabulary that describes kinds of action in which a person is not 
in control of the actions that he performs. In the eddy of perpetual activity, a person’s 
individual self—his ability to direct himself deliberately through choice—is drained out 
of his own action.  
  
Existential mania therefore gives rise to anonymity. It gives rise to a self-
understanding in which no limited, and no factical, and therefore, ultimately, no 
individual self is understood; and it gives rise to a kind of perpetual activity in which no 
deliberate, individual choices can be made. It can be pointed out that this anonymity, 
based on existential mania, is structurally similar to the anonymity that is grounded on 
the inauthentic person’s conformity to the impersonal crowd. The conforming inauthentic 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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person is anonymous because his abilities are average, that is, his abilities are not 
individual, and because his power of choice is disburdened, that is, he cannot make any 
individual choices. The existentially manic inauthentic person is anonymous for the same 
reasons: the abilities that he understands himself to possess are not individual, and he 
lacks the power of individual choice.  
 In this perspective, Heidegger, in Being and Time, takes two perspectives on the 
constitution of inauthenticity, and on the anonymity that belongs to it. There may be a 
temporal reason for the simultaneity, in Being and Time, of these two perspectives. The 
lecture course on Aristotle, given six years before the publication of Being and Time, 
presents an account of what, in Being and Time, will become inauthenticity, but primarily 
from the perspective of existential mania. In Being and Time, while the account of 
inauthenticity preserves many of the conclusions that Heidegger reached in the lecture 
course on Aristotle, it mainly focuses on the inauthentic person’s conformity to the type 
of abilities and understanding characteristic of das Man. Heidegger therefore appears to 
have moved away, in Being and Time, from an account of inauthenticity that emphasizes 
existential mania, to an account of inauthenticity that focuses on conformity. I cannot 
here begin to try to explain what motivated this change, although I believe that there are 
systematic reasons behind it. 
 On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that Heidegger tries to integrate 
his two approaches to inauthenticity. It may be incorrect to suggest that the interpretation 
of inauthenticity from the perspective of existential mania is really independent of the 
interpretation of inauthenticity from the perspective of conformity. Heidegger writes that 
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falling, that characteristic of the being of the human being in which existential mania 
becomes especially clear, is always a falling that falls into the impersonal crowd: 
 
Da-sein has initially always already fallen away from itself and fallen prey to the 
“world.” Falling prey to the “world” means being absorbed in being-with-one-
another as it is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity… [Inauthenticity] 
constitutes precisely a distinctive kind of being-in-the-world which is completely 
taken in by the world and the Mida-sein of the others in the they.228 
 
Therefore, it may only be because a person conforms to the impersonal crowd, that a 
person becomes existentially manic.  For example, tranquillization, or a person’s self-
understanding according to non-factical abilities, arises from the “supposition of the they 
that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life.’”229 And, Heidegger writes, a 
person’s perpetual activity, a person’s plunging and eddying, always takes place “within 
the groundlessness of inauthentic being in the they.”230 On the other hand, it must be 
acknowledged that Heidegger’s descriptions of curiosity, or a person’s understanding of 
his abilities as limitless, generally do not mention any dependence of that self-
understanding on conformity to the impersonal crowd. This kind of inauthentic, and 
anonymous self-understanding appears to be an individual’s own initiative.  
I will, then, leave this question open: is the person’s existential mania, the fact 
that a person understands his abilities as limitless and non-factical, and acts perpetually, 
due to the fact that the person conforms to das Man? Perhaps Winnicott’s conception of 
mania may be of some help. Winnicott understands mania like Klein—as a set of 
psychological defenses in which a person denies the destructibility of his life, 
understands himself to be omnipotent, and is always undertaking new endeavors. These """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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psychological defenses are independent of any social norms to which a person may 
conform. On the other hand, Winnicott shows how certain social realities—the theatre, 
the modern city—facilitate these defenses: there are certain realities of the social world 
which allow a person to deny the destructibility of life, to understand himself 
omnipotently, to always be busy, and so on. Even more, these social realities especially 
facilitate mania because a person’s manic participation in them will be normal: it is 
through recognizing, and acting in light of, these social realities, that a person becomes 
manic.  
Perhaps this is one way to understand Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity. The 
person can become inauthentic, and anonymous, through existential mania; and yet that 
existential mania is facilitated by certain social norms, prescribed by the impersonal 
crowd. The person’s conformity to the impersonal crowd will therefore institute an 
existential mania, that, as is the case with conformity in general, only leads to each 
person’s own anonymity.  
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Chapter 5: Issues in Heidegger’s Understanding of Death 
 
I would now like to examine Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, in order to critique it. 
As I suggested, the concept of authenticity brings together two phenomena, and in a 
peculiar way. On the one hand, the authentic person anticipates the authentic experience 
of death; and, on the other hand, the authentic person anticipates his individuality. And, 
according to the concept of authenticity, this anticipation of the authentic experience of 
death and this anticipation of individuality are identical with one another. I gave a 
characterization of these two anticipations, and their identity, in the introduction, and, in 
the following chapter, I will give a full account of them. In this chapter, however, I would 
like to raise some issues about one crucial element in Heidegger’s concept of 
authenticity: what I called just above the authentic experience of death. I gave a brief 
characterization in the introduction of what this authentic experience of death is, and, in 
the following chapter, I will discuss it in its full detail. Here, I would like to address some 
preliminary problems that an interpretation of Heidegger’s understanding of the authentic 
experience of death poses. There are, primarily, two of them. 
 First of all, by speaking of an “authentic experience of death,” death is understood 
to be an “experience.” However, there is a long philosophical tradition that claims that 
death cannot be an “experience.” And, even, there are interpretations of Being and Time 
that claim that, by death, Heidegger cannot mean something that can be experienced. I 
will therefore here look at why, for Heidegger, death is something that can be 
experienced, and in what sense it is experienced. Second of all, and as I pointed out in the 
first chapter, Heidegger describes death with the formula “the possibility of the 
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impossibility of existence.” This formulation of death as “the possibility of the 
impossibility of existence” poses its own problems. Above all, it might seem as though 
this formulation is a paradox. (There are other issues with this formulation that I will look 
at.) Death is a person’s possibility. But it is a possibility of impossibility. But how can a 
possibility be of impossibility? I will therefore here try to show how death, as the 
possibility of the impossibility of existence, does not present a paradox. Showing this 
relies on identifying very precisely the meaning, in the formulation that Heidegger gives, 
of “possibility” and “impossibility.” 
 A remark here should be made about the use of the word “authentic” in the 
expression “the authentic experience of death.” I will, in the following chapter, interpret 
the concept of authenticity, according to what I suggested just above: the authentic person 
anticipates the authentic experience of death, and, identical to that, anticipates his 
individuality. However, the word “authentic” in the expression “the authentic experience 
of death” does not refer to this authenticity. Rather, it refers to an experience of death that 
is merely an explicit experience of death, one in which a person does not, as Heidegger 
says, and as I will explain in more detail below, “flee” from it. A person can have, 
therefore, an authentic experience of death, without anticipating it, as the authentic person 
does, and in the way that I will explain in the following chapter. Therefore, in addressing 
the first problem that the interpretation of Heidegger’s understanding of death poses—
how death is an experience—I will discuss the “flight” from death, and I will also discuss 
in what sense the authentic experience of death is an “explicit” experience of death. But it 
is very important that this “authentic experience of death,” while it is a part of the 
concept of authenticity—the authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of 
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death—be separated from it. One could say that the use of the word “authentic” in 
“authentic experience of death” is a structural use of that word: it merely indicates that a 
person’s experience of death is genuine, in the sense of explicit and transparent; whereas 
the use of the word “authentic” in “authenticity” is a normative use of that word: it 
indicates a kind of relationship toward death which a person should strive to achieve. 
 I will, then, (1) look at why and in what sense death, for Heidegger, is an 
experience, and define more precisely what “the authentic experience of death” is; and 
(2) look at some of the problems posed by Heidegger’s formulation of death, as “the 
possibility of the impossibility of existence,” and the precise sense in which this 
formulation should be understood. 
  
1. Is there an experience of death? 
First of all, common sense, and a prominent philosophical tradition, answers the question 
whether death can be experienced in the negative. Both Stoicism and Epicureanism 
provided a consolation for death by claiming that it cannot, in fact, be experienced. It is 
that event which, once it occurs, marks the end of all experience: what then is there to 
fear? And this is how death is commonly understood: when death occurs, consciousness, 
among other things, comes to an end, and therefore the occurrence of death is precisely 
the occurrence of the impossibility of all experience. Could it then be correct for 
Heidegger to claim—or for an interpretation of Being and Time to claim that Heidegger 
claims—that a person is able to experience death? 
 It is here important to be clear about what, for Heidegger, death is not. For 
Heidegger, death (Tod) is not organic death, what Heidegger calls “perishing” 
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(Verenden)—that state of any biological being in which it loses all organic functionality. 
Nor, for Heidegger, is death what he calls “demise” (Ableben)—that event which 
concludes a human being’s life, and which, for example, is commemorated and legally 
ascertained.231 
In fact, a conflation between Heidegger’s death and organic death or the 
conclusion of a person’s life has led many interpreters to claim, incorrectly, that 
Heidegger’s discussion of death in Being and Time is incoherent. Paul Edwards, for 
example, claims that Heidegger “interiorizes” death, or makes an “external” event like 
death, which a person cannot experience personally, a personal experience.232 In other 
words, for Edwards, Heidegger understands a normal and perfectly reasonable 
phenomenon, a person’s “concern” about organic death, in such a way that this concern 
also involves that a person endures, and experiences, that organic death. Death therefore 
becomes an incoherent and impossible phenomenon: a death whose meaning is that it 
cannot be experienced becomes, simultaneously, an object of experience. 
This critique would be correct if Heidegger meant to speak about a person’s 
organic death. In this case, it would be true that Heidegger “interiorized” organic death, 
and incoherently, and impossibly, understood it as an object of experience. But Edwards 
overlooks the fact that Heidegger never says that a person can experience a organic death. 
Heidegger specifically says that the death of which he speaks “can become visible only 
by distinguishing” it “from the ending of a living thing,” that is, only by distinguishing it 
from perishing.233 In order to designate the death that he will address, Heidegger therefore 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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introduces the term “dying” (sterben).234 Death, for Heidegger, is dying, that is, not the 
event of death, organic or the conclusion of life, but that way in which “Da-sein is toward 
its death”235—that is, that way in which a person experiences death. 
 But it may be claimed at this point that Heidegger has performed a sleight-of-
hand. He separates his idea of death from perishing or demise by calling death “dying,” 
or “being-toward” death. But then is it not the case that “dying” involves perishing or 
demise, insofar as, while dying is not the event of perishing or demise, it is just the being 
toward, or the experience of, perishing or demise? But was not the original issue that if 
death is understood in these ways—as perishing or demise—then it cannot be 
experienced, or a person cannot be “toward” it? Heidegger’s distinction between dying 
and perishing or demise is therefore a false distinction, and he asserts, with the concept of 
dying, precisely what is contested: that there can be an experience of, or a being-toward, 
perishing or demise.  
 This objection is correct. However, it relies on the assumption that what, in dying, 
a person experiences, or is toward, must be perishing or demise. However, for Heidegger, 
what a person experiences, or is toward, in dying, is not perishing or demise, but rather 
what he calls, as I suggested above, “the possibility of the impossibility of existence,” or 
what he elsewhere calls “the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Da-sein”236 ([die] 
Möglichkeit der schlechthinnigen Unmöglichkeit des Daseins) or “the absolute 
impossibility of existence” (die schletchthinnige Unmöglichkeit der Existenz).237 By “the 
possibility of the impossibility of existence,” “the possibility of the absolute impossibility """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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of Da-sein,” or by “the absolute impossibility of existence,” Heidegger indicates that 
possibility in which a person faces the impossibility of his being. William Blattner, has, 
very persuasively, tried to understand death from this perspective. For Blattner, 
Heidegger understands a person’s death as a person’s possibility of being “unable to 
be,”238 or, in other words, as the possibility of an “existential death.”239 Blattner writes:  
 
Death is the condition in which Dasein is unable to be-there, because it is unable 
to exercise its ability to determine who it is. This is to say that death is a limit-
situation in which the ability-to-be is stifled, in the way in which the ability to see 
is stifled by the absence of light. This situation occurs when Dasein is beset by 
anxiety, in which none of its possibilities matters to it differentially, in which all 
are equally irrelevant to it.240 
 
If the being of Dasein is its ability-to-be—as I explained above, its care, or its projection 
into abilities—then death is the possibility of not being able-to-be, or of, in some way, 
not being able to project into abilities. (And I write “in some way” because, as I will 
explain below, this “impossibility of existence” must be understood in a very specific 
sense.) This existential death is what Heidegger means by “death,” and this existential 
death is an object of experience.  
Heidegger gives a picture of the kind of experience of this existential death in 
discussing anxiety. Anxiety is, for Heidegger, that attunement which “hold[s] open the 
constant and absolute threat to itself arising from the ownmost individualized being of 
Da-sein.”241 The intentional content that the mood of anxiety discloses is precisely death. 
In anxiety, therefore, 
 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
238 William D. Blattner, “The concept of death in Being and Time,” Man and World, 27 (1994), 
49-70, 49. 
239 The concept of death in Being and Time,” 62. 
240 “The concept of death in Being and Time,” 67. 
241 BT, 245 [265]; emphases eliminated. 
!##"
"
[t]he world in which I exist has sunk into insignificance, and the world thus 
disclosed can set free only beings that are not relevant. The nothingness of the 
world in the face of which Angst is anxious does not mean that an absence of 
innerworldly things objectively present is experienced in Angst. They must be 
encountered in just such a way that they are of no relevance at all, but can show 
themselves in a barren mercilessness. However, this means that our heedful 
awaiting finds nothing in terms of which it could understand itself, it grasps at the 
nothingness of the world.242 
 
I will, in the following, discuss anxiety in more detail. Pertinent here is the fact that, in 
describing the intentional content of anxiety, Heidegger gives a picture of a perhaps 
extreme and unfamiliar, but nevertheless robustly possible, experience. In anxiety, a 
person experiences that his existence is impossible. He experiences that he is unable to 
pursue any particular possible self—a person “finds” that there is “nothing in terms of 
which to understand himself. A person experiences that he is unable to exercise any 
particular skills—he “grasps at the nothingness of the world.” And a person experiences 
that particular worldly beings are unable to be used—worldly beings “show themselves in 
a barren mercilessness.” If death comprises these inabilities, then death can be 
experienced.243 
 It should finally be stated that Heidegger himself uses the concept of experience 
in order to describe a person’s relation to his death. Heidegger notes that the relation a """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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over, while to die death itself means to live to experience dying. And if one can live to experience 
this for a single moment, then one lives to experience it for ever… Far from its being any comfort 
to the despairer that the despair doesn’t consume him, on the contrary this comfort is just what 
torments him; the very thing that keeps the sore alive and life in the sore. For what he—not 
despaired but—despairs over is precisely this: that he cannot consume himself, cannot be rid of 
himself, cannot become nothing. This is the heightened formula for despair, the rising fever in 
this sickness of the self.” Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, trans. Alastair Hannay 
(Penguin Classics, 1989), 48-9 
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person bears to the death of which he speaks is not a relation to the already dead, the 
deceased. But he adds that “[t]he more appropriately the no-longer-being-there of the 
deceased is grasped phenomenally, the more clearly it can be seen that in such being-with 
with the dead, the real having-come-to-an-end of the deceased is precisely not 
experienced” (solches Mitsein mit dem Toten gerade nicht das eigentliche 
Zuendegekommensein des Verstorbenen erfährt).244 In other words, it is the experience of 
death that Heidegger is trying to describe which is not given by simply being with the 
deceased. This implies that Heidegger does indeed believe that a person can experience 
death—just not the death of others. Indeed, Heidegger adds that “[w]e do not experience 
the dying of others in a genuine sense; we are at best always just ‘there,’ too” (Wir 
erfahren nicht im genuinen Sinne das Sterben der Anderen, sondern sind höchstens 
immer nur “dabei”).245  
 For Heidegger, then, death can be experienced. And what is experienced is not 
organic death, or the conclusion of a person’s life, but rather existential death: “the 
possibility of the absolute impossibility of existence.” I will, momentarily, address how 
this formulation should be understood. I want here, however, to note two ways in which 
Heidegger understands this experience of death, and indicate which of those ways will be 
focused on in the following chapters. For the experience of death on which I will focus is, 
specifically, the authentic experience of death. 
 As I suggested, one of the ways in which Heidegger indicates that death is an 
experience is that, for him, death is being-toward death (Sein zum Tode). Death is not an 
organic event, or the conclusion of a person’s life, but a person’s being-toward, his """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
244 BT, 222 [238-9].  
245 BT, 222 [239].  
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relation to, his own death. Now, for Heidegger, a person is always being-toward-death. 
Heidegger writes that “[f]actically one’s own Da-sein is always already dying, that is, it is 
in a being-toward-its-end.”246 In this sense, one can say that death is always being 
experienced. But there are many ways of experiencing, or being-toward, death. This is 
clear from everyday life. One can be in the grips of despair over death; or one can speak 
incidentally, in passing, and in perfect equanimity, about the death of others, and even 
one’s own death. For Heidegger, there are two primary ways in which death can be 
experienced: there is what he calls a “flight” (Flucht) from death; and there is the 
authentic experience of death. I will look at each of these in turn. 
 For Heidegger, the experience of death as a “flight” from death involves, 
primarily, the acknowledgment that death exists, and yet exists in such a way that it 
affects no one in particular, and, especially, does not affect a person himself. Death is 
therefore experienced as a “public event.” It is of concern to everyone, and yet, 
personally, to no one. “‘Dying,’” Heidegger writes, “is leveled down to an event which 
does concern Da-sein, but which belongs to no one in particular.”247 For Heidegger, that 
death is a public event, in this sense, is the way in which death is experienced insofar as 
das Man, the impersonal crowd, determines how death is experienced. “The public 
interpretation of Da-sein says that ‘one dies’ because in this way everybody can convince 
him/herself that in no case it is I myself, for this one is no one.”248 But this way of 
experiencing death is, for Heidegger, a flight from death, because it entails that death will 
not be experienced authentically: that is, not as what it genuinely is. This way of “[b]eing 
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toward the end has the mode of evading that end—reinterpreting it, understanding it 
inauthentically, and veiling it.”249 In the flight from death, the object, so to speak, of a 
person’s experience of death is death itself. And yet, in this flight, a person experiences it 
as what it is not: for death is not a public event. 
 Alternatively, for Heidegger, a person can experience death as what it is. That is, 
a person can experience death without fleeing from it, without evading it, reinterpreting 
it, and veiling it. A person can have an authentic experience of death, or can experience 
death explicitly. The authentic experience of death is an experience of death that does not 
flee from it, evade and veil it, but rather is an experience of death as, explicitly, what 
death itself is.  
I cannot, at this stage, give a comprehensive description of what the authentic 
experience of death is. I will give that comprehensive description in the following 
chapter. But one example of this authentic experience of death may be given. For 
Heidegger, in the flight from death, a person treats death as though it were merely an 
event in the world—a thing, whose kind of being is, therefore, the being of an object, 
presence-at-hand.250 However, as I have already noted, and as I am about to look at in 
more detail, death is the possibility of the impossibility of existence. As the possibility of 
the impossibility of existence, death has the being, not of a thing, but rather of Dasein. 
Death must, for this reason, be understood on the basis of a person’s care or abilities. 
Therefore, to experience death as a thing is to flee from it precisely by not understanding 
it in terms of a person’s care or abilities, but rather as a thing. On the other hand, the 
authentic, explicit experience of death is an experience of death in which it is experienced """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
249 BT, 235 [254].  
250 BT, 234 [254].  
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in terms of a person’s care or abilities: a person understands death, not as an event, but 
rather as the possibility of the impossibility of existence. 
Again, I will return, in the next chapter, to what the authentic experience of death 
is. I will show how the authentic experience of death involves an experience of death in 
which a person explicitly understands death as his “ownmost,” his “unsurpassable,” and 
his “non-relational” possibility, and discloses this death to himself in the mood of 
anxiety. Here, however, I only want to indicate that it will be this authentic experience of 
death with which I will be concerned in the following, and not that experience of death in 
which a person flees from death.  
 
2. Death as “the possibility of impossibility” 
The second problem that I would like to discuss bears on one of Heidegger’s 
characterizations of the authentic experience of death. As I suggested just above, and as I 
will explain in the following chapter, Heidegger understands the authentic experience of 
death as a person’s authentic experience of his ownmost, unsurpassable, non-relational, 
possibility, which is disclosed in the mood of anxiety. But he also, and primarily, 
understands the authentic experience of death as the authentic experience of the 
possibility of the impossibility of existence. 
This description of death is repeated in a number of places; for example, and as I 
have already indicated, that death is “the possibility of the impossibility of existence in 
general,”251 that death is “the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence”252; 
Heidegger also adds that death is “the possibility of the impossibility of every mode of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
251 BT, 242 [262], emphases removed. 
252 BT, 242 [262]. 
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behavior toward…, of every way of existing” (Er [Der Tod] ist die Möglichkeit der 
Unmöglichkeit jeglichen Verhaltens zu…, jedes Existierens).253 These descriptions of 
death can be condensed into the following formulation: death is the possibility of 
impossibility, since, as I will explain in a moment, “impossibility” means to be unable, 
and, since “existence,” as I have already suggested, means for a person to be able, 
“impossibility of existence” signifies what “impossibility” alone signifies.  
But this is a startling description of death. For how are we to think of a 
“possibility” that is “of” an “impossibility” (Möglichkeit der Unmöglichkeit)? Is not this 
paradoxical? Even more, if a “possibility” is “of” an “impossibility,” then might it not be 
a “possibility” at all, but rather just an “impossibility”? Additionally, if “impossibility” is 
something in which “possibility” itself is not “possible,” then might “possibility of 
impossibility” really mean “impossibility of possibility”? I want here to try to untangle 
these questions, and to untangle this formulation. And, as will become clear, this 
untangling bears directly on the question of what, precisely, for Heidegger, death is. 
 Figuring out what death, as “the possibility of impossibility,” means, is dependent 
upon first understanding what “possibility” and “impossibility” mean. First of all, and as 
I have suggested, possibility and impossibility do not indicate, for Heidegger, modal, or 
categorical possibility and impossibility: that something is not or is inconsistent with 
what is the case or is known to be true.254 Furthermore, and related to this, possibility and 
impossibility do not indicate the possibility or impossibility of a coming event, as when 
we say “it is possible that the sun will rise tomorrow” or “it is impossible that the sun will 
rise tomorrow.” For, in this case, “possibility” and “impossibility” would be employed in """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
253 BT, 242 [262].  
254 BT, 135 [143].  
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their modal or categorial senses: it is not inconsistent with what we know, or it is not 
inconsistent with what is the case, that something will come; or it is consistent with what 
we know, or it is consistent with what is the case, that something will not come. Even 
more, understanding possibility and impossibility in relation to coming events is to 
understand them in relation to things, that is, things whose being, for Heidegger, is 
presence-at-hand. However, for Heidegger, possibility and impossibility relate to a 
person’s existence, and, as I have already suggested, a person’s existence is precisely not 
a thing, or something whose being is presence-at-hand. 
 As I explained at the end of the third chapter, possibility and impossibility must 
be understood in relation to a person’s abilities. A person’s “possibilities” 
(Möglichkeiten) are those abilities in which his care consists: his ability to pursue a 
possible self; his ability to exercise skills; and his ability to use worldly beings. As I also 
suggested, this pursuit, exercise, and use all refer to “abilities” because, at the basis of 
them, is a person’s projection into abilities—namely, that “know-how” by which a 
person projects himself toward a possible self—and is therefore able to be a possible self; 
and projects his use of worldly beings—and is therefore able to use worldly beings. A 
person’s projection is, therefore, Heidegger writes, at the basis of a person’s “ability-to-
be” (Seinskönnen).255 In this light, then, “the possibility of impossibility” must be 
understood as a person’s projecting into not projecting, or a person’s being able to be 
unable.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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 But understanding “possibility of impossibility” in this way poses two distinct 
issues. First, it appears paradoxical:256 how can a person project that he does not project; 
or how can a person be able to be unable? And, second, it appears that the formula 
should be reversed. If “possibility of impossibility” means that a person projects that he 
does not project, or is able to be unable, should the expression not be rephrased as 
“impossibility of possibility,” in other words, a person’s not projecting that he projects, 
or a person’s being unable to be able? I will here address both of these issues. They are 
connected with one another. I will begin with the latter issue first. 
 First of all, a person’s “possibility of impossibility” is not equivalent to a person’s 
“impossibility of possibility.” According to the first formulation, a person does project or 
is able. What he does project, however, is his own not projecting, or he is able, but to be 
unable. According to the second formulation, however, a person does not project, and is 
not able. For this reason, indeed, the second formulation is paradoxical, or simply 
nonsensical. For what it fundamentally means is that a person cannot project that he can 
project; or that a person is not able, but, somehow, to be able. 
 If, then, the first formulation—which, after all, is Heidegger’s own formulation—
is accepted, then a person’s authentic experience of death is a person’s authentic 
experience of the possibility of impossibility, namely, of the fact that he projects that he 
cannot project, or is able to be unable. But at this point a paradox seems to appear. For 
how can a person project that he cannot project? How can a person be able to be unable? 
This apparent paradox can be resolved. However, it is important to see in what way it is 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
256 It should be mentioned that the paradox that this appears to raise is not the paradox that I am 
criticizing in this dissertation. 
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resolved. There is one potential type of resolution that is tempting, but that is, in fact, 
unsatisfactory. 
 The following may be proposed. A person does project, or is able. And what he 
projects, or that of which is able, is not projecting, or being unable. And he can do this by 
projecting or being able in such a way that he finds, at the, so to speak, “horizon” of his 
projection or ability, the fact that he cannot project, or is unable. So a person, for 
example, pursues the possible self of a doctor, exercises the skills of a doctor, and uses 
the worldly beings of a doctor. But he does this while grasping that, at the “horizon” of 
this being a doctor, he will not be able to be a doctor. This not being able to be a doctor is 
a person’s death, his possibility of impossibility: it is a person’s projecting that he cannot 
project, or his ability to be unable. Indeed, Heidegger speaks of death in just this sense: 
he says that death has the character of “imminence” (or something that is imminent: ein 
Bevorstand).257 
 There are a number of problems with this way of resolving the apparent paradox. 
First, it threatens to treat a person’s impossibility as something which is “possible” in that 
sense of something that possibly comes, and therefore according to the modal or 
categorial sense of possibility. In other words, a person’s impossibility, that he does not 
project or is unable, is something which he grasps can happen, in the sense that it is 
something which can, after or during the course of one’s life, happen. However, this “can 
happen” is a “can happen” appropriate only to events which are possible in the modal or 
categorial sense of “possible,” that is, which are not contradictory with what is known, or 
what is the case.  
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But it could be replied here that this “can happen” of a person’s impossibility is 
not a “can happen” of a more or less probable exigency, but rather a “can happen,” or, 
more precisely, a “can be” in Heidegger’s sense of “possibility.” That a person does not 
project or is unable “can be” in the sense that any of a person’s abilities “can be.” If a 
person is able to be a doctor, then he “can be” a doctor in the sense that he will be a 
doctor. Similarly, a person’s impossibility “can be” in this sense: a person “can be” 
unable in the sense that he will be unable. Therefore, by speaking of “the possibility of 
impossibility,” Heidegger means to indicate that a person can and thus will be 
impossible. A person who authentically experiences death therefore authentically 
experiences that he projects, or is able, but projects, or is able, in such a way that he 
projects his own I can and will not project or be able. So, a person, who authentically 
experiences death, is a doctor. He is able to pursue the possible self, exercise the skills, 
and use the worldly beings, of a doctor. But he projects, also, that he can and will not be a 
doctor, that is, that he can and will not be able to pursue the possible self, exercise the 
skills, and use the worldly beings, of a doctor.  
The problem with this way of resolving the paradox is that it overlooks the fact 
that, for Heidegger, a person’s authentic experience of death, of his possibility of 
impossibility, is not compatible with a person’s projecting in a meaningful way. I use the 
word “meaningful” here in the following sense (and this is my own, and not Heidegger’s, 
sense of “meaningful”): that there are particular abilities onto which a person projects. 
Therefore, for a person to project in a meaningful way, means that he has particular 
abilities into which to project, that is, a particular possible self to pursue and particular 
worldly beings to use, and that he projects into these with his particular skills. A person 
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who is a doctor projects in a meaningful way, since he has a particular possible self to 
pursue—that of a doctor; has particular skills to exercise—the skills of a doctor; and has 
particular worldly beings to use—the worldly beings that a doctor uses. 
A person’s authentic experience of death, or a person’s authentic experience of 
his possibility of impossibility, is not compatible with a person’s projecting in a 
meaningful way, because the possibility of impossibility is just the possibility of 
impossibility. A person’s death is, for Heidegger, and as I mentioned above, “the 
possibility of the impossibility of existence in general,” “the possibility of the 
impossibility of every mode of behavior toward…, of every way of existing,” and “the 
possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence.” If a person’s possibility is of 
impossibility, but of impossibility in general and measurelessly, then a person cannot 
project meaningfully. For if a person’s possibility is of impossibility in general, or of 
measureless impossibility, then there can be no particular abilities into which a person 
can project. However, it is just this meaningful projection that the latter way of resolving 
the apparent paradox ascribes to a person whose possibility is impossibility. For, 
according to this way of resolving the apparent paradox, a person who authentically 
experiences that his possibility is of impossibility is able to project into particular 
abilities—for example, he is able to pursue the particular possible self of a doctor, 
exercise those particular skills of a doctor, and use those particular worldly beings of a 
doctor.  
But how then is the apparent paradox resolved? In fact, the means to resolve it 
have just been made available. The authentic experience of death is the authentic 
experience of the possibility of impossibility. The person who authentically experiences 
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death therefore experiences that he is possible: he does project, or is able. However, he 
does not project meaningfully. But, therefore, the person who authentically experiences 
death experiences that he does project, but that he projects into no particular abilities. 
Heidegger describes a person’s authentic experience of death in just this way. He 
writes that the person who authentically experiences death is “primarily unsupported by 
concern taking care of things.”258 In other words, a person who authentically experiences 
death is not able to be concerned with particular others, or to take care of particular 
worldly beings. Furthermore, and as I explained above, in describing the mood of 
anxiety, that mood in which death is authentically experienced, Heidegger writes: 
 
[t]he world in which I exist has sunk into insignificance, and the world thus 
disclosed can set free only beings that are not relevant. The nothingness of the 
world in the face of which Angst is anxious does not mean that an absence of 
innerworldly things objectively present is experienced in Angst. They must be 
encountered in just such a way that they are of no relevance at all, but can show 
themselves in a barren mercilessness. However, this means that our heedful 
awaiting finds nothing in terms of which it could understand itself, it grasps at the 
nothingness of the world.259 
 
In the mood of anxiety, a person projects into abilities. He pursues a possible self; he 
exercises skills; he uses worldly beings. But he projects in such a way that he projects 
into no particular abilities. For the person whose mood is anxiety, there are no particular 
worldly beings to use: they are only mercilessly barren. And there is no particular 
possible self to pursue: there is nothing, no particular possible self, in terms of which a 
person can understand himself. And a person can exercise skills, and yet this exercise 
grasps at nothing—there are no particular skills to exercise. 
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 The paradox is therefore resolved in this way: a person’s authentic experience of 
death, of the possibility of impossibility, is a person’s authentic experience of projecting, 
in such a way that he has no particular abilities into which to project. It is in this sense 
that a person is able to be unable. 
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Chapter 6: The Concept of Authenticity 
 
I will here give an interpretation of the concept of authenticity—the concept which, in 
this dissertation, I mean to critique. Authenticity is a complex concept. It brings together 
two phenomena, and in a peculiar way. As I have suggested, it does not indicate, for 
Heidegger, what it most familiarly indicates in English—that a thing is “real,” as opposed 
to being fake or an imitation. Authenticity indicates a way of being of the human being; 
that is, it describes a way of being of a being that is characterized by care. “Because Da-
sein is always essentially its possibility, it can ‘choose’ itself in its being, it can win itself, 
it can lose itself, or it can never and only ‘apparently’ win itself.”260  
I will argue here that the authenticity of the authentic person consists in this: on 
the one hand, the authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of death, and, on 
the other hand, he anticipates his individuality. And, finally, for the authentic person, this 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death is identical to, or simply is, this 
anticipation of own individuality. For the authentic person to anticipate the authentic 
experience of death is for the authentic person to anticipate his individuality. 
It is clear that at the center of the concept of authenticity is the concept of 
anticipation (Vorlaufen), a concept that Heidegger links to the concept of “resoluteness” 
(Entschlossenheit): the authenticity of the authentic person is what Heidegger calls 
“anticipatory resoluteness” (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit). I will, in the following, 
explain what “anticipation” and “resoluteness” mean in more detail. Here I only want to 
give an initial orientation to the concept of authenticity.  
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Heidegger writes that anticipatory resoluteness, the authenticity of the authentic 
person, 
 
is not a way out fabricated for the purpose “overcoming” death, but it is rather the 
understanding… that frees for death the possibility of gaining power over the 





We defined anticipatory resoluteness as authentic being toward the possibility that 
we characterized as the absolute impossibility of Da-sein. In this being-toward-
the-end, Da-sein exists authentically and totally as the being that it can be when 
“thrown into death.”262 
 
The authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of death. But in this 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death (“in this being-toward-the-end”) the 
authentic person is also able to reveal a self that is otherwise covered over—that is, the 
authentic person is also to anticipate his individuality. Heidegger additionally writes:  
 
Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation frees one from one’s lostness 
in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities 
lying before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically 
understood and chosen.263  
 
The authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of death: he becomes “free for” 
death. But the authentic person is also able to anticipate his individuality—that is, he is 
able to understand and choose the factical, individual self that he is. Heidegger therefore 
states that the authentic person, who anticipates the authentic experience of death, “can 
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be individualized in individuation of [his] own accord,” or is “free for the freedom of 
choosing and grasping [himself].”264 
But the concept of authenticity not only involves these two sides—a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death, and a person’s anticipation of his 
individuality. It identifies these two sides. According to the concept of authenticity, in 
other words, a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is a person’s 
anticipation of his individuality. This becomes clear in Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety, 
the mood in which, as I have suggested, discloses the authentic experience of death. 
Heidegger writes that in anxiety, 
 
Da-sein is taken back fully to its naked uncanniness and benumbed by it. But this 
numbness not only takes Da-sein back from its ‘worldly’ possibilities, but at the 
same time gives it the possibility of an authentic potentiality-of-being.265 
 
In anxiety, a person authentically experiences death—a person is taken back fully to his 
naked uncanniness, that is, authentically experiences the fact that he absolutely is not “at 
home,”266 which, as I will explain below, is very much a part of the content of the 
authentic experience of death. However, in anxiety, a person is given, at the same time 
(zugleich), “the possibility of an authentic potentiality-of-being” (die Möglichkeit eines 
eigentlichen Seinkönnens), that is, the ability to be an individual. Heidegger therefore 
writes that “[t]ogether with the sober Angst that brings us before our individualized 
potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakable joy in this possibility”;267 that is, together with 
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(zusammen mit) the sobriety of anxiety, which discloses the authentic experience of 
death, is the joy (Freude) in a person’s ability to be an individual.268 
 In this chapter, then, I will (1) explain in more detail what the authentic 
experience of death is—that is, beyond what I said about it in the last chapter, that it is 
the authentic experience of “the possibility of the impossibility of existence.” And I will 
(2) explain how, according to the concept of authenticity, a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death is a person’s anticipation of his individuality.  
I lastly want remark here that there will be a specific limitation on the following 
interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. In the following, I will avoid 
Heidegger’s description of authenticity as “anticipatory resoluteness.” Since this is a 
frequent and even definitive description of authenticity, this deserves an explanation. My 
reason for avoiding this description is that I would like primarily to focus on how 
Heidegger understands authenticity as a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience 
of death and, what is identical to that, a person’s anticipation of his individuality. This 
understanding of authenticity is captured, specifically, by Heidegger’s concept of the 
“anticipation of death” (Vorlaufen in den Tod or Vorlaufen zum Tode).269 It is not 
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268 I want to note that this duality of the mood of anxiety is also especially apparent in Sartre’s 
account of “anxiety” or “anguish” (“angoisse”) in Being and Nothingness. See Being and 
Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (Citadel, 2001), 65 ff. For Sartre, anxiety is a state in which 
pathological sources of action—desire and fear—break down, and conventional moral standards 
cannot be appealed to in order to motivate action. For this reason, the anxious person finds 
himself unable to act. However, for Sartre, because of this, and at the same time, the anxious 
person discovers that his own self can and must be the source of his action. Sartre therefore writes 
that “it is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of his freedom, or if you prefer, anguish is 
the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of it is being; it is in anguish that freedom is, in 
its being, in question for itself” (65).  
269 Heidegger uses the expressions “Vorlaufen in den Tod” and “Vorlaufen zum Tode,” both of 
which Stambaugh translates as “anticipation of death” (for an example of the former, see BT, 282 
[305]; for an example of the latter, see BT 246 [267]). Because the German dative “zum” and 
accusative “in” is closer to the English accusative “in” than to the English genitive “of” because 
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specifically captured by Heidegger’s concept of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). For 
resoluteness is a person’s acknowledgment of, or “self-projection upon,” his own guilt 
(Schuld),270 namely, the fact that he is a “null ground of a nullity,”271 or has not chosen his 
own factical abilities, and, by choosing certain factical abilities, makes other factical 
abilities impossible.272  
The relationship between the anticipation of the authentic experience of death and 
resoluteness is complicated. Heidegger appears to suggest that only insofar as a person 
anticipates the authentic experience of death, can a person become resolute: “resoluteness 
becomes a primordial being toward the ownmost potentiality-of-being of Da-sein [that is, 
a self-projection upon guilt] only as anticipatory. Resoluteness understands the ‘can’ of 
its potentiality-for-being-guilty only when it ‘qualifies’ itself as being-toward-death.”273 
To be honest, I do not have a clear idea of what this relationship really is. However, the 
object of my critique is Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, insofar as that concept of 
authenticity proposes that a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is a 
person’s anticipation of his individuality. I will therefore not look at how the concept of 
authenticity involves resoluteness, but this oversight should not affect whether my 




of its directionality and sense of movement, “forerunning into death” has certain merits as a 
translation.  
270 BT, 272ff. [295 ff.]. 
271 BT, 261 [283].  
272 BT, 262 [284].  
273 BT, 283 [306].  
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1. The authentic experience of death 
First, then, I want to look in more detail at what the authentic experience of death is. In 
the last chapter, I looked at one dimension of the authentic experience of death. It is the 
authentic—or, as I suggested in the last chapter, explicit and not fleeing—experience of a 
person’s possibility of impossibility, which means the authentic experience of projecting 
into no particular abilities.   
But apart from describing death as the possibility of impossibility, Heidegger also 
describes death as a possibility which is a person’s “ownmost” (eigenste), which is 
“unsurpassable,” (unüberholbare), and which is non-relational (unbezügliche). In fact, 
Heidegger defines what he calls the “existential-ontological structure of death” (der 
existenzial-ontologischen Struktur des Todes)274 in these terms: the ontological structure 
of death is death as a person’s ownmost, unsurpassable, and non-relational possibility. 
The authentic experience of death, then, is a person’s explicit, not fleeing, experience of 
his ownmost, unsurpassable, and non-relational possibility. I here, then, want to describe 
in more detail what the authentic experience of this ownmost, unsurpassable, non-
relational possibility is.  
 Additionally, I will also describe Heidegger’s account of the mood of anxiety 
(Angst). Anxiety, Heidegger says, is “able to hold open the constant and absolute threat 
to itself arising from the ownmost individualized being of Da-sein,”275 that is, it is that 
mood which holds open, which explicitly discloses, death. Even more, “[t]hrownness into 
death reveals itself to it more primordially and penetratingly in the attunement of 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
274 BT, 231 [249].  
275 BT, 245 [265]. 
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Angst,”276 that is, it is in anxiety that a person most genuinely, or with the least distortion, 
experiences death. Anxiety is therefore an inextricable part of a person’s authentic 
experience of death. Even more, if every understanding of an experience has its mood, 
and a mood that contributes its own content to that experience,277 and anxiety is the mood 
in which death is authentically experienced, then anxiety contributes a unique content to a 
person’s authentic experience of death, and ought to be treated as a part of it. 
 A preliminary comment about a person’s authentic experience of his ownmost, 
unsurpassable, and non-relational possibility should be made. These characteristics of 
death are, for Heidegger, possibilities, just as the characteristic of death, that it is the 
“impossibility of existence,” which I looked at in the last chapter, is a possibility. 
Therefore, what I said about the meaning of “possibility” in the last chapter applies to 
these possibilities. Possibility indicates an ability, or a person’s projection into abilities. 
Just as, then, the possibility of impossibility indicates that a person projects into a 
particular kind of ability—he projects into no particular abilities—so too a person’s 
ownmost possibility, or a person’s unsurpassable possibility, or a person’s non-relational 
possibility, all indicate that a person projects into a particular kind of ability. So, for 
example, a person’s non-relational possibility means that a person projects into an ability 
that is non-relational. And, therefore, the authentic experience of death will be (among 
other things) an explicit, not fleeing experience of the projection into a non-relational 
ability.  
 A. The authentic experience of death is, first of all, the authentic experience of a 
person’s ownmost possibility. Heidegger writes: """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
276 BT, 232 [251].  




Death is a possibility of being that Da-sein always has to take upon itself. With 
death, Da-sein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being. In this 
possibility, Da-sein is concerned about its being-in-the-world absolutely. Its death 
is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there.278 
 
In this passage, “ownmost” (eigenste) indicates what is most one’s own (eigen), what is 
proper to a person, or what is an essential part of a person’s very self. And, therefore, the 
authentic experience of death, as the authentic experience of a person’s ownmost 
possibility or ownmost potentiality-of-being (ability-to-be), is the authentic experience of 
that ability that is most a person’s own, the authentic experience of that ability that is 
most proper to a person, or the authentic experience of that ability that is an essential 
part of a person’s very self. In a person’s authentic experience of death, a person comes, 
therefore, into the fullness of himself: he authentically experiences that most his own, 
most proper to himself, and most essentially himself.  
 This is correct. Yet it means the opposite of what it suggests. It suggests that a 
person’s authentic experience of death is the authentic experience of the full expression of 
himself—the ability to pursue that self that most expresses himself, that ability to exercise 
those skills that most expresses himself, that ability to use worldly beings in such a way 
that a person most expresses himself. In the authentic experience of death, a person is at 
the height of his life—he authentically experiences that he is able to be that kind of 
person, that doctor, teacher, and so on, that he most is.  
Yet this is precisely the wrong interpretation. Heidegger states that the authentic 
experience of death, as the authentic experience of a person’s ownmost possibility, is the 
authentic experience of that “possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there” (Sein Tod 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
278 BT, 232 [250].  
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ist die Möglichkeit des Nicht-mehr-dasein-können). The authentic experience of a 
person’s ownmost possibility is therefore that experience in which a person is not able to 
“express himself” at all. It is that authentic experience of a person’s not being able to be 
a doctor, not being able to be a teacher, and so on, because it is the authentic experience 
of no longer being able-to-be. A person’s authentic experience of death is, indeed, an 
experience of what is most a person’s own, most proper to a person, and most a part of a 
person’s self. But what is most a person’s own, most proper to a person, and most a part 
of a person’s self, is that a person is no longer able-to-be.  
 What does it mean for a person to have, as his possibility, no longer being able-to-
be? As I have already suggested, a person’s being “able-to-be” (Seinskönnen) is 
coextensive with “existence” and “care”: it is a person’s being. Therefore, not being able 
to be indicates that a person no longer is able to be in that way in which a person is. It 
indicates that a person’s being, his existence or care, is impossible. This understanding of 
death as a person’s ownmost possibility therefore only indicates the meaning of death 
that I looked at in the last chapter. It can be recalled here, in its various formulations: 
death is “the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general,” death is “the 
possibility of the impossibility of every mode of behavior toward…, of every way of 
existing,” and death is the “possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence.” As 
I suggested above, these descriptions of death can be condensed into the formulation of 
death as “the possibility of impossibility,” and this means that a person projects into no 
particular abilities. The authentic experience of death, then, as the authentic experience of 
a person’s ownmost possibility, is just the authentic experience of projecting into no 
particular abilities.  
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 B. Second of all, the authentic experience of death is the authentic experience of 
an unsurpassable possibility. But it should immediately be pointed out that death is not an 
unsurpassable possibility in the sense that organic death might be thought to be 
“unsurpassable”—that it is inevitable that we all die. For to reduce the unsurpassability of 
death to its organic inevitability is to understand death as organic death, that is, as 
perishing, Verenden, from which, however, Heidegger separates the existential death 
which he means to describe. The reason for the unsurpassability of death must therefore 
be sought elsewhere.279 
 It must be sought, in particular, in the facticity of a person’s experience of death. 
For Heidegger, “facticity” (Faktizität) is a basic aspect of the being of the human being. 
It indicates that a person is constituted as the kind of being that he is—that he is 
constituted as a being that cares, or a being that is able to pursue a possible self, able to 
exercise skills, and able to use worldly beings. For this reason, Heidegger states that 
“facticity” does not refer to what is normally understood to be facts—states of affairs of 
which propositions are true; it is not “the factuality of the factum brutum of something 
objectively present.”280 Rather, facticity expresses, in relation to Dasein, “that it is and 
has to be.”281 As factical (faktisch), a person must, then, be able to pursue a possible self, 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
279 I must admit here that I am not entirely convinced that the unsurpassability of death is entirely 
unrelated to the unsurpassability of organic death, Verenden. I say this as a qualification to the 
interpretation that I am about to give, which, however, is faithful to Heidegger’s explicit 
intentions. But there is a very ordinary sense in which death is unsurpassable—that is, we all die, 
we all must die, or death is inevitable; but the death to which this ordinary sense of the 
unsurpassability of death refers is, clearly, organic death. Can the unsurpassability of existential 
death be understood outside of this unsurpassability (inevitability) of organic death? This would 
seem very difficult. The interpretation that I give is one way; but it does not capture what 
immediately suggests itself in Heidegger’s use of the concept of unsurpassability, namely, 
inevitability. 
280 BT, 127 [135]. 
281 BT, 127 [135].  
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must be able to exercise skills, and must be able to use worldly beings. For this reason, 
according to Heidegger, the facticity in the being of the human being displays the 
“thrownness” (Geworfenheit) of the human being: that it is thrown into, or, as he writes, 
“delivered over” (Überantwortung) to its being.282 Even more, however, a being that is 
factical is always thrown into or delivered over to a specific kind of care, or specific 
abilities. A person has to be able to pursue a specific possible self, has to be able to 
exercise specific skills, and has to be able to use particular worldly beings. Heidegger 
therefore writes that a person is “delivered over” “as that being…which it, existing, has 
to be.”283 Thrown into or delivered over to its being, the human being cannot get away 
from itself, or cannot get over itself. Facticity therefore expresses what can be called “the 
force of circumstance”:284 that a person must confront, and engage with, the specific 
worldly situations in which he finds himself, must confront, and engage with, the specific 
skills that he possesses, and must confront, and engage with, the specific possible self 
that he pursues.  
 Heidegger understands the unsurpassability of death in light of facticity. Just as a 
person is thrown into those factical abilities by which his life constituted, so too a person 
is thrown into death. Heidegger writes that a person is “thrown into death” (geworfen in 
den Tod);285 that “Da-sein itself is as thrownness into death”;286 that a person is “thrown 
into being-toward-death”;287 and that a person is “thrown being-toward-death.”288  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
282 BT, 127 [135]. 
283 BT, 127 [135], emphasis not added. 
284 I would like to thank Taylor Carman for this phrase. 
285 BT, 303 [329].  
286 BT, 285 [308]. 
287 BT, 319 [348].  
288 BT, 316 [344]. 
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Therefore, if death is the possibility of impossibility, or a person’s ownmost possibility, 
then this impossible, ownmost possibility is factical. A person must project into no 
particular abilities: he must die. In this light, Heidegger’s statement that “one’s own Da-
sein is always already dying, that is, it is in a being-toward-its-end”289 gets its full sense 
and justification. A person is always dying because, since death is factical, a person must 
die. Heidegger’s full phrase therefore states: “Factically one’s own Da-sein is always 
already dying, that is, it is in a being-toward-its-end.”290 The authentic experience of 
death is therefore the authentic experience of this “must”: that it is “has to be,” that it is a 
“force of circumstance,” that a person projects into no particular abilities.  
 C. A person’s authentic experience of death is the authentic experience of a non-
relational possibility. However, the non-relationality of death should not be understood 
as the simple indifference of the character of a thing to the character of other things, as 
when one says a table is “unrelated” to the moon, or the concept of a dog is “unrelated” 
to the concept of a mountain. The non-relationality of death must be understood, rather, 
in the context of the peculiar relationality which, according to Heidegger, human beings, 
whose being is care, enjoy with others.  
As I discussed in the fourth chapter, Heidegger understands the being of human 
beings as a being with others. For a person to care is for a person to care with others who 
care. And, even more, it is to care in a way like the way that others care. If others possess 
certain abilities, then a person conforms his own abilities to those abilities; and if others 
understand their own abilities in a certain way, then a person conforms his own 
understanding of his abilities to that way. In this sense, a person is “related” to others """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
289 BT, 235 [254].  
290 BT, 235 [254], emphasis added. 
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insofar as his kind of care is involved with the kind of care of others: involved with them, 
not because a person becomes entangled with others in, so to speak, “knots” of competing 
and interdependent passions and endeavors, but because a person’s very way of being a 
human being, or very way of caring, is dependent on the others’ very way of being or 
caring. 
 The non-relationality of death indicates that death is not a possibility—a 
projection into an ability—that can be involved with the abilities of others in the sense 
described just above. Heidegger writes: 
 
Death is the ownmost possibility of Da-sein. Being toward it discloses to Da-sein 
its ownmost potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned about the being of Da-
sein absolutely. Here the fact can become evident to Da-sein that in the eminent 
possibility of itself it is torn away from the they, that is, anticipation can always 
already have torn itself away from the they.291 
 
Death “tears” (entreißen) a person away from the impersonal crowd. And it tears him 
away from the impersonal crowd for a specific reason. Heidegger begins this passage by 
noting that a person’s death is a person’s ownmost possibility, that is, as I have suggested, 
a person’s projection into no particular abilities. But this kind of care—projecting into no 
particular abilities—cannot be a kind of care that can conform to the type of care of the 
impersonal crowd’s care. For in order to care in that way in which others care, a person 
must be able to project into particular abilities. For this reason, projecting into no 
particular abilities tears a person away from the impersonal crowd. Heidegger therefore 
adds: 
 
The ownmost possibility is nonrelational… Death does not just “belong” in an 
undifferentiated way to one’s own Da-sein, but it lays claim on it as something """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
291 BT, 243 [263].  
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individual. The nonrelational character of death understood in anticipation 
individualizes Da-sein down to itself… It reveals the fact that any being-together-
with what is taken care of and any being-with the others fails when one’s 
ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake.292 
 
A person’s death entails that any care for particular worldly beings “fails” (“alles Sein bei 
dem Besorgten… versagt”). But that is not all that “fails.” Additionally, all of a person’s 
being with others fails as well (“jedes Mitsein mit Anderen versagt”). This is why death is 
a possibility that is non-relational: it is a projection into abilities—the projection into no 
particular abilities—that must be independent of the kind of care of others. 
 D. Finally, the authentic experience of death is an experience in the mood of 
anxiety. Anxiety, for Heidegger, is an attunement (Befindlichkeit) or mood (Stimmung). It 
is, then, not a psychological affect—for example, bothersome uneasiness. As I suggested 
in the third chapter, moods, for Heidegger, are a part of the way in which the human 
being discloses the “there” to itself—the human being’s disclosure of the full structure of 
his care: a possible self that he is able to pursue, worldly beings that he is able to use, and 
skills that he is able to exercise. But, as I also suggested in the third chapter, moods 
disclose, and prior to any understanding disclosure, “how one is and is coming along.”293 
For example, in a bad mood, a person himself and the world itself will, so to speak, 
“show up” in a specific way. Even more, this disclosure in a mood is not the disclosure of 
a simple affect; rather, it is a disclosure of way in which the world itself and a person 
himself matter—even, and for example, as not mattering.294 
Anxiety is, then, such a mood. But the particular character of anxiety is given by 
its specific intentional content: anxiety is, for Heidegger, anxiety over death. Heidegger """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
292 BT, 243 [263]. 
293 BT, 127 [124].  
294 BT, 129 [137]. 
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writes that “the attunement which is able to hold open the constant and absolute threat to 
itself arising from the ownmost individualized being of Da-sein is Angst,”295 and adds that 
“[t[hrownness into death reveals itself to it more primordially and penetratingly in the 
attunement of Angst. Angst in the face of death is Angst ‘in the face of’ the ownmost 
nonrelational potentiality-of-being not to be bypassed.”296 Insofar, then, as a person has 
an authentic experience of his “ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being not to be 
bypassed,” a person is in the mood of anxiety. “Being-toward-death,” Heidegger writes, 
“is essentially Angst.”297 
But what, then, specifically, does anxiety contribute to a person’s authentic 
experience of death? How does the mood of anxiety allow death to “show up”? 
Heidegger writes: 
 
that in the face of which one has Angst is not encountered as something definite to 
be taken care of; the threat does not come from something at hand and objectively 
present, but rather from the fact that everything at hand and objectively present 
absolutely has nothing more to ‘say’ to us. Beings in the surrounding world are no 
longer relevant. The world in which I exist has sunk into insignificance, and the 
world thus disclosed can set free only beings that are not relevant. The 
nothingness of the world in the face of which Angst is anxious does not mean that 
an absence of innerworldly things objectively present is experienced in Angst. 
They must be encountered in just such a way that they are of no relevance at all, 
but can show themselves in a barren mercilessness. However, this means that our 
heedful awaiting finds nothing in terms of which it could understand itself, it 
grasps at the nothingness of the world.298 
 
Relevance, as I discussed in the third chapter, is the involvement that worldly beings have 
with one another—namely, that by using one worldly being, other worldly beings can be 
used. In the mood of anxiety, therefore, particular worldly beings are unable to be used """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
295 BT, 245 [265], emphases removed. 
296 BT, 232 [251].  
297 BT, 245 [266].  
298 BT, 315 [343]. 
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with one another. Particular worldly beings have no use. In this sense, they do not 
“speak” to us any longer: they suggest to us no use. They are simply “there”—and there, 
like refuse, or as irrelevant. Even more, in anxiety, a person’s particular possible self 
shows up in a particular way—as nothing: “our heedful awaiting finds nothing in terms 
of which it could understand itself.” Because a person is unable to use worldly beings, 
there is no particular worldly possible self through which a person can understand 
himself. There is, consequently, no particular worldly possible self that a person is able to 
pursue. And, finally, in anxiety, a person’s particular skills show up in a particular way. 
Unable to use worldly beings, and unable to pursue a possible self, a person “grasps at the 
nothingness of the world”: grasping at nothing, a person finds himself unable to exercise 
particular skills.  
 In this perspective, and as Hubert Dreyfus has emphasized,299 what the mood of 
anxiety discloses is strikingly close to the content of a person’s experience of death 
insofar as death is a person’s ownmost possibility. As I discussed above, death, as 
person’s ownmost possibility, is a person’s projecting into no particular abilities. This is, 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
299 See Being in the World, 311. Dreyfus describes what is experienced in anxiety as a 
presentation of what would be experienced in dying if, according to Dreyfus, death could be 
experienced (he does not think it can be). “Death shows us in a  specific case that Dasein can 
have no possibilities that define it and its world… Thus the anxiety at the moment of dying when 
I have no possibilities left, the world recedes, and everything is seen to be meaningless, can be an 
analogon  for living lucidly in such a way that the world is constantly seen to be meaningless and 
I am constantly owning up to the fact that Dasein is not only the null basis as revealed in the 
anxiety of conscience but also is a nullity in that it can make no possibilities its own… Ordinary 
death is a perspicuous but misleading illustration of Dasein’s essential structural nullity, viz., that 




however, just what Heidegger describes the mood of anxiety to disclose. Anxiety is that 
mood which discloses that a person projects into no particular abilities.300 
 If anxiety is that mood that discloses to a person that he projects into no particular 
abilities, then one of the defining features of the mood of anxiety becomes clarified. For 
Heidegger, anxiety, unlike fear, so to speak “has no object”:  
 
How is what Angst is anxious about phenomenally differentiated from what fear is 
afraid of? What Angst is about is not an innerworldly being. Thus it essentially 
cannot be relevant. The threat does not have the character of a definite 
detrimentality which concerns what is threatened with a definite regard to a 
particular factical potentiality for being. What Angst is about is completely 
indefinite.301 
 
Anxiety is never about any particular worldly being: what anxiety is about is not a 
relevant worldly being, which could injure a person’s activity in a specific way. But 
anxiety “has no object,” not because anxiety is a gazing at the world in its general 
meaninglessness, as though it were a chaos in which relevant objects cannot be 
individuated, or in which nothing can, as it were, “make sense.” Rather, anxiety “has no 
object” because it discloses that a person cannot project into particular abilities. For in 
this case, a person cannot “have” particular worldly beings that he can use, through the 
exercise of his particular skills, and in pursuit of a particular possible self.  
 Anxiety is the mood of the authentic experience of death: therefore, in the mood 
of anxiety, a person authentically, explicitly, without fleeing or distortion, experiences 
that he projects into no particular abilities. With this, a complete description of a person’s 
authentic experience of death can be given. It is a person’s authentic experience of his """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
300 Heidegger makes clear that the mood of anxiety discloses death in just this sense in another 
passage as well. He writes: “The insignificance of the world disclosed in Angst reveals the nullity 
of what can be taken care of, that is, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-of-
being primarily based upon what is taken care of” (BT, 315 [343]).  
301 BT, 174 [186].  
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ownmost possibility—the authentic experience of the fact that a person projects into no 
particular abilities. It is a person’s authentic experience of his unsurpassable 
possibility—that this projection into no particular abilities is factical, that his projection 
into no particular abilities “has to be,” or that his projection into no particular abilities has 
the “force of circumstance.” It is a person’s authentic experience of his non-relational 
possibility—that, insofar as a person projects into no particular abilities, he is no longer is 
able to conform his kind of care to the kind of care of others. And this authentic 
experience of death is disclosed in the mood of anxiety. 
 
2. Authenticity as the anticipation of death and the anticipation of individuality 
I now want to look, directly, at the concept of authenticity. Authenticity, as I have 
suggested, is a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death, and the 
anticipation of his individuality. Even more, according to the concept of authenticity, 
these two sides are identical to one another. The anticipation of the authentic experience 
of death is, for the authentic person, the anticipation of his individuality.  
Heidegger therefore writes that the anticipation of the authentic experience of 
death “is not a way out fabricated for the purpose ‘overcoming’ death, but it is rather the 
understanding… that frees for death the possibility of gaining power over the existence 
of Da-sein and of basically dispersing every fugitive self-covering-over.”302 In a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death, death is powerful (mächtig). And this 
power is a power that frees the possibility that a person’s own concealment of himself be 
destroyed (Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit… dem Tod die Möglichkeit freigibt… jede 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
302 BT, 286 [310]. 
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flüchtige Selbstverdeckung im Grunde zu zerstreuen”). Or, again, a person’s anticipation 
of the authentic experience of death “brings [Da-sein] face to face with the possibility to 
be itself… to be itself in passionate anxious freedom toward death which is free of the 
illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself.”303 The person who anticipates the 
authentic experience of death is, in that experience—in passionate anxious freedom 
toward death—certain of himself (ihrer selbst gewissen), and has the possibility to be 
himself (die Möglichkeit… es selbst zu sein). 
What I want to show here, then, is how the authentic person anticipates the 
authentic experience of death, and, in that anticipation, anticipates his individuality. But 
two specific concepts, which I have not as yet explained in any detail, need here to be 
clarified. What specifically is “anticipation,” and what specifically is a person’s 
“individuality”?  
The sense of a person’s individuality will, in the following, especially become 
clear. I can here give an overview of what I will, in the following, explain. For 
Heidegger, in a person’s anticipation of his individuality, a person anticipates the ability 
to understand himself in terms of abilities which are limited and factical. That is, a person 
anticipates the ability to understand himself according to particular abilities which, as he 
says, “lie before” (vorliegen) death, and therefore constitute a whole (Ganze). And a 
person anticipates the ability to understand himself according to particular abilities 
which, following Heidegger’s understanding of “facticity,” a person is constituted as 
possessing, and which he therefore “has to” be. Even more, by anticipating his 
individuality, a person is able anticipate the ability to choose those limited, factical 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
303 BT, 245 [266], one order of emphasis removed. 
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abilities independently—that is, to choose them independently of the choices that the 
impersonal crowd compels. And a person anticipates the ability to choose those abilities 
individually, or deliberately, in a sense that I will further explain below. The anticipation 
of a person’s “individuality” is therefore a person’s anticipation of this individuality: a 
self-understanding in terms of limited and factical abilities, and the ability to make 
independent and individual, deliberate choices.  
 Anticipation (Vorlaufen), for Heidegger, is a way in which a person relates to the 
authentic experience of death, and to his individuality. By translating Vorlaufen as 
“anticipation,” I follow Stambaugh. Another common translation of Vorlaufen is 
“forerunning,” or “running ahead into.” “Anticipation” has its advantages and 
disadvantages. What it loses in its vagueness—etymologically, it means “taking in 
advance”—it gains in avoiding the problematic literal meaning of “forerunning” or 
“running ahead into.” Vorlaufen does not mean, literally, “running” or “running ahead 
into,” as though Vorlaufen were a matter of physical movement. At the same time, 
Vorlaufen does not mean “to anticipate,” in the common sense of the word, that is, to 
expect, to await, or to predict. In fact, in discussing the meaning of anticipation, 
Heidegger explicitly excludes this latter group of meanings. “Expecting” (Erwarten), 
Heidegger suggests, means to relate to something possible, and yet to relate to something 
possible with a view to its actualization: 
 
To expect something possible is always to understand and ‘have’ it with regard to 
whether and when and how it will really be objectively present. Expecting is not 
only an occasional looking away from the possible to its possible actualization, 
but essentially a waiting for that actualization. Even in expecting, one leaps away 
from the and gets a footing in the real. It is for its reality that what is expected is 
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expected. By the very nature of expecting, the possible is drawn into the real, 
arising from it and returning to it.304 
 
Anticipation is not expectation because what is anticipated is not something that either is 
meant to be actualized, or even could be actualized. What a person anticipates in 
anticipation is his authentic experience of death, and his individuality. But neither the 
authentic experience of death nor a person’s individuality are things which could be 
realized. They are, rather, abilities, which, as I have explained, do not have the 
ontological character of things, and therefore not of something that could be actual or 
objectively present.  
 Anticipation, then, is a relation to abilities. And, for Heidegger, it is a relation to a 
person’s abilities in which a person seizes them. It is for this reason that the translations 
of Vorlaufen as “forerunning” and “running ahead into” are particularly helpful, despite 
what they literally suggest. In respect of the anticipation of the authentic experience of 
death, Heidegger writes: 
 
But does not this mode of behavior [anticipation] contain an approach to the 
possible, and does not its actualization emerge with its nearness? In this kind of 
coming near, however, one does not tend toward making something real available 
and taking care of it, but one comes nearer understandingly, the possibility of the 
possible only becomes “greater.” The nearest nearness of being-toward-death as 
possibility is as far removed as possible from everything real. The more clearly 
this possibility is understood, the more purely does understanding penetrate to it 
as the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general.305 
 
Anticipation, then, is a relation to abilities—in this latter case, the authentic experience of 
death—by which a person comes as near to them as possible, penetrates them as purely 
as possible, and, therefore, presents them, as abilities, as greatly as possible. Anticipation 
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is the seizure of abilities. In anticipation, a person determinedly and courageously takes a 
firm and clear hold of those abilities as the abilities which they are. In the anticipation of 
the authentic experience of death, therefore, a person determinedly, courageously, firmly 
and transparently, seizes the authentic experience of death as his ability; and in the 
anticipation of his individuality, a person takes a person determinedly, courageously, 
firmly and transparently seizes his individuality as his ability. 
 There are four respects in which, for Heidegger, a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death is identical to a person’s anticipation of his individuality. I 
will look at each in turn: (A) a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death 
is the anticipation of understanding his abilities as limited; (B) a person’s anticipation of 
the authentic experience of death is the anticipation of understanding his ability as 
factical; (C) a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is the 
anticipation of his ability to make independent choices; (D) a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death as it is experienced in the mood of anxiety is the 
anticipation of his ability to make independent, deliberate choices. It can be noted that the 
person who anticipates his individuality in these foregoing respects arrives at a 
comportment that is the precise contrary of the anonymous comportment of the 
inauthentic person, as I interpreted that comportment in the fourth chapter. 
A. I showed above how, for Heidegger, a person’s authentic experience of death 
is the authentic experience of his ownmost possibility. It is the authentic experience of 
the fact that a person is “no-longer-able-to-be-there,” that is, of the impossibility of a 
person’s existence. And this means that, in the authentic experience of death, a person 
authentically experiences that he projects into no particular abilities.  
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But if a person’s authentic experience of death is the authentic experience of 
projecting into no particular abilities, then, for Heidegger, anticipating this authentic 
experience of death carries a lesson. Heidegger writes: 
 
Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation frees one from one’s lostness 
in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities 
lying before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically 
understood and chosen.306 
 
This passage is significant in a number of respects, and I will also return to it below. 
What should be emphasized here is that Heidegger identifies the anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death—becoming “free for one’s own death”—with the 
anticipation of abilities which are understood to be “lying before” (vorgelagert) that 
death. The connection between these two anticipations can be explained in the following 
way. A person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is the anticipation of a 
person’s projecting into no particular abilities. But, for Heidegger, it is therefore the 
anticipation of the ending of a person’s projection into particular abilities. “The ending 
that we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify a being-at-an-end of Da-
sein, but rather a being toward the end of this being.”307 By anticipating the ending of a 
person’s projection into particular abilities, a person is therefore able to anticipate his 
projection into particular abilities in such a way that this projection is understood to be 
ended by that end.  
But by anticipating the projection into particular abilities as ended, a person is 
able to anticipate a highly significant form of self-understanding. Heidegger writes that a 
person who anticipates his projection into particular abilities as lying before or ended by """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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death, anticipates his projection into particular abilities in such a way that they are 
understood to constitute a whole: 
 
Because anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-bypassed [death] also disclosed 
all the possibilities lying before it, this anticipation includes the possibility of 
taking the whole of Da-sein in advance in an existentiell way, that is, the 
possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-of-being.308 
 
In the anticipation of the authentic experience of death, a person anticipates his projection 
into particular abilities in such a way that this projection into particular abilities is 
understood as a whole, or, to put it another way, in such a way that this projection into 
particular abilities is understood to be limited. A person anticipates his projection into 
particular abilities in such a way that those abilities are understood to comprise a limited, 
whole set of abilities. It can be recalled, however, that one of the central elements of the 
inauthentic person’s anonymity is his understanding himself in terms of limitless abilities. 
The inauthentic person does not understand himself to be an individual, because he does 
not understand his abilities to be limited in any way. In this light, therefore, it can be seen 
that the person who anticipates the authentic experience of death, anticipates 
understanding himself as an individual. For what he anticipates is, precisely, his 
projection into particular abilities, but in such a way that this projection into abilities is 
understood to be limited. The anticipation of the authentic experience of death is, 
therefore, the anticipation of a person’s individuality. 
B. I showed above how the authentic experience of death is the authentic 
experience of a unsurpassable death: a death which is factical. A person who 
authentically experiences death authentically experiences that he must not be able to 
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project into particular abilities. For this reason, however, the anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death teaches a person another lesson: it allows a person to anticipate his 
abilities in such a way that they are understood to be factical.  
In discussing the anticipation of the authentic experience of death as the 
anticipation of an unsurpassable possibility, Heidegger writes: 
 
The ownmost nonrelational possibility [death] is not to be bypassed [is 
“unsurpassable”]. Being toward this possibility lets Da-sein understand that the 
most extreme possibility of existence is imminent, that of giving itself up. But the 
anticipation does not evade the impossibility of bypassing death, as does 
inauthentic being-toward-death, but frees itself for it. Becoming free for one’s 
own death in anticipation frees one from one’s lostness in chance possibilities 
urging themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities lying before the 
possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically understood and chosen.309 
 
A person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is, here, identified with a 
person’s anticipating in such a way that he is freed from “chance” abilities, and freed for 
factical abilities. A person anticipates his unsurpassable death—that he must die, that he 
must not be able to project into particular abilities. But, in this anticipation, a person is 
freed for those factical abilities by which his life is constituted—that is, he is freed for the 
projection into particular abilities in which he understands his life to factically consist. In 
other words, in anticipating the authentic experience of death, a person anticipates his 
own projection into particular abilities, but in such a way that these abilities are 
understood to be factical. Another way to put the point is the following. A person who 
anticipates the authentic experience of death becomes sensitive to his facticity: he 
anticipates an unsurpassable death, that he must not project into particular abilities. But 
this anticipation allows a person to become sensitive to the projection into particular 
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abilities in which his life factically consists: it allows a person to become sensitive to the 
fact that he must project into the particular abilities in which his life factically consists.  
 The anticipation of projecting into particular abilities which are understood to be 
factical implies, however, that the authentic person anticipates his individuality. It can be 
recalled that part of the inauthentic person’s anonymity is that he does not understand his 
abilities to be factical. The inauthentic person does not understand himself as an 
individual, because he cannot understand himself in terms of his own factical abilities. In 
the anticipation of the authentic experience of death, however, a person is precisely able 
to anticipate his abilities in such a way that they are understood to be factical. Heidegger 
therefore writes that authenticity does not 
 
stem from “idealistic” expectations soaring above existence and its possibilities; 
but arises from the sober understanding of the basic factical possibilities of Da-
sein. Together with the sober Angst that brings us before our individualized 
potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakeable joy in this possibility. In it Da-sein 
becomes free of the entertaining ‘incidentals’ that busy curiosity provides for 
itself…310 
 
A person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death therefore provides a “sober 
understanding of the basic factical possibilities of Da-sein.” And sober understanding is, 
specifically, of a person’s “individualized potentiality-of-being,” since what a person 
anticipates in the anticipation of the authentic experience of death, is his individuality, or 
his projection into particular abilities which are understood to be factical. 
C. I discussed above how a person’s authentic experience of death is the authentic 
experience of a non-relational death. For Heidegger, a person’s being is always being 
with: a person cares in such a way that he cares with others who also care. But being with 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
310 BT, 286 [310].  
!'!"
"
these others who also care is, for Heidegger, being like these others who also care: a 
person cares in that specific way in which the others care. On the other hand, the person 
who authentically experiences death does not conform to the impersonal crowd. The 
authentic experience of death is the authentic experience of projecting into no particular 
abilities. But, in order to conform to the impersonal crowd, a person must be able to 
project into particular abilities. As Heidegger writes, “any being-together-with what is 
taken care of and any being-with the others fails when one’s ownmost potentiality-of-
being is at stake.”311 
 For Heidegger, however, if the authentic experience of death is the authentic 
experience of not being able to conform to the impersonal crowd, then anticipating the 
authentic experience of death is also the anticipation of a very significant ability. It is the 
anticipation of the ability to make choices independently of the prescriptions of the 
impersonal crowd. Heidegger writes: 
 
The nonrelational character of death understood in anticipation individualizes Da-
sein down to itself… It reveals the fact that any being-together-with what is taken 
care of and any being-with the others fails when one’s ownmost potentiality-of-
being is at stake. Da-sein can authentically be itself only when it makes that 
possible of its own accord… Anticipation of its nonrelational possibility forces 
the being that anticipates into the possibility of taking over its ownmost being of 
its own accord.312 
 
Since, in the anticipation of the authentic experience of death, a person anticipates that he 
cannot conform to the impersonal crowd, in anticipating the authentic experience of 
death, a person anticipates the necessity, or even the compulsion, to make his own, 
independent choices. A person anticipates a situation—death—in which his choices 
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cannot be compelled by the impersonal crowd, and therefore anticipates a situation in 
which his choices must only derive from himself. And, indeed, Heidegger writes that the 
anticipation of a person’s authentic experience of death (the “anticipation of its 
nonrelational possibility”) forces a person to anticipate “taking over” his own being of his 
“own accord” (“Das Vorlaufen in die unbezügliche Möglichkeit zwingt das vorlaufende 
Seiende in die Möglichkeit, sein eigenstes Sein von ihm selbst her aus ihm selbst zu 
übernehmen”).  
 The anticipation of the authentic experience of death therefore allows a person to 
anticipate an ability that, specifically, is denied to the inauthentic person. As I explained 
above, the inauthentic person, who conforms to the impersonal crowd, suffers a 
“disburdening” (Entlassen) of his own power of choice. Not only does a person choose 
those abilities that the crowd chooses—and therefore chooses abilities characterized by 
“averageness” (Durchschittlichkeit)—but a person’s very power of choice itself is ceded 
to the impersonal crowd:  
 
The they is everywhere, but in such a way that it has always already stolen away 
when Da-sein presses for a decision. However, because the they presents every 
judgment and decision as its own, it takes the responsibility of Da-sein away from 
it… In the everydayness of Da-sein, most things happen in such a way that we 
must say “no one did it.”313 
 
By contrast, a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is also the 
anticipation of the burdening of a person with his own, independent, power of choice. 
And a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is, therefore, a person’s 
anticipation of his individuality, insofar as, in this anticipation, a person anticipates 
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making his own independent choices, independent of the compulsion of the impersonal 
crowd.  
D. Finally, I showed above how a person authentically experiences death in the 
mood of anxiety. The mood of anxiety discloses to a person that he cannot project into 
particular abilities: that he is unable to use particular worldly beings (they are 
“irrelevant”), that he is unable to pursue a particular possible self (there is “nothing” in 
whose terms a person can “understand himself”), and that he is unable to exercise 
particular skills (“our heedful awaiting…grasps at the nothingness of the world”).  
A significant implication of this mood of anxiety is that a person’s perpetual 
activity, characteristic of his inauthenticity, comes to a stop. A person is anxious over the 
fact that there is no particular possible self to pursue, no particular skills to exercise, and 
no particular worldly being to use. As Heidegger writes, “[i]n accordance with its 
existential meaning, Angst cannot lose itself in what can be taken care of.”314 Anxiety, for 
this reason, can be said to be “paralyzing,” but not in the ordinary psychological sense in 
which the affect of anxiety freezes a person in terror. Anxiety is paralyzing because it is 
the mood of a person’s being unable to project into particular abilities.  
However, for this reason, in the anxiety that a person experiences in the 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death, a person can anticipate his individuality, 
and in a specific sense. Heidegger writes:  
 
Angst discloses Da-sein as being-possible, and indeed as what can be 
individualized in individuation of its own accord. Angst reveals in Da-sein its 
being toward its ownmost potentiality of being, that is, being free for the freedom 
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of choosing and grasping itself. Angst brings Da-sein before its being free for… 
(propensio in)…, the authenticity of its being…315 
 
In anxiety, a person discloses his not being able to project into particular abilities. But 
this anxious disclosure of his not being able to project into particular abilities implies, for 
Heidegger, that a person discloses his pure ability. A person understands his abilities as 
abilities, and as nothing else: “Angst discloses Da-sein as being-possible.” This means, 
for Heidegger, that a person, in experiencing anxiety in the anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death, is able to anticipate making individual, deliberate choices. These 
choices are “deliberate,” not in the sense that they issue from weighing the benefits and 
costs of making them, but rather because they issue from a person’s own resolved, 
composed, decision. The anxious person, no longer perpetually acting, and anticipating 
his own pure ability, is able to resolve, decisively, on that pure ability. In anxiety, and 
understanding himself as “being-possible,” a person becomes “free for the freedom of 
choosing and grasping [himself]” (Die Angst offenbart im Dasein… das Freisein für die 
Freiheit des Sich-selbst-wählens). 
 The anxiety that is experienced in the anticipation of the authentic experience of 
death is therefore both that mood which discloses that a person projects into no particular 
abilities, and, at the same time, that mood which discloses that a person is able to make 
individual, deliberate choices. Heidegger therefore writes that, in the mood of anxiety, 
 
Da-sein is taken back fully to its naked uncanniness and benumbed by it. But this 
numbness not only takes Da-sein back from its “worldly” possibilities, but at the 
same time gives it the possibility of an authentic potentiality-of-being.316 
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In the mood of anxiety, a person is not only (nicht nur) immersed in his uncanniness—his 
not being “at home,” or his not being able to pursue a familiar possible self, exercise 
familiar skills, or use familiar worldly beings317—but, at the same time (zugleich), is 
holds before himself the ability to make individual choices (“Diese Benommenheit… gibt 
[Dasein] zugleich die Möglicheit eines eigentlichen Seinkönnens”).  
 
 Heidegger writes that “[w]hen Da-sein, anticipating, lets death become powerful 
in itself, as free for death it understands itself in its own higher power, the power of its 
finite freedom…”318 The foregoing interpretation of the concept of authenticity can make 
sense of this sentence. Let me try to summarize what this interpretation has tried to show. 
Authenticity is the anticipation of the authentic experience of death, but also, identical to 
that, the anticipation of a person’s individuality. In anticipating the authentic experience 
of death, a person anxiously anticipates his ownmost, unsurpassable, non-relational 
possibility. But in anxiously anticipating this authentic experience of death, a person is 
able to anticipate his abilities in such a way that they are understood to be limited and 
factical, and therefore, in this anticipation, can understand himself as an individual. And, 
in anticipating this authentic experience of death, a person is able to anticipate his ability 
to make independent and individual, deliberate choices: he is again able to anticipate his 
individuality.  
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Chapter 7: Critique of the Concept of Authenticity 
 
I will here offer a critique of the concept of authenticity. This critique is based upon—and 
therefore presupposes—the meaning of the concept of authenticity, as I interpreted it in 
the last chapter. In fact, in the last chapter, certain problems that belong to the concept of 
authenticity emerged. However, I did not explicitly point them out. Here I will. I will 
focus on one primary problem that belongs to the concept of authenticity: that the 
concept of authenticity is paradoxical. And I will also discuss a secondary but connected 
problem: that part of the concept of authenticity is nonsensical. 
It can be recalled that according to the concept of authenticity, for Heidegger, the 
authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of death; and anticipates his 
individuality; and this anticipation of the authentic experience of death, and anticipation 
of individuality, are identical to one another. For a person to anticipate the authentic 
experience of death is for him to anticipate his individuality.  
The two problems that emerge in this concept of authenticity are as follows. 
1. The concept of authenticity appears to be paradoxical. I can note here that this 
paradox is not the paradox that I discussed in the fifth chapter, namely the paradox that 
the authentic experience of death is the authentic experience of the possibility of 
impossibility. I showed that it is not a paradox for there to be a possibility which is of 
impossibility.319 The paradox belonging to the concept of authenticity does not, strictly 
speaking, concern Heidegger’s understanding of what death is, but, rather, concerns the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
319 William Blattner has tried to show that this understanding of the authentic experience of death 
is not paradoxical; however, in showing that it is not paradoxical, he neither mentions the 
possibility that the concept of authenticity is paradoxical, nor tries to show that the concept of 
authenticity is not paradoxical. See “The concept of death in Being and Time.” 
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nature of the concept of authenticity itself. The paradox can be stated in the following 
way. The concept of authenticity proposes that a person’s anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death is a person’s anticipation of his individuality. But the anticipation of 
the authentic experience of death is the anticipation of projecting into no particular 
abilities; whereas the anticipation of individuality is the anticipation of projecting into 
particular abilities. These two kinds of anticipation cannot, consequently, be identified 
with one another. Their identification, therefore, which is precisely what the concept of 
authenticity proposes, is paradoxical.  
2. Additionally, one of the sides of the concept of authenticity—the anticipation 
of the authentic experience of death—appears to be nonsensical.  If the authentic 
experience of death is the authentic experience of projecting into no particular abilities, 
then how is a person supposed to anticipate this authentic experience of death? How is a 
person supposed to “seize” it, “forerun” or “run up ahead” into it? Is it not nonsense320 to 
think that a person can seize his projecting into no particular abilities? This problem is 
related to the first problem: it is symmetrical to it. The first problem points to an 
incompatibility between the anticipation of individuality and the anticipation of the 
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one of Heidegger’s formulations (I believe it was “the nothing nothings” or “the world worlds”) 
was written on the board along with a phrase of Hegel’s (which I do not remember). The 
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for an ironic reason, which is that it is offered mainly because its proponents have not taken the 
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!')"
"
authentic experience of death. This problem points to an incompatibility between 
anticipation itself and the authentic experience of death.  
In this chapter, I will look at each of these problems in more detail. I will also, 
however, look at a way in which the concept of authenticity may be rethought, in order to 
avoid the first problem. I will therefore (1) look at the paradox in the concept of 
authenticity; (2) look at the nonsensicality of one of the sides of the concept of 
authenticity; and (3) discuss a way in which the concept of authenticity can be rethought, 
in order to avoid these problems. 
I would like to mention one last point. As I showed in the second chapter, most of 
the criticisms of the concept of authenticity that have been offered are focused on its 
political and moral consequences, and its status as ideology. I suggested that these 
critiques are flawed, not so much because of their intentions—there are many ways in 
which the concept of authenticity is politically and morally dangerous, and there are also 
many ways in which it can be understood to be ideology—but because of their execution 
of these intentions. They do not consider Heidegger’s justifications for the concept of 
authenticity, or whether it is coherent. The critique that I will offer, however, does ask 
about these justifications, and, primarily, about its coherence. However, asking about the 
concept of authenticity’s coherence, and, ultimately, claiming that it is not coherent, is 
connected in a very direct way to the three other kinds of critiques. Showing that the 
concept of authenticity is incoherent allows a politically and morally dangerous concept 
to be resisted, but with philosophical means. And it also gives evidence for its ideological 
status, insofar as ideology is frequently incoherent, since ideology is thinking that aims 
for something other than rationality. 
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1. The paradox in the concept of authenticity 
I would here, then, like to argue that the concept of authenticity is paradoxical. Let me 
first try to bring all of the relevant features of the concept of authenticity into view. 
Authenticity is a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death, and, identical 
to that, a person’s anticipation of his individuality. The anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death is the anticipation of the explicit and not fleeing experience of the 
possibility of impossibility, that is,321 a person’s ownmost, unsurpassable, non-relational 
possibility, all of which is disclosed in the mood of anxiety. The anticipation of 
individuality is a person’s anticipation of understanding himself in terms of limited and 
factical abilities, and his anticipation of his ability to make independent choices, and 
individual, deliberate choices. “Anticipation” means here that, in relating to the authentic 
experience of death, and in relating to his individuality, a person seizes both, that is, he 
determinedly, courageously, and transparently takes hold of these abilities.  
 Now, I want to claim that the concept of authenticity is paradoxical, or that it is 
paradoxical that a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is identical to 
a person’s anticipation of his individuality. If one looks at what the two anticipations, 
which the concept of authenticity identifies with one another, mean, then it can be seen 
that they cannot be identified with one another. Before, however, trying to show this 
paradox in detail, I first would like to address a possible misunderstanding of what it 
means to say that the concept of authenticity is paradoxical, insofar as it entails that a 
person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death is a person’s anticipation of 
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individuality. This possible misunderstanding is highly significant, since its consequence 
is the avoidance of the very paradox that I wish to point out.  
 When I say that it is paradoxical for the concept of authenticity to identify a 
person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death and a person’s anticipation of 
his individuality, I mean that it is paradoxical for it to identify a person’s anticipation of 
the authentic experience of death and a person’s anticipation of his individuality, in the 
sense in which I have been speaking up to this point about a person’s individuality. The 
paradox emerges, in other words, when the anticipation of individuality is understood as 
a person’s anticipation of understanding himself in terms of limited and factical abilities, 
and of being able to make independent, and individual, deliberate choices.  
But a person’s anticipation of his individuality can be understood in another 
sense. In fact, it can be reduced to the bare meaning of a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death. As I have discussed, in anticipating the authentic 
experience of death, a person anticipates his ownmost possibility, and his non-relational 
possibility. Both these characteristics of the authentic experience of death evince a kind 
of “individuality.” Death is a person’s ownmost (eigenste) possibility, as I explained, 
insofar as death is what is most a person’s own, or insofar as death is what is most 
appropriate to a person. And death is a person’s non-relational possibility, insofar as, 
projecting into no particular abilities, a person cannot conform to das Man, the 
impersonal crowd. As the authentic experience of a person’s non-relational possibility, 
the authentic experience of death is therefore a person’s authentic experience of being 




In this light, the authentic experience of death could be understood to be the 
authentic experience of a person’s individuality. What a person authentically experiences 
is what is most his own; and it is a kind of solitude, in which he shares no abilities with 
others. For this reason, however, a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of 
death could be understood simply to be a person’s anticipation of his individuality: it just 
is the anticipation of what is most a person’s own, and a person’s solitude, or his not 
sharing abilities with others. 
This way of understanding a person’s anticipation of his individuality would 
undermine, or, more precisely, preempt, the claim of a paradox in the concept of 
authenticity. The reason for this lies in its reduction of the meaning of a person’s 
anticipation of his individuality to the bare meaning of a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death. For how could there be a paradox in identifying two types 
of anticipation which, however, are not two types of anticipation, but are, rather, simply 
the same anticipation?  
I agree with this. However, the identification, which the concept of authenticity 
proposes, and in which, I would like to claim, lies the paradox, is not the identification 
between a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death and a person’s 
anticipation of that individuality, whose meaning is simply reducible to the bare meaning 
of a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death. Rather, the paradox to 
which I would like to draw attention lies in the identification of a person’s anticipation of 
the authentic experience of death with a person’s anticipation of his individuality, 
understood as a person’s anticipation of understanding himself in terms of limited and 
factical abilities, and of making independent, and individual, deliberate choices. This 
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latter kind of anticipation of individuality has a meaning entirely distinct from that of the 
anticipation of individuality which is simply reducible to the bare meaning of a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death, and therefore is itself not simply 
reducible to the bare meaning of a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of 
death. 
I can note here, however, that if the first problem that I will discuss, the problem 
of a paradox in the concept of authenticity, is preempted by understanding a person’s 
anticipation of his individuality to be simply reducible to the meaning of a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death, nevertheless the second problem that I 
will discuss, the problem of the nonsensicality of one of the sides of the concept of 
authenticity, is not preempted. The second problem, as I suggested, is that a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death is nonsensical. But if a person’s 
anticipation of individuality is understood to be simply reducible to the meaning of a 
person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death, then this kind of anticipation of 
individuality will be nonsensical, too. 
Let me then try to establish that the concept of authenticity contains a paradox. 
This paradox is not, in truth, difficult to establish. One must only focus on a specific 
aspect in both a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death, and a person’s 
anticipation of his individuality. This aspect is the way in which each anticipation is an 
anticipation of a projection into particular abilities or of a projection into no particular 
abilities.  
In a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death, what is anticipated, 
essentially, is a person’s projection into no particular abilities. This is clear if one looks at 
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the various ways in which Heidegger characterizes the authentic experience of death. It is 
the possibility of impossibility. But, as I showed in the fifth chapter, this means nothing 
else than that the authentic experience of death is the authentic experience of projecting 
into no particular abilities. Heidegger’s understanding of the authentic experience of 
death as a person’s ownmost, unsurpassable, and non-relational possibility, demonstrates 
this as well. As I showed in the last chapter, by understanding the authentic experience of 
death as the authentic experience of a person’s ownmost possibility, Heidegger means to 
capture just what he captures by understanding the authentic experience of death as the 
authentic experience of the possibility of impossibility: that it is the authentic experience 
of projecting into no particular abilities. Furthermore, that the authentic experience of 
death is the authentic experience of a non-relational possibility is, as I showed in the last 
chapter, dependent upon the fact that it is the authentic experience of projecting into no 
particular abilities. The reason why the authentic experience of death is of a non-
relational possibility is because, insofar as a person does not project into particular 
abilities, he is unable to conform his abilities to the type of abilities enjoyed by the 
impersonal crowd, and therefore his choice of his abilities therefore cannot be compelled 
by the impersonal crowd. And, finally, while Heidegger’s understanding of the authentic 
experience of death as the authentic experience of an unsurpassable possibility indicates 
that the facticity of death is authentically experienced, what, in particular, is authentically 
experienced as factical in the authentic experience of death is just the projection into no 
particular abilities. In the authentic experience of an unsurpassable, factical death, that a 
person must project into no particular abilities is authentically experienced.  
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On the other hand, in a person’s anticipation of his individuality, what is 
anticipated is, essentially, a person’s projection into particular abilities. This is clear if 
one looks at how Heidegger understands the individuality that is anticipated. It can be 
recalled that Heidegger writes: 
 
Becoming free for one’s own death in anticipation frees one from one’s lostness 
in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities 
lying before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically 
understood and chosen.322  
 
What is anticipated in a person’s anticipation of his individuality is his understanding 
himself in terms of his limited and factical abilities: his “factical” abilities which are 
“lying before” his death. In anticipating his individuality, a person therefore anticipates 
his projection into his limited and factical abilities, that is, his projection into particular 
abilities. This is especially clear in Heidegger’s characterization of the “whole” that the 
limited abilities which a person anticipates constitutes. It can be called that Heidegger 
writes: 
 
Because anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-bypassed [death] also disclosed 
all the possibilities lying before it, this anticipation includes the possibility of 
taking the whole of Da-sein in advance in an existentiell way, that is, the 
possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-of-being.323 
 
The whole which, in anticipating his individuality, a person “takes in advance” 
(Vorwegnehmens), is a whole taken in advance in an “existentiell” way. For Heidegger, 
“existentiell” indicates a kind of understanding of the being of the human being, an 
understanding of the being of the human being in terms of the particular abilities that a 
person possesses—the particular possible self that he pursues, the particular worldly """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
322 BT, 244 [264].  
323 BT, 244 [264].  
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beings that he uses, and the particular skills that he exercises.324 “Da-sein always already 
understands itself factically in definite existentiell possibilities.”325 A person who “takes 
in advance” the “whole” of Dasein in an “existentiell” way therefore anticipates 
understanding himself in terms of his particular abilities, that is, he anticipates 
understanding himself in terms of his projection into particular abilities. Additionally, 
following the first quotation that I provided just above, these existentiell projections into 
particular abilities, which constitutes a whole, are none other than the factical abilities in 
terms of which a person, in anticipation, understands himself. Therefore, those factical 
abilities are also comprised of a person’s projection into particular abilities. The self-
understanding that a person anticipates, then, in anticipating his individuality, is a self-
understanding in terms of his limited and factical projection into particular abilities. 
 That a person’s anticipation of his individuality involves the anticipation of 
projecting into particular abilities also can be seen by looking at a person’s anticipation of 
his individuality as the anticipation of the ability to make independent, and individual, 
deliberate choices. The ability to make independent and individual, deliberate choices, 
which is anticipated, is the ability to choose, independently and individually, to project 
into particular abilities. Heidegger, in fact, already indicates this in his description of a 
person’s anticipation of his individuality as the anticipation of understanding himself in 
terms of limited and factical abilities. For what is anticipated is not merely a self-
understanding according to limited and factical abilities, but also a choosing of those 
abilities which are understood as limited and factical. “Becoming free for one’s own 
death in anticipation frees one from one’s lostness in chance possibilities urging """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
324 BT, 10-11 [12].  
325 BT, 288 [312], emphases added. 
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themselves upon us,” Heidegger writes, “so that the factical possibilities lying before the 
possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically understood and chosen” 
(verstehen und wählen).326 What a person anticipates in anticipating the ability to make 
independent choices is his choice of his abilities, which he understands to be limited and 
factical, but a choice which is not compelled by the impersonal crowd. And what a 
person anticipates in anticipating his ability to make individual, deliberate choices is his 
ability to make a choice of his abilities, which he understands to be limited and factical, 
but a choice which is individual in the sense that it is deliberate: it is clear-sighted, 
determined and resolved. But insofar as the abilities which a person understands to be 
limited and factical are a person’s projection into particular abilities which are 
understood to be limited and factical, what a person anticipates, in anticipating his ability 
to make independent and individual, deliberate choices, is his ability to make independent 
and individual, deliberate choices of his projection into particular abilities. 
 A paradox, however, can therefore be seen to emerge at the heart of the concept 
of authenticity. For how, as this concept proposes, can a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death, and a person’s anticipation of his individuality, be 
identified, if the former anticipation is a person’s anticipation of projecting into no 
particular abilities, and the latter anticipation is a person’s anticipation of projecting into 
particular abilities? The two sides of authenticity are, therefore, incompatible with one 
another, and yet the concept of authenticity proposes that they are identical. This is a 
paradox. 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
326 Emphasis added in translation. 
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 This paradox can be clarified by looking more closely at the role of anxiety in the 
authentic person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death and his anticipation of 
his individuality. In fact, it is especially in relation to anxiety that the paradox becomes 
conspicuous. Anxiety, as I explained in the last chapter, is the mood in which the 
authentic experience of death is disclosed. Therefore, in anticipating the authentic 
experience of death, the authentic person experiences anxiety. At the same time, 
however, as I also explained, by experiencing anxiety, the authentic person discloses his 
pure ability, and, by disclosing his pure ability, he discloses his ability to make 
individual, deliberate, choices. It is for this reason that a person’s experience of anxiety is 
not only the disclosure of the authentic experience of death, but also, at the same time, a 
person’s disclosure of his ability to be an individual. Heidegger draws together these two 
sides of the anxiety experienced in the anticipation of the authentic experience of death, 
and, indeed, into an identity, in the following passage. In anxiety, Heidegger writes, 
 
Da-sein is taken back fully to its naked uncanniness and benumbed by it. But this 
numbness not only takes Da-sein back from its “worldly” possibilities, but at the 
same time gives it the possibility of an authentic potentiality-of-being.327 
 
Heidegger here states that in the experience of anxiety, a person is indeed “taken back 
fully” (völlig zurückgenommen) to his naked uncanniness. In other words, in mood of 
anxiety, a person is taken back fully” to the fact that he projects into no particular 
abilities. But, for Heidegger, at the same time (zulgeich), the mood of anxiety also 
“gives” (gibt) a person “the possibility of an authentic potentiality-of-being,” in other 
words, a person also is able to be an individual, or able to project into particular abilities.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
327 BT, 316 [344].  
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But how can the experience of anxiety, in a person’s anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death, fulfill both of these roles? How can a person experience anxiety in 
such a way that he is “benumbed,” or “struck” or “captivated” by the fact that he can 
project into no particular abilities, but, at the same time, experience anxiety in such a way 
that he discloses to himself his ability to project into particular abilities? Without 
presenting the problem in Heidegger’s terminology, one could say that, for Heidegger, a 
person can, in the anticipation of the authentic experience of death, experience an anxiety 
in which he is overwhelmed, stunned, and not able to “go on” with his life—basically 
experience despair—but this, at the same time, is an experience of an anxiety in which he 
becomes able to seize his particular life, in a transparent, and determined, way. This is 
astonishing. But the astonishment is due to the fact that the experience of anxiety only 
reflects and concentrates the paradox in the concept of authenticity itself: that a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death is, and is at the same time, a person’s 
anticipation of his individuality. 
 There is another way to understand this paradox in the concept of authenticity. 
One could say that there is a gap, in the concept of authenticity, between the two types of 
anticipation that it involves. The authentic person anticipates the authentic experience of 
death: his projection into no particular abilities. But this anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death is, for the authentic person, his anticipation of his individuality: his 
projection into particular abilities. One could ask here, however, what explains the 
transition from the authentic person’s anticipation of the projection into no particular 
abilities to the authentic person’s anticipation of the projection into particular abilities. In 
fact, this transition appears to be inexplicable. It is as though Heidegger has, with the 
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concept of authenticity, performed a kind of magic trick: he has, with the concept of 
authenticity, produced something out of nothing. The authentic person’s anticipation of 
the projection into particular abilities emerges, ex nihilo, out of his anticipation of the 
projection into no particular abilities. This way of stating the problem, however, only 
reaffirms that the concept of authenticity contains a paradox. The transition is 
inexplicable because the two ends of the transition stand opposed to one another, and yet 
are supposed to flow into one another seamlessly.  
 
2. The problem of the anticipation of the authentic experience of death 
I would here like to point to another problem in the concept of authenticity, that is closely 
related to the foregoing problem of a paradox. I will only briefly describe this related 
problem; it is not the problem to which I primarily wish to draw attention in this 
dissertation.  
It is paradoxical that a person anticipates the authentic experience of death, and, 
identical to that, anticipates his individuality. A person cannot, as the concept of 
authenticity proposes, anticipate his projection into no particular abilities, and, identical 
to that, anticipate his projection into particular abilities. A related problem emerges, 
however, if one looks only at the idea that the authentic experience of death itself can be 
anticipated. For is it possible for a person to anticipate the authentic experience of death?  
 As I have explained, the authentic experience of death is the authentic experience 
of projecting into no particular abilities. The anticipation of the authentic experience of 
death is a person’s seizure of this authentic experience of death. In anticipating the 
authentic experience of death, a person seizes, in a transparent, determined, and 
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courageous way, the fact that he experiences, explicitly, that he projects into no particular 
abilities. But can a person thus transparently, determinedly, and courageously seize an 
explicit experience of projecting into no particular abilities? For what is there, in the 
authentic experience of death, to seize? There appears to be nothing to seize. And, indeed, 
it is central to the authentic experience of death that, in this experience, a person cannot 
seize anything. As I have explained, anxiety-ridden, the person who authentically 
experiences death discloses to himself the fact that his abilities are empty—that he has no 
particular possible self to pursue, that he has no particular worldly beings to use, and that 
he has no particular skills to exercise. However, anticipating the authentic experience of 
death would seem to require that, indeed, there be some particular abilities to seize: 
namely, some ability to pursue a particular possible self, some ability to exercise 
particular skills, and some ability to exercise particular skills. 
 The problem presented by the idea of the anticipation of the authentic experience 
of death is therefore symmetrical to the problem of a paradox in the concept of 
authenticity itself. The paradox in the concept of authenticity itself emerges because a 
person’s anticipation of individuality, or of his projection into particular abilities, cannot 
be identified with a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death, or of his 
projection into no particular abilities. Here, however, it appears as though anticipation 
itself requires that a person anticipate projecting into particular abilities, so that, in this 
anticipation, there are particular abilities which a person can seize. But the authentic 
experience of death, which is supposed to be anticipated, entails that a person 
authentically experience that he projects into no particular abilities. What therefore is to 
be anticipated—the authentic experience of death—resists anticipation itself. 
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 Rather than understanding this problem as a paradox in the idea of a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death, this problem rather should be 
understood as a problem of nonsensicality in the idea of a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death. I called the problem in the concept of authenticity a 
paradox because the concept of authenticity explicitly identifies what cannot be 
identified. However, Heidegger does not explicitly identify anticipation and the authentic 
experience of death, or at least does not explicitly identify them as he explicitly identifies 
a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death and a person’s anticipation of 
his individuality. He brings together anticipation and the authentic experience of death in 
the syntagm “anticipation of death” (Vorlaufen in den Tod or Vorlaufen zum Tode). But if 
anticipation requires the seizure of the projection into particular abilities, and the 
authentic experience of death entails that no particular abilities are projected into, then 
this syntagm is nonsense.  
 
3. Rethinking the concept of authenticity 
I would here like to return to the problem of a paradox in the concept of authenticity, and 
to ask the question whether the concept of authenticity can, in light of the fact that it 
contain a paradox, be rethought in such a way that it is not paradoxical.  
The concept of authenticity identifies a person’s anticipation of the authentic 
experience of death and a person’s anticipation of his individuality; but this is 
paradoxical, insofar as the former anticipation involves a person’s anticipation of 
projecting into no particular abilities, and the latter anticipation involves a person’s 
anticipation of projecting into particular abilities.  
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In order to relieve the concept of authenticity of a paradox, therefore, one must 
either (a) understand a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death in such a 
way that it does not involve the anticipation of the projecting into no particular abilities; 
(b) understand a person’s anticipation of his individuality in such a way that it does not 
involve the anticipation of projecting into particular abilities; (c) understand the concept 
of authenticity in such a way that these two anticipations are not identified with one 
another.  
I will here pursue (a). Clearly, (b) cannot pursued, since one cannot understand a 
person’s anticipation of his individuality without understanding that anticipation as an 
anticipation of a person’s projection into particular abilities—anticipating the projection 
into what is not particular abilities is, after all, the anticipation of the authentic experience 
of death, which is precisely what a person’s anticipation of his individuality is not. And 
(c) cannot be pursued, insofar as the basic intention of the concept of authenticity is to 
identify a person’s anticipation of the authentic experience of death and a person’s 
anticipation of his individuality. While (c) would offer a way of understanding something 
like the concept of authenticity in a non-paradoxical way, it would present a concept too 
dissimilar to the concept of authenticity to qualify plausibly as a rethinking of it.  
What, then, I would like to try to do is to understand a person’s anticipation of the 
authentic experience of death in such a way that it is not the anticipation of a person’s 
projection into no particular abilities. Toward this end, I will follow a specific train of 
thought. One can think of a person’s anticipation of his individuality in connection to a 
person’s relation to the authentic experience of death as though on a spectrum. This 
spectrum will present the possibilities of a person’s anticipating his individuality and, at 
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the same time, his relating, in varying degrees, to the authentic experience of death. At 
one end of the spectrum will be a person who anticipates his individuality with a full 
relation to the authentic experience of death, and, at the other end of the spectrum, will be 
a person who anticipates his individuality with an empty relation to the authentic 
experience of death. And, in the middle of the spectrum, will be a person who anticipates 
his individuality with a moderate relation to the authentic experience of death. In order to 
clarify what I mean, I will describe this spectrum in more detail. I will first present the 
extreme ends, and then the middle. 
1. At one extreme end of the spectrum will be a person who anticipates his 
individuality, while, at the same time, possessing a full relation to the authentic 
experience of death. By this I mean that he will anticipate the authentic experience of 
death. He will seize the fact that he projects into no particular abilities, and, in this 
seizure, he will anticipate his individuality. This end of the spectrum corresponds, 
therefore, to Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. It can be noted, also, that, for this 
reason, by “full relation to the authentic experience of death” I do not mean that 
“absolute” relation to death—being biologically dead. “Death” is here understood 
according to Heidegger’s understanding of death; and so being dead cannot mean being 
biologically dead. Here, then, the “full” relation to the authentic experience of death, is 
the anticipation of the authentic experience of death. 
 2. At the other extreme end of the spectrum will be a person who anticipates his 
individuality, while, at the same time, possessing an empty relation to the authentic 
experience of death. By this I mean that a person will not anticipate the authentic 
experience of death at all, but rather, will ignore it. This other extreme end of the 
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spectrum corresponds, therefore, to Heidegger’s conception of a person’s flight from the 
authentic experience of death, which I discussed in the fifth chapter. As I suggested in the 
fifth chapter, a person is, always, dying; in other words, he is, always, projecting into no 
particular abilities. However, this can be authentically experienced—a person can 
explicitly and transparently understand himself as projecting into no particular abilities—
or, on the other hand, this authentic experience can be fled from—a person can resist 
explicitly and transparently understanding himself as projecting into no particular 
abilities. This is what I mean by “ignoring” the authentic experience of death. One could 
also say that, at this other extreme end of the spectrum, a person denies the authentic 
experience of death. He goes about life as though he does not die (in the sense that 
Heidegger gives to “death”: this is a kind of immortality, existentially understood). 
 3. Finally, at the middle of the spectrum will be a person who anticipates his 
individuality, while, at the same time, possessing a moderate relation to the authentic 
experience of death. Significantly, this “moderate relation” has no basis in Being and 
Time. It can be understood in the following way. A person has a constant sensitivity to the 
fact that, at any time, his projection into particular abilities can fall apart. This constant 
sensitivity should not be understood as “anticipation”; a person does not “seize” the fact 
that his projection into particular abilities can fall apart. Having a constant sensitivity to 
the fact that, any time, his projection into particular abilities can fall apart, this person can 
still go on with his life; in other words, he is still able to project into particular abilities. 
He only relates to his projection into particular abilities with an awareness of their 
fragility.  
 This spectrum provides a possibility of rethinking the concept of authenticity in 
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such a way that it is not paradoxical. Of course, the two extreme ends of the spectrum do 
not provide that possibility. The first extreme end depicts the concept of authenticity 
itself—the authentic person who anticipates the authentic experience of death, and, 
identical to that, anticipates his individuality. This is paradoxical. The other extreme end 
is not paradoxical: a person can seize his individuality, or his projection into particular 
abilities, while ignoring or denying his authentic experience of death. But while this other 
extreme end is not paradoxical, it is not any candidate for rethinking the concept of 
authenticity. At this extreme end, a person ignores his own death. But the concept of 
authenticity means to show how a person can anticipate his individuality while, at the 
same time, relating in an explicit way to the authentic experience of death.  
The middle of the spectrum, on the other hand, does offer a plausible way in 
which to rethink the concept of authenticity. At the middle of the spectrum, a person does 
have an explicit relation to the authentic experience of death. But he does not relate to it 
in the sense that he anticipates it. He does not seize the fact that he projects into no 
particular abilities. Rather, he is sensitive to the fact that he could project into no 
particular abilities. This “could” is not the modal or categorial “could” that describes an 
event that could happen. Rather, this “could” is the “could” that describes a person’s 
abilities: that a person is able, and therefore, can, project into no particular abilities.328 
But sensitive to the fact that he could project into no particular abilities, he, so to speak, 
“goes on living,” in the sense that he does project into particular abilities. However, it is 
because of this sensitivity to the fact that he could project into no particular abilities, that 
this person is able to anticipate his individuality. Sensitive to the fact that he could project """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
328 I discussed this distinction at greater length in the fifth chapter, to which I refer the reader if 
further clarification is needed. 
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into no particular abilities, and therefore sensitive to the fact that his current projection 
into particular abilities could come to an end, he might, for example, relate to his current 
projection into particular abilities in a more meaningful way. After all, they can be lost, 
and what can be lost is more valuable and precious. Understanding he only has finite 
resources—his life—he, so to speak, spends his life wisely. (More could be said about 
this spending one’s life wisely on the basis of the limited resource which is one’s life.) 
Relating to his abilities in a more meaningful way, he has a greater understanding of them 
in their individuality; and he has a determination to choose them, independently, 
individually, and deliberately.  
This middle of the spectrum therefore gives a way to rethink the concept of 
authenticity so that it is not paradoxical. A person does relate, in a substantial way, to the 
authentic experience of death; he is sensitive to the fact that he could project into no 
particular abilities. And this sensitivity is identical to his anticipation of his individuality. 
However, there is no paradox: this person does not anticipate the authentic experience of 
death, and, at the same time, anticipate his individuality, or does not anticipate his 
projection into no particular abilities, and, at the same time, anticipate his projection into 
particular abilities.  
 
 But there are perhaps two reasons not to rethink the concept of authenticity at all, 
that is, to acknowledge that from its paradox there should be no relief. First of all, there is 
the point stressed by the critiques which emphasize the concept of authenticity’s 
dangerous moral and political consequences. The concept of authenticity valorizes the 
authentic experience of death insofar as a person’s anticipation of it is understood to be 
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identical to a person’s anticipation of his individuality. Death is the pathway to 
individuality. However, even when authenticity is rethought in such a way that a person’s 
anticipation of the authentic experience of death is replaced by a person’s sensitivity to 
the authentic experience of death, the authentic experience of death might be, once again, 
valorized. This valorization does not entail, of course, any Todeswunsch. But the 
authentic experience of death still possesses a positive valence: it is sensitivity toward 
death that enables a person to achieve individuality. And if the concept of authenticity 
valorizes death, and if concepts which, faithful to the spirit of the concept of authenticity, 
rethink it, also valorize death, then we might want simply to admit that the concept of 
authenticity is a paradox, and leave it at that. 
 Secondly, there may be a certain problem in the basic idea that in any kind of 
relation to the explicit, authentic experience of death—whether in anticipation, or through 
sensitivity—a person’s anticipation of his individuality is made possible, or, more 
broadly, his ability to be an individual is made possible. It is worth considering whether 
there is a sense in which any kind of relation to the authentic experience of death does 
away with a person’s ability to be an individual. Evidence for this was indicated above, in 
relation to the nonsensicality of the idea of the anticipation of death: how can a person 
seize an authentic experience of death whose very meaning is that he cannot project into 
particular abilities? How can a person, so to speak, make the motions of individuality—
make individual choices, project into particular abilities—in the defacing face of an 
experience whose very meaning is that such motions of individuality cannot be made?  
In this perspective, the authentic experience of death is like the despair of which 
Kierkegaard writes in The Sickness unto Death: it is a person’s being unable to choose to 
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be himself. In this perspective, also, the authentic experience of death is like a kind of 
hell, present, however, as Marlowe’s devil says, here and now. (“Tell me where is the 
place that men call hell?” “In one self place; for where we are is hell, and where hell is 
there must we ever be.”329) The idea, however, that in our relationship to this death-hell—
either in anticipation, or in sensitivity to it—we could better be able to be individuals, 
would therefore appear to be problematic. The problem could be put this way. It does 
injustice to hell, or injustice to death. For it gives to us a power to make of death, in our 
relation to it, something advantageous to us. I can understand this—it is a natural wish to 
make of what is worst what it is not. This is testified, in philosophy, by the spirit of 
reconciliation: finding in negativity something positive. But perhaps this reflects a certain 
blindness toward death, and toward the possibility that it harbors in itself a negativity 
beyond repair. This blindness would be a blindness that darkens the night, in which all 
sorts of things that we could not imagine become visible: 
 
Whichever stone you lift— 
you expose, 
those who require the protection of stones: 
naked, 
they now renew the entanglement.330 
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